








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Zhu, D. (2006). Essays on financial structure and macroeconomic performance. CentER, Center for Economic
Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
 
 
Essays on Financial Structure 




Essays on Financial Structure 












ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit 
van Tilburg, op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof.dr. F.A. 
van der Duyn Schouten, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten 
overstaan van een door het college voor promoties aan-
gewezen commissie in de aula van de Universiteit op 
 










PROMOTOR:          Prof.Dr. Harry Huizinga  











































               —— 孔子 
 
Acknowledgements
The work presented here is the output of my Ph.D. study at Tilburg Uni-
versity within the framework of a Sino-Dutch joint Ph.D. program. A joint
degree program between the two countries was pioneered eight years ago,
when I, in a first “experiment”, got involved in a joint Master program, dur-
ing the period 1998-2000, in a collaboration between Renmin University of
China and Tilburg University. Then I entered a joint Ph.D. program dur-
ing 1999-2004 of Peking University and Tilburg. Later on, more Chinese
(and Dutch) students and universities got involved, which was evidence of
the strengthened tie between Tilburg and China. Thanks to Dr. Henk van
Gemert, who mainly pushed forward this cooperation path. Without his
capability, patience, and dedication over the years, this type of fruitful co-
operation could not come into existence. I am the first Chinese person at
Tilburg who benefited from his endeavor in bringing about this Sino-Dutch
academic cooperation. The current thesis is a reflection of the advantage of
a joint program lying in the possibility of pooling resources from both sides.
I have to give in giving credit to others, as I must admit that I have been
surrounded by such nice, skillful, and helpful people that any errors can only
be blamed on me.
Most of all, my great thanks go to my supervisor, Harry Huizinga. He
brought me from the gate towards the core of economics research, shaped
the overall direction of my Ph.D. research, and helped me move forward
with investigations in depth. His insightful ideas, sharp economic intuition,
and rigorous way of thinking made each meeting inspiring and stimulating.
His patience, encouragement, and openness offered me continuous strength
to go through difficulties. It is my great honor to be his student and he sets
an example, both professionally and personally, which I will try to emulate
throughout my academic life. Furthermore, Harry is also the co-author of
one paper on which one chapter of the thesis is based, and has in that way
essentially contributed to the thesis.
Henk is not only the joint program coordinator but also my cosupervisor.
His knowledge both of finance and of China, together with his unique west-
erner’s point of view in observing China, helped me in two chapters related
to Chinese issues. Ton van Schaik supervised my work for some time at the
early stage of the thesis, helping with Chapter 4 and the initial development
of the structure of the thesis. I feel indebted to these two people. Harald
Uhlig supervised my first research paper, which turned out to be Chapter
4 of the thesis. He also made my three-month enjoyable stay at Humboldt
University in Berlin possible in 2005, during which he helped to adjust the
directions of the final three chapters. I am thankful for his constant support
and effective help on the thesis.
Several Chinese professors were either conductive to my personal acad-
emic development or helpful for the smooth running of the joint program.
Among others, they are Wang Mengkui, Gong Xiaodong, Wang Haiping,
Chen Yulu, Xu Guangjian, Zou Henfu, Zhu Shanli, Lin Yifu Justin, Gong
Liutang, Li Yang, and Yu Yongding. I show my great respect and apprecia-
tion to them all.
Special thanks go to the other members of the thesis committee: Hans
Blommestein, Sylvester Eijffinger, and Sweder van Wijnbergen. I appreciate
their time and efforts a lot and I am very proud to have them in my commit-
tee. Moreover, I am very much grateful to Li Yang, as distinguished scholar
from China, for his interest in my project and for his willingness to join the
public defence of my thesis in Tilburg.
Most of the thesis was written in Tilburg. I am grateful to CentER
and to the Department of Economics for providing such a challenging, cre-
ative and supporting environment for academic pursuit. There were several
other teachers at Tilburg who helped me in several ways. Among others,
Arthur van Soest, Vasso Ioannidou, Sjak Smulders, Harrie Verbon, Jan Pot-
ters, Frederic Vermeulen, Jenny Ligthart, Lans Bovenberg, Dolf Talman,
Aart de Zeeuw, Lex Meijdam, and Steven Ongena always had their door
open for questions and chats. Jeany Bovenberg helped correct my English of
the thesis, many thanks goes to her.
Daily research becomes more enjoyable if you have officemates and flat-
mates who are kind, encouraging, and ready to help. Sabine and Anne are
surely such kind of officemates and Johannes and Crina such flat-mates. Our
talks on various issues and frequent sharing of feelings are among my nice
memories Tilburg left to me.
I would like to thank my Ph.D. colleagues and friends at Tilburg and in
the Netherlands, with special mention of Charles, Tu Qin, Steffan, Daniel,
Youwei, Yu Yi, Zhaorui, Nanfei, Attila, Isabelle, Yan Kai, Chengdi, Shi Zhen,
Rossella, and Yvonne. They enriched my life at Tilburg and taught me to
keep a balance between study and life. Special thanks also goes to Qunhong,
for your encouragement and understanding.
I am deeply grateful to my family who continuously supportedme through-
out my life. To live far away from my family for Ph.D. studies abroad was
not an easy decision. Over the past years, my parents and sister’s letters
and voices were always the firmest support behind my progress. This thesis
is dedicated to my parents, Zhu Wuyan and Xing Pinxian.
Dantao Zhu




2 Domestic and International Finance: How do they Affect
Consumption Smoothing? 8
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2 Optimal consumption under financial market constraints 14
2.2.3 Derivation of estimating equations . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Data and empirical specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.2 Macroeconomic and domestic financial variables . . . . 17
2.3.3 International financial variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.4 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.1 Smoothing GNP relative to GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.2 Smoothing consumption relative to GNP . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.3 Smoothing consumption relative to GDP . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.4 Quantitative assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5 Discussion and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Financial Structure, Macroeconomic Volatility and Down-
turns: Theory and Evidence 59
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2.2 A firm’s capital structure choice problem . . . . . . . . 65
3.2.3 Aggregate problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2.4 Macroeconomic downturns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2.5 Aggregate output variance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4
3.3 Data and empirical specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.2 Empirical specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4.1 Finance and GDP growth-rate volatility . . . . . . . . 79
3.4.2 Finance and economic downturns . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.5 Discussion and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4 Inequality, Credit Market Imperfections and Segmentation,
and Economic Growth 104
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2.1 Key ingredients of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2.2 Set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2.3 Two extreme cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.2.4 The "formal" credit market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.2.5 The "informal" credit market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.2.6 Coexistence of the "formal" and "informal" credit mar-
kets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.3 Empirical evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.3.1 Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.3.2 The basic model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.3.3 The full model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.4 Discussion and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Appendix to Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5 The Political Economy of Interest Rate Liberalization and a
Chinese Case Study (1980-2004) 147
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.2.1 Interest-rate liberalization debate . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.2.2 Public vs. private interest view of interest-rate regulation152
5.2.3 A closer review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.3.1 Set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.3.2 Regulator’s problem in a closed economy . . . . . . . . 158
5.3.3 Regulator’s problem in an open economy . . . . . . . . 162
5.4 China’s case (1980-2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.4.1 Background: pre-1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.4.2 Institutional features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.4.3 Observations on interest-rate data . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.4.4 Regulated interest rate and biased lending (1980-1996) 171
5.4.5 Trend of interest-rate liberalization (1996-2004) . . . . 176
5.5 Discussion and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Appendix to Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188




This thesis consists of four essays examining how financial structure can af-
fect aspects of an economy’s macroeconomic performance such as economic
growth, macroeconomic volatility, and consumption smoothing. The impor-
tance of financial development for economic growth has been recognized for a
long time (see Schumpeter, 1912; Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Goldsmith, 1969;
McKinnon, 1973; and Shaw, 1973). In the last 15 years, the literature has
further developed a series of more extensive and in-depth studies on finance-
growth linkages (see survey papers including Pagano, 1993; Levine, 1997;
and Levine, 2004). The common understanding is that a well-functioning fi-
nancial system, among all other channels, facilitates saving mobilization, en-
hances capital allocation efficiency, shifts portfolios towards illiquid and inno-
vative investment, increases economic specialization, and provides a smooth
payment system – all increasing economic efficiency and stimulating eco-
nomic growth. Only recently, however, have researchers started to pay at-
tention to the influences of financial development on macroeconomic per-
formance apart from economic growth, including macroeconomic volatility,
income inequality, and risk sharing. This is clearly an underexplored area of
research.
Financial development is in fact multi-faceted and cannot be simply gen-
eralized. The useful concept of "financial structure" can be defined as the
complex of the financial contracts, markets, institutions, the supervisory and
regulatory system, the rules governing financial system functions, and the
interest-rate structure. Across countries, there is no one-to-one relationship
between financial structure and financial development. For example, in terms
of the debt vs. equity dimension of financial structure, Japan and the U.S.
have a similar level of financial development, yet quite different financial
structures; Mexico and the Netherlands have similar financial structures, yet
quite different degrees of financial development. Consider also the financial
1
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structure of developing countries, compared with that of developed countries
with a similar level of financial development, which is quite often character-
ized by the coexistence of formal and informal financial institutions. It is
therefore necessary to distinguish financial structure from financial develop-
ment and to study financial structure separately. In theory, the deviation
from the Arrow-Debreu world due to the cost of acquiring information and
making transactions creates incentives for the emergence of financial markets
and institutions. It is thus the different types and combinations of informa-
tion and transaction costs that motivate distinct financial contracts, markets,
and institutions, giving rise to the complexity of the financial system. Thus,
balanced components of a financial system are needed for an economy. It
is therefore high on the agenda of economists to develop an analytical ba-
sis that describes the evolution of the financial structure and the conditions
under which different financial structures are better at promoting growth,
maintaining macroeconomic stability, and helping facilitate risk sharing.
The chapters in this thesis are presented as more or less independent es-
says in the field of financial structure and macroeconomics. Chapters 2 and 3
study the effects of the debt vs. equity dimension of the financial structure on
international consumption smoothing and macroeconomic volatility, respec-
tively. Both relationships are understudied in the current literature. Bearing
in mind that informal financial institutions are prevalent in developing coun-
tries, and that policy attitudes towards these institutions are ambiguous,
chapter 4 evaluates the role of informal financial institutions by examining
the economic growth implications of the coexistence of formal-informal fi-
nancial institutions within a specific setting of an unequal society with credit
market imperfections. Chapter 5 examines interest-rate determination as
the optimization choice of the central regulator, whose objective function is
characterized by the regulator’s ideological bias and interest groups’ lobbying
contributions. This set-up, enabling us to study the efficiency implications
of the interest rates with political distortions, is still a relevant description
of some of the transition countries. In the thesis, each of the four essays
contains both a theoretical and an empirical part, varying in the relative
weights. The empirical approaches differ across chapters. Chapters 2 and 3
apply cross-country regressions. Chapter 4 conducts cross-provincial regres-
sions within one particular country. Chapter 5 carries out a country case
study. Due to the theoretical relevance and to the author’s own familiarity,
China, both as a developing and as a transition country, has been chosen as
the country to be investigated in both chapter 4 and chapter 5.
The first two chapters deal with one major dimension of financial struc-
ture, debt vs. equity, and its implications for international risk sharing and
macroeconomic volatility. It is well documented that Anglo-Saxon economies
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have a more market-based financial structure, and that Japan and Germany
have a more bank-based financial structure. The existing literature mainly
studies whether and how financial structure can affect economic growth.
Levine (2002) concludes that financial structure (regarding the prominence of
either debt or equity) does not help to explain long-run economic growth. He
therefore takes a neutral position regarding which financial structure should
be promoted. Others (Allen and Gale, 1999; and Christensen and Drejre,
1998) argue that the sources and types of growth determine which finan-
cial structure best facilitates growth. For developing countries, they argue a
bank-based financial structure is preferred. Few papers, however, study the
effects of the debt vs. equity dimension of financial structure on other issues
of the macroeconomy, such as volatility and consumption smoothing, which
are surely important concerns for macroeconomic policy makers. Sound poli-
cies promoting certain kinds of financial structure need to balance effectively
various macroeconomic objectives. It is therefore necessary to understand the
relationships between financial structure, on the one hand, and risk sharing
and macroeconomic volatility, on the other.
Chapter 2 uses empirical proxies for the domestic development and in-
ternational integration of debt and equity markets to assess the impacts of
financial development and structure on international consumption smooth-
ing. We use a simple theoretical model to illustrate how a representative
consumer smoothes his consumption under a restricted availability of debt
and equity market instruments due to imperfect debt and equity markets.
The model yields testable implications regarding the co-movements of GDP,
GDP and consumption for a given level of domestic or international debt
and equity market development. These implications are then explored us-
ing a variety of empirical proxies for domestic and international debt and
equity market development that are familiar from the empirical literature
on the finance-growth nexus. The empirical results confirm that the extent
to which consumption smoothing is possible in the face of output or GDP
shocks depends importantly on the level of financial development and the
type of financial structure. We find that both domestic and international
aspects of financial development play distinct roles in reducing consumption
variability. Domestic debt market development is more relevant, however, for
reducing consumption variability relative to GNP for OECD member coun-
tries than for non-member countries. Moreover, international debt market
development is more relevant for reducing consumption variability relative to
GNP for non-OECD member countries than for member countries. As to the
role of the financial structure on international risk sharing, we find that debt
and equity have independent roles in reducing the variability of consump-
tion relative to GDP. They are to some extent substitutes in that more of
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one can make up for less of the other, consistent with the theoretical model.
But it goes too far to say that financial structure doesn’t matter for inter-
national consumption smoothing; calculated elasticities suggest that (within
the empirical specifications of this chapter) credit market development is
more potent than equity market development in reducing the variability of
consumption relative to GDP.
Not only can financial development be conducive in smoothing consump-
tion given exogenous shocks to GDP, but also financial factors themselves
could be the sources of GDP volatility. Chapter 3 constructs a simple model
capturing the characteristic differences between debt and equity contracts
to find a particular mechanism describing how financial structure can mat-
ter for macroeconomic volatility and economic downturns. While choosing
the optimal capital structure at the firm level, the entrepreneur balances a
trade-off. Debt financing is cheaper than equity financing (since debt holders
need to verify fewer states), but more debt increases the probability of going
into costly bankruptcy. At the aggregate level, for given negative shocks,
a more bank-based financial structure leads to a higher proportion of firms
going into costly bankruptcies, amplifying the unfavorable situation. The
variance of GDP and the possibility and the extent of the severity of eco-
nomic downturns are therefore larger in an economy with the bank-based
system. Using robust standard errors, the FGLS method, and the Tobit es-
timation technique on a broad cross-country time series data set for various
empirical specifications, this chapter indeed provides evidence that countries
relying more on equity (either in absolute or in relative measures) have lower
variance of GDP, and a lower possibility and less severe economic downturns.
These results are interesting, given that the previous empirical studies accu-
mulatively find mitigating effects of credit market development on volatility
without accounting for equity development indicators. In this chapter, we
find that when stock market capitalization is included in the regression for
growth rate volatility, the credit indicators become insignificant; it is thus
actually equity market development that presents a volatility-reducing role.
Even more striking, regressions explaining economic downturns reveal that
credit actually increases the probability and severity of economic downturns
(in contrast with previous views), whereas a larger equity market remains
conductive to reducing the chance and extent of downturns. Chapters 2 and
3, together with the existing literature on financial structure and economic
growth, show that particular financial structures could have different direc-
tions of effects on various macroeconomic objectives. Since policy makers
usually face a broader set of macroeconomic policy objectives, they quite
often need to weight various macroeconomic objectives in order to set proper
policies towards promoting certain kind of financial structure.
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The remaining two chapters of the thesis add to the traditional finance-
growth literature, but emphasize two understudied aspects of financial struc-
ture and their implications for economic efficiency and growth. One is the
coexistence of formal and informal financial institutions; the other is the
interest-rate structure, including interest-rate spread, loan interest-rate dif-
ferences, etc. Notably, the background and mechanisms analyzed in these
two chapters are more country-specific and not appropriate for economies in
general. First, since informal financial institutions are especially prevalent
in developing countries, the chapter studying the formal-informal financial
structure is especially relevant for developing countries. Secondly, a for-
mer central-planning economy normally regulates interest rates tightly for
its ideological and central-planning purposes, resulting in an interest-rate
determination mechanism that is different from the regular market economy.
Since even nowadays some of the transition economies are still saddled with
the legacy of the central-planning system, the chapter studying interest-rate
structure (assuming interest rates are set by central regulator) is more per-
tinent to transitional economies. Due to these two chapters studying issues
with more specific backgrounds, unlike the former two chapters using cross-
country empirical regressions, China, both as a developing and a transition
economy, is chosen as the subject for empirical investigations in these two
chapters.
Chapter 4 studies one dimension of financial structure — the coexistence
of formal and informal financial institutions, and its efficiency and economic
growth implications. This chapter particularly examines how, in an unequal
society with information asymmetry in financial markets, the existence of in-
formal financial institutions could be an endogenous response of the agents.
The key argument is as follows. The agents differ in terms of their ini-
tial capital level. They have access to credit markets to borrow, or lend
in order to invest at an optimal level. When there are information asym-
metries in the credit market, the presence of limited liability of borrowers
imparts a preference for risk among borrowers. This is exactly the source of
moral hazard. Two types of financial institutions intermediate savings be-
tween borrowers and lenders: modern commercial banks and informal credit
institutions. Banks rely on collateral in order to provide incentives for bor-
rowers not to engage in moral hazard behaviors. Because of their proximity
to the borrowers, the informal financial institutions could directly monitor
the projects undertaken at a certain cost. We call it the "informal" credit
market, since the model basically characterizes its features close to what is
happening in reality. Given the "formal" credit market, the informal one
emerges endogenously: if only a formal credit market exists, for example,
then there must be some agents (characterized by the initial capital levels)
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having incentives to enter into the informal credit markets. In equilibrium,
the poorest segment of the agents relies on the informal market for borrowing;
agents with medium wealth levels have access to the formal credit market for
borrowing, but the relatively poorer segment of these medium wealth indi-
viduals are "financially constrained"; rich agents are lenders and self-finance
their projects. The empirical part of this chapter uses cross-province data
of China to check the relationship between initial inequality and growth.
The robust negative relationship between inequality and growth is pinned
down. Moreover, the policy dummy variable signalling the permission of the
informal credit market presents a positive sign, which is to a certain extent
consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model. The main message
conveyed by chapter 4 is the following. Since both kinds of financial institu-
tions favor or disfavor certain segments of the agents, the coexistence of the
formal and informal credit institutions could combine the advantages of the
two institutions, thereby enhancing efficiency and economic growth. Policy-
makers in developing countries should therefore be cautious when designing
policy for informal financial institutions.
One particular dimension of financial structure is the interest-rate struc-
ture, which has previously been studied more often from purely economic
perspectives. Chapter 5 of this thesis takes a political economic approach
to construct a lobbying model to explain positively why the interest rate
could be set differently from the market-clearing level, and why the existing
interest-rate structure could be a result of a political economy equilibrium.
The model shows how these observations on the interest rate could follow
from the choice of the regulator, who maximizes his/her social welfare objec-
tive function taking into consideration both an ideological bias toward certain
sectors (in the model, it is the state-owned enterprises) and lobbying contri-
butions. The model thus offers useful insights in explaining the depressed
level of the interest rate, the size of the interest-rate spread, the interest-rate
bias towards a certain sector (here, the state-owned enterprises), and the
pace and sequence of interest-rate liberalization. The political distortions
consequently induce welfare and efficiency deadweight losses, because, for in-
stance, the state-owned enterprises with relatively low productivity efficiency
get more than the socially optimal amount of credits. Applying this model
to China for the periods between 1980 to 2004, we find that the interest
groups’ lobbying activity and ideological bias are forces behind the delayed
Chinese interest-rate liberalization. Over time, the dynamic changes of the
characteristics of interest groups and the regulator’s ideology shift, together
with the partial financial opening in China shaking the previous political
equilibrium, can largely account for the recent trend of Chinese interest-
rate liberalization and the enhancement of economic efficiency. The main
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messages conveyed by this chapter are the following. First, the normative
analysis of interest-rate structure based on purely economic reasons is not
sufficient. Interest-rate regulation and liberalization have significant distrib-
utive effects; positive analyses using a political economy approach are thus re-
warding. This is especially true for transition economies. Second, the extent
to which the political economic equilibrium of interest-rate structure favors
or disfavors certain players depends on the political and economic strength
of the players. The underlying relative strength change can shake the previ-
ous political economic equilibrium of interest-rate structure and can contain
economic efficiency implications. Third, over the past two decades, China
has shown itself to be a transition economy with a central planning legacy.
Her biased and low interest-rate levels, low interest-rate spread, and lagged
pace and particular path of interest-rate liberalization can be explained, to
a large extent, by a political economic model.
Taken together, the essays presented in the thesis collectively attempt
to deepen the understanding of the determination and adaptation of the
financial structure, and to widen the research scope of the impacts of finan-
cial structure on aspects of macroeconomic performance including economic
growth, macroeconomic volatility, and consumption smoothing. In conveying
practical messages, the thesis is offered as a tool to be used by policy-makers
to set proper financial structure policies in the years to come.
Chapter 2
Domestic and International
Finance: How do they Affect
Consumption Smoothing?
2.1 Introduction
In tandem with the development of a range of proxies for financial mar-
ket development, researchers have addressed several aspects of the financial
development-growth nexus (see Levine, 1996, for an early survey). A main
question is whether financial structure, i.e. the relative development of debt
and equity markets, matters for growth. The answer, as suggested by Levine
(2002), is that financial structure matters relatively little, as the two types of
financial market development to some extent are substitutes. More recently,
several papers have addressed whether there is a distinct role for interna-
tional financial integration as proxied by either international capital flow or
stock variables in explaining growth. The available evidence does not find
clear and robust support for the idea that international financial integra-
tion boosts economic growth (see Edison, Levine, Ricci and Slok, 2002; and
Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose, 2003), although some studies suggest that dif-
ferent types of international financial integration may have different growth
effects (see De Mello, 1999; and Reisen and Soto, 2001). Edison et al. (2002)
particularly find that the growth effect of domestic bank or stock market
development dominates that of international financial integration, if any.
Relative to the financial development-growth nexus, the link between fi-
0This chapter is coauthored by Harry Huizinga and it first appeared as “Domestic and
International Finance: How do they Affect Consumption Smoothing?”, CEPR working
paper 4677 (Huizinga and Zhu, 2004).
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nancial development and consumption smoothing has received little attention
in the empirical literature. Theoretical contributions (see Obstfeld and Ro-
goff, 1998, Chapter 5; Sorensen and Yosha, 1998; and Baxter and Crucini,
1995) have laid out that the feasibility of international consumption smooth-
ing depends crucially on the existence and tradeability of debt and equity
instruments. The tradeability of equity, specifically, should allow economies
to swap equity shares, or claims to output as proxied by GDP, with the result
of smoothing both national income, or GNP, and consumption. The trade-
ability of debt claims, in turn, enables economies to adjust their consumption
streams in the face of temporary output shocks that remain despite equity
trading. Debt and equity market development hence are expected to be em-
pirically important in explaining the variability of consumption smoothing
across countries. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed em-
pirical investigation of how in fact financial market development affects the
ability to smooth consumption at the national level. A range of empirical
proxies for debt and equity market development and efficiency, familiar from
the growth literature, are used for this purpose.
Private agents, with few exceptions, only deal with domestic banks and
other financial institutions. If so, international consumption smoothing can
only come about through the international interaction of financial institu-
tions. Banks, for instance, may choose to offset their aggregate transactions
with their domestic retail customers by entering the international interbank
deposit market. Similarly, domestic equity market institutions (brokerage
houses, exchanges, clearing and settlement institutions) generally are in-
volved in any transaction that changes a country’s portfolio equity balance.
This suggests that both domestic financial market development and finan-
cial market integration are necessary to bring about effective international
consumption smoothing. Parallel to the finance and growth literature, this
chapter tests for the independent effects of both aspects of overall finan-
cial development. International financial market integration is measured by
several gross or net debt and equity balances from the capital account of
the balance of payments and, alternatively, by dummy variables indicating
whether a particular net balance item is positive.
In overall economic development, domestic financial development can be
expected to precede international financial integration. The reason is that
international financial integration, mostly resulting from the international
interaction of financial institutions, presupposes the existence of these (do-
mestic) financial institutions. The existence of an international interbank
deposit market, for instance, requires the existence of banking institutions
that are active in individual countries. This suggests that for countries just
entering international financial markets the bottleneck factor will indeed be
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the level of international integration of domestically active financial institu-
tions. At higher levels of economic development, there already is some level of
international financial integration and, relatively speaking, domestic financial
market development becomes more of a bottleneck factor. To see why this is
the case, note that even in rich countries a high percentage of households does
not have substantial financial assets and only a limited borrowing capacity.
Hence, even in rich countries many households can do little to contribute
to their own consumption smoothing. For these individuals, there thus can
only be international consumption smoothing through their "participation"
in national tax and transfer systems. This suggests that for rich economies
the bottleneck in bringing about better international consumption smooth-
ing will be domestic financial development. Our sample includes developed
and developing countries. This allows us to test whether different aspects
of financial development are important for countries at different levels of
economic development in furthering international consumption smoothing.
As indicated, on the basis of the theory we expect equity market devel-
opment to help smooth GNP relatively to GDP. Debt market development
subsequently helps to smooth consumption relative to GNP, while debt and
equity market development together contribute to smoothing consumption
relative to GDP. Based on these three relationships, the chapter presents
three sets of empirical results.
Regarding the first relationship, we find that proxies for domestic equity
market development, in particular the ratio of stock market capitalization to
GDP and stock market turnover, are important in smoothing GNP relative to
GDP for the overall world sample. However, we find no role for our measures
of international equity market integration, in particular gross and net stocks
of FDI and portfolio equity investments, to explain GNP smoothing. The
bottleneck factor thus appears to be domestic equity market development,
as this explains differences in GNP variability relatively well in the world
sample. Domestic equity market development has a similar role in reducing
GNP variability for developed and developing countries separately. The role
of international financial market integration, as measured by FDI stocks,
however, is different for the two sets of countries. FDI exposure appears
to contribute to GNP smoothing for developing countries, but it perversely
increases GNP variability for developed countries. This may reflect that
the FDI flows of rich countries are intended to capitalize on these countries’
technological and other strengths and in practice are bad hedges against
output shocks.
Our proxies for domestic debt market development, i.e. measures of bank
credit and overall liquid assets relative to GDP and the bank interest spread,
and our proxies for international debt market integration, i.e. gross and net
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stocks of bank intermediated debts and other debt instruments, all perform
well in explaining the smoothing of consumption relative to GNP. Interest-
ingly, domestic debt market integration is found to be more important in
smoothing consumption for developed countries, and vice versa. This sug-
gests that for developed countries, with well-established international links
between financial institutions, domestic debt market integration is the bot-
tleneck factor.
Finally, we examine the joint role of debt and equity market development
in explaining consumption smoothing in the face of GDP shocks. For this
purpose, domestic debt market development is measured by bank credit rel-
ative to GDP, while domestic equity market development is measured by the
stock market capitalization relative to GDP. International debt and equity
market integration now are measured as gross debt and equity balances rel-
ative to GDP. We find that debt and equity market development have an
independent role in explaining consumption smoothing. In fact, debt and
equity market development appear to be substitutes in that a lack of one
can be made up by more of the other. Moreover, the effectiveness of, say,
debt market development to smooth consumption relative to GDP decreases
in the extent of equity market development, and vice versa. On the basis
of the estimated coefficients, we can compute the implied elasticities of the
variability of consumption with respect to debt and equity market develop-
ment. Comparing these elasticities, we see a larger role for debt markets
in smoothing consumption than for equity markets. Domestic debt market
development continues to be relatively important for developed countries.
In previous work, Van Wincoop (1994) has shown that international risk
sharing can bring non-negligible welfare gains. Asdrubali, Sorensen and
Yosha (1996) use a decomposition of variance to compute the relative impor-
tance of equity market development (which smooths GNP relative to GDP)
and debt market development (which smooths consumption relative to GNP).
Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha (2002) show that risk sharing from international
cross-ownership of assets, as measured by the smoothing of GNP, is higher
in countries that hold a higher amount of foreign equity relative to GDP.
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002) find that capital account openness
has smaller effects on consumption smoothing than equity market liberal-
ization. Melitz and Zumer (1999) show that in the long run credit plays a
smaller role relative to claims on property in risk sharing between countries.
Becker and Hoffmann (2003) extend Asdrubali et al. (1996) to a dynamic
setting and find that transitory shocks can be smoothed away to a greater
extent than permanent shocks because market incompleteness may render
permanent shocks a lot harder to insure. Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003)
show that the risk-sharing and consumption smoothing benefits of financial
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integration appear to accrue only beyond a certain "threshold" level of finan-
cial openness. Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001) find that a higher level of
development of the domestic financial sector is associated with lower output
volatility. However, their concern is how domestic financial development can
affect output volatility rather than consumption smoothing. Relative to these
papers, the contribution of this chapter is to examine simultaneously the do-
mestic and international aspects of debt and equity market development in
bringing about consumption smoothing.
The next section presents the underlying theoretical model. Section 2.3
describes the data and empirical specifications. Section 2.4 presents and
interprets the empirical results. The final section concludes.
2.2 The model
This section lays out the theoretical framework that underlies the later em-
pirical work. There is a representative agent who adjusts his consumption
path in the face of domestic output shocks subject to financial market im-
perfections. Both debt and equity markets exist, but market imperfections
imply that the agent can only smooth consumption partially through the use
of debt and equity instruments.
2.2.1 Assumptions
At the beginning of period t = 1, 2, ...., the representative agent receives a
random output, denoted GDPt, generated from a "goods tree". This output
is the sum of a fixed value ȳ and a random component εt as follows
GDPt = ȳ + εt (2.1)
The temporary random shock {εt : t = 1, 2, ...} is an i.i.d. sequence with
E(εt) = 0 and V ar(εt) = σ21.
The representative individual chooses the optimal consumption level ct








1Our framework abstracts from the distinction between temporary and permanent
shocks considered in Becker and Hoffman (2003).
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where β is a discount factor taken to be equal to 1
1+r
with r being the inter-
national interest rate. Further, we take the utility function to be quadratic
with u(c) = c− a0
2
c2.
In principle, both equity and debt markets are available to enable the
consumer to smooth his consumption path. Equity markets allow the indi-
vidual to diversify away part of the risk associated with domestic output by
selling shares to foreigners (in exchange for riskless foreign debt instruments
or a diversified, riskless foreign share portfolio). After the shock is known,
the individual may wish to borrow or lend internationally to the extent that
he has not already diversified away the risk associated with domestic output.
Market imperfections are assumed to limit in practice the extent to which the
individual can transact in international equity and debt markets. Straight-
forwardly, the individual would like to sell all the equity in the domestic
goods tree to obtain perfect income certainty. In practice, we assume that
only a share αs (0 5 αs 5 1) of desired (total) equity sales can be realized.
Similarly, we will assume that only a share αc (0 5 αc 5 1) of the desired
borrowing or lending (after the shock is known) can be realized. Desired lend-
ing or borrowing is below shown to be a simple share of the output shock
(with imperfect equity markets). Rather than as a share of desired lending
or borrowing, the limitation on borrowing could thus easily be rephrased as
a share of the observable output shock.
The literature has advanced several reasons why perfect risk sharing
through equity and debt markets, domestic or international, in reality is
not possible (see Lewis, 1999, for a survey). These include, among others,
contract writing costs (Levine, 1997), the non-tradeability of goods (Tesar,
1993), the existence of non-tradeable wealth such as human capital (Lewis,
1999), restrictions on the ownership of foreign assets that can take the form of
taxes on repatriated earnings (Lewis, 1996), asymmetric information regard-
ing the productivity of assets (Brennan and Cao, 1997), incomplete markets
due to imperfect contract enforcement (Kehoe and Perri, 2002), and the in-
centive effects associated with selling equity to outside international investors
(Eijffinger and Wagner, 2001). Factors of this kind limit domestic financial
market development as well as international financial integration and, indi-
rectly, a country’s ability to smooth consumption through international debt
and equity markets. In this chapter, we do not spell out the precise mi-
cro foundations of the restriction parameters αs and αc. In the subsequent
empirical work, however, we will take empirical proxies for equity and debt
market development and international integration also to be proxies for the
equity and debt transaction restriction parameters.
Chapter 2. Finance and Consumption Smoothing 14
2.2.2 Optimal consumption under financial market con-
straints
With actual equity sales to foreigners equal to the maximum possible, it is
seen that domestic national income, or GNP, is given by
GNPt = rAt−1 + ȳ + (1− αs)εt (2.3)
where At−1 is the country’s net foreign asset position at the beginning of
period t before any equity trading2.
Taking into account equity market diversification, we can write the con-
















)τ−t(ȳ + (1− αs)ετ )
)
(2.4)
The consumer determines his consumption - and implicitly his international
borrowing and lending - so as to maximize lifetime utility subject to the post-
diversification intertemporal budget constraint. This yields the following
familiar Euler equation,
Et {u0(cs)} = (1 + r)βEt {u0(cs+1)} (2.5)
for s >= t. This implies ct = Etcs for s > t, as (1+r)β = 1. Recognizing the
budget constraint, we can now derive the optimal consumption, c∗t , if there
were no debt market imperfection or c∗t = ȳ + rAt−1 +
r
1+r
(1− αs)εt . Corre-
spondingly, we can derive the optimal lending (or borrowing, if negative) in






As only a fraction αc of these desired credit market transactions can be





So the actual consumption, ct, different from desired consumption, c
∗
t ,
can be seen to be given by




2Note that GNP ignores capital gains or losses on the net foreign asset position as
discussed by Obstfeld (2004).
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The dynamics of GNP, consumption and the net foreign asset position
can now be derived as follows




ct − ct−1 = (1− αs)[(1−
αc
1 + r





These variables in first difference are seen to be stationary.
2.2.3 Derivation of estimating equations
In this subsection, we derive the estimating equations that relate the co-
variability of GDP, GNP and consumption to empirical proxies of domestic
financial development and international financial integration. To start, the
three covariances among GDPt and GNPt, GNPt and ct, and GDPt and ct
- all in first differences - can be obtained as follows,















Next, we can derive the following theoretical least-squares regression
equations:
GNPt −GNPt−1 = b1(GDPt −GDPt−1) (2.11)
ct − ct−1 = b2(GNPt −GNPt−1) (2.12)
ct − ct−1 = b3(GDPt −GDPt−1) (2.13)
with the three coefficients b1, b2 and b3 given by,
b1 =
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b2 =
Cov(GNPt −GNPt−1, ct − ct−1)
V ar(GNPt −GNPt−1)
=
2(1− αc) + r1+rα2c











To interpret the coefficients, first note that b1, b2 and b3 all depend on the
interest rate r. To see why, note that a higher interest r increases the return
to savings out of GNPt−1, thereby making GNPt more responsive to εt−1.
This reduces the co-variation between differenced GNP and differenced GDP
as well as b1. At the same time, we see that lending Lt is negatively related
to the interest rate r in (2.6) (as at a higher interest rate smaller savings
are required to guarantee a higher level of consumption in the future). At a
higher interest rate, actual lending thus becomes less responsive to the output
shock εt and at the same time consumption becomes more responsive to this
shock. This increases the covariances between the differenced consumption
and GNP, and between the differenced consumption and GDP - leading to
higher coefficients b2 and b3. The role of the interest rate in this model,
to wit, reflects its discrete-time nature, with only periodic adjustment of
consumption to output shocks. With smaller periods, the relevant interest
rate between periods would become smaller as well. If we let the interest
rate go to zero, it can be seen that b1 collapses to 1 − αs, that b2 collapses
to 1 − αc, and that b3 collapses to (1 − αc)(1 − αs). Regardless of whether
the interest rate is taken to be zero in the limit, the role of the restriction
parameters αs and αc in determining b1, b2 and b3 is now apparent. A less
stringent equity market restriction - or higher αs - reduces the "regression
coefficient" b1, while a less stringent debt market restriction - or higher αc
- reduces the "regression coefficient" b2. Finally, higher values of αs and αc





> 0, which means that - with
a higher level of the equity market restriction parameter - the effect of a
higher debt market restriction parameter in reducing the covariance between
consumption and GDP is smaller (and vice versa).
Next, we note that the restriction parameters αs and αc are not directly
observable. However, we can assume that they are related to observable
measures for equity and credit market development, denoted S and C, by
αs = βsS and αc = βcC. The restriction parameters αs and αc can change
over time, as S and C vary over time. Substituting period t values for αc and
αs and suppressing the interest rate, we get
GNPt −GNPt−1 = GDPt −GDPt−1 − βsSt(GDPt −GDPt−1) (2.14)
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ct − ct−1 = GNPt −GNPt−1 − βcCt(GNPt −GNPt−1) (2.15)
ct−ct−1 = GDPt−GDPt−1−βcCt(GDPt−GDPt−1)−βsSt(GDPt−GDPt−1)+
+βcβsCtSt(GDPt −GDPt−1) (2.16)
After adding a constant and error terms, we obtain the benchmark re-
gression equations underlying the empirical work in the next section. A
variety of proxies for domestic equity market development and international
equity market integration will be used for St, while a variety of domestic
and international debt market indicators will be used to represent Ct. In the
empirical work, growth rates rather than first differences of the GDP, GNP
and consumption variables will be used.
2.3 Data and empirical specifications
2.3.1 Data
The data on GDP, GNP, consumption and domestic financial development
cover 210 countries from 1960 to 2001, while there are international financial
variables for 67 countries during 1970-1998. This section briefly describes the
data used in this study. Variable definitions and data sources are provided
in appendix.
2.3.2 Macroeconomic and domestic financial variables
GDPg, GNPg, CONSg are defined as the annual growth rates of per capita
GDP, GNP, and final consumption expressed in terms of constant local cur-
rencies3. Domestic financial variables are proxies for domestic debt and eq-
uity market development. Two stock market development indicators are used
as measures of domestic stock market size and efficiency. They are the mar-
ket capitalization of listed companies as a percent of GDP (MCap) and stock
market turnover relative to market capitalization (Turn). There are five do-
mestic credit market development indicators: domestic credit to the private
sector as a percent of GDP (CredPriv), domestic credit provided by the bank-
ing sector as a percent of GDP (CredBank), liquid liabilities as a percent of
3Local currencies are chosen since we are interested in countries’ growth rates rather
than international level comparisons.
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GDP (M3), and the bank interest rate spread (Spread). They characterize
the size (CredPriv, CredBank), liquidity (M3 ) and efficiency (Spread) of the
domestic credit market.
2.3.3 International financial variables
The international financial variables are indices of international equity and
debt market integration. All of these variables are based on financial stock
variables from the balance of payments. Stock variables summarize a coun-
try’s past involvement in international financial markets and are taken to be
indices of potential current international financial activity in pursuit of con-
sumption smoothing as well. To represent international equity integration,
there are three variables: the gross stock of foreign direct investment assets
and liabilities as a percent of GDP (FDI ), the gross stock of the portfolio
equity assets and liabilities as a percent of GDP (PortEq), and the sum of
the previous two, i.e. the gross international equity stock as a percent of
GDP (TotEq). These variables are obtained from estimates by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
To obtain variables to represent international debt market integration,
we need to use data from several sources. Again represented as the sums of
national assets and liabilities, i.e. as gross variables, we have three variables
for rich countries: gross non-portfolio debt (mostly bank debt) as a percent
of GDP (IntBank), gross portfolio debt as a percent of GDP (PortDebt),
and, finally, the sum of the previous two, i.e., gross total debt as a percent
of GDP (TotDebt). For poor countries, we can obtain two analogues of the
rich-country TotDebt by taking the sum between one series of national debt
liability4 (from the OECD) and two alternative estimated series of debt assets
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001), leading to the TotDebt and TotDebt
0
series
for poor countries. After combining with rich-country data, we obtain the
TotDebt and TotDebt
0
series for the world as a whole.
Gross stock variables are indices of total market activity. Higher gross
stocks thus may give rise to volume-based, lower transaction costs in inter-
national financial markets, which would be a sign of higher financial market
integration. Gross stock variables, by construction, give equal weight to na-
tional financial assets and liabilities. However, it is reasonable to assume that
4For debt liability data, we in fact have two measures avaliable, constructed differently.
OECD data rely mainly on the creditor-reporting system and refers primarily to debt by a
country’s residents, regardless of the currency of denomination. World Bank data relies on
a debtor-reporting system and focuses primarily on foreign-currency denominated debt.
Not surprisingly, the World Bank numbers are smaller than OECD numbers. We use the
broader OECD data as out debt liability measure.
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countries with a positive net foreign asset position in, say, bank deposits can
more easily smooth their consumption than countries with a negative net
asset position, as it may be easier to draw down positive balances than to
increase negative balances. To reflect this, we also construct analogous net
stock variables, measured as national assets minus liabilities for the relevant
financial instrument category. These net stock variables clearly are contin-
uous variables. However, it may be important whether a country is a net
asset or liability holder rather than how large these net assets or liabilities
are. To reflect this, we also construct net stock dummy variables that take
on a value of 1 if the country is a net asset holder in a particular instrument
category and zero otherwise.
2.3.4 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for all the variables. Next, Table 2.2A
gives the correlation coefficients among the GDPg, GNPg, CONSg variables.
It is seen that the correlation coefficients between GDPg and GNPg are close
to one. The correlation coefficients between GDPg and GNPg on the one
hand and CONSg on the other are both shown to be a bit above 0.5. Table
2.2B gives the correlation coefficients among the financial variables, with the
international financial variables measured in gross stock terms. The financial
variables tend to be significantly correlated with the expected signs. Coun-
tries with large domestic debt markets (high CredPriv and CredBank), for
instance, tend to have highly liquid financial markets (highM3 andM3_M1 )
and a high efficiency (low Spread). Turning to the international equity vari-
ables, we see that countries with high gross FDI stocks also tend to have
high gross portfolio equity stocks, which suggests that these modes of equity
finance are complements rather than substitutes. Not surprisingly, the two
total international debt measures (TotDebt and TotDebt
0
) are highly posi-
tively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.923. We see, however, that
the TotEq and TotDebt variables display a weak negative correlation, while
TotEq and TotDebt’ display only a weak positive relation. Also note that
the domestic debt variables tend to be positively correlated with the interna-
tional debt variables and the same holds for the equity variables. Domestic
and international financial development, not surprisingly, thus tend to move
in tandem.
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2.4 Empirical results
This section presents three sets of regression results. First, we examine how
equity market development affects the co-movement of GNP and GDP based
on specification (2.14). Second, we consider how debt market development
affects the co-movement of consumption and GNP based on specification
(2.15). Finally, the impact of equity and debt market development on the
co-movement of consumption and GDP is considered along the lines of spec-
ification (2.16). For all three sets of regressions as discussed in three sub-
sections, we first take the worldwide sample and subsequently the samples
of OECD and non-OECD countries separately. For each sample, the im-
pact of domestic and international financial variables is considered in turn
given that these tend to be substantially positively correlated as seen in Ta-
ble 2.2B. Subsection 2.4.2 in addition considers the joint impact of domestic
and international debt market development on the relationship between con-
sumption and GNP to check whether in fact they can be shown to have a
distinct impact. Subsection 2.4.4, finally, assesses the quantitative impact of
domestic and international finance on the co-movements of GDP, GNP and
consumption as implied by the estimated regression coefficients.
Throughout, we correct for possible heteroscedasticity across country pan-
els and autocorrelation over time within a panel. Specifically, we allow for
AR(1) autocorrelation which is specific for each country in the panel data
set, while between countries we assume heteroskedasticy5. Estimation is by
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS).
2.4.1 Smoothing GNP relative to GDP
The regressions of GNP growth on GDP growth are based on specification
(2.14). Table 2.3 shows the results for the worldwide sample. Panel A is
based on domestic equity market variables, while Panels B through D con-
tain the international equity market variables in gross, net and dummy form,
respectively. In Table 2.3A, stock market capitalization and turnover ra-
tio enter the regressions separately with negative and significant coefficients,
which suggests that both domestic stock market size and efficiency are con-
ducive to smoothing GNP relative to GDP. Moreover, capitalization and
5We do not specify cross-sectional correlation because in order to consider this possi-
bility we must have at least as many time periods as there are panels in the dataset, which
is not the case. We attentively applied robust standard error methods with clustering of
countries, which specifies that error terms are independent across countries but correlated
within a country with similar, unreported results.
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stock market turnover jointly enter into a regression with negative signs as
well, demonstrating to some extent that stock market size and efficiency ac-
tually play distinct roles. In Tables 2.3B through 2.3D, international equity
market integration indicators - in gross, net, and dummy forms - appear
to be unimportant for the smoothing of GNP relatively to GDP with the
exception that the net dummy variable for equity (TotEq) enters negatively,
to suggest that a positive net equity positive position is good for smoothing
GNP relative to GDP.
Table 2.4 presents results analogous to Table 2.3 but based on a sample
of only OECD member countries6. Domestic stock market size and efficiency
play similar roles in Table 2.4A for OECD countries as for the world as a
whole. Turning to the international variables, we see that gross FDI and
PortEq enter simultaneously with a negative and positive coefficients in Ta-
ble 2.4B. In net and dummy forms, the international equity variables enter
with positive significant coefficients in several instances in Tables 2.4C and
2.4D. Overall, this suggests that equity investments of rich countries do not
contribute to smoothing GNP relative to GDP. This is consistent with Lane
(2001) who finds that cross-holdings of foreign assets and liabilities more
broadly fail to smooth GNP relative to GDP for OECD countries. These
finding could reflect that in practice international equity investments from
rich countries serve to exploit national technological and other advantages,
while international equity portfolio diversification may only be of secondary
importance in the selection of international portfolio investments.
For the non-OECD countries in Table 2.5, the domestic equity variables,
i.e. stock market capitalization and turnover, play a similar role in smooth-
ing GNP relative to GDP as in the world sample, as both variables enter
the regressions in Table 2.5A with negative and significant coefficients. Simi-
larly to the world sample, international equity market integration indicators,
measured in gross terms, do no appear to significantly reduce GNP shocks
relative to GDP shocks. However, when measured in net and dummy terms,
higher FDI appears to contribute to GDP smoothing for the poor countries
in Tables 2.5C and 2.5D. For non-OECD countries, FDI thus appears to
bring diversification advantages, as the implied activities (in part resulting
from inward FDI) may be sufficiently distinct from domestic activities (not
related to FDI).
6We use the latest OECD member country list including the following 30 countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep., Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
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2.4.2 Smoothing consumption relative to GNP
In this subsection, we present regressions of consumption growth on GNP
growth along the line of (2.15). Table 2.6 presents the results for the world
as a whole. In Table 2.6A, the various domestic debt market development
indicators enter into regressions of consumption growth on GNP growth with
negative and significant coefficients, except for the interest rate spread which
enters with a positive but not statistically significant coefficient. So larger
domestic debt markets (measured by higher CredPriv and CredBank) and
more liquid ones (higherM3 ) appear to contribute to smoothing consumption
relatively to GNP. Turning to the international debt indicators TotDebt and
TotDebt
0
, we see in Tables 2.6B through 2.6D that they enter negatively re-
gardless of whether they are in gross, net or dummy form, with statistically
significant coefficients (apart from the net TotDebt variable). Specifically,
the negative and significant signs for the TotDebt and TotDebt
0
variables in
dummy form suggest that countries with positive net foreign debt assets can
more easily smooth their consumption in the face of GNP shocks than coun-
tries with negative net foreign debt assets. This makes sense as it should be
much easier to draw down a positive bank deposit balance or to liquidate
a net position in bonds than to borrow money from banks or through the
flotation of bonds in the international capital market. Specifically, the liqui-
dation of positive debt balances may be quicker and require lower transaction
costs7.
Table 2.7 presents the results for OECD countries. Now in Table 2.7A, all
domestic debt market variables enter the regressions with significant coeffi-
cients, with the expected negative signs for CredPriv, CredBank, andM3, and
a positive sign for Spread. For rich countries, domestic debt market develop-
ment thus is important in explaining international variation in the smoothing
of consumption relative to GNP. Turning to the international debt variables,
we now have the CredPriv, CredBank variables in addition to a TotDebt vari-
able. For the gross variables, we see that all three enter with negative and
significant coefficients in Table 2.7B when entered by themselves. Negative
coefficients also are shown in several instances in Tables 2.7C and 2.7D with
the net and dummy variables. For OECD countries, international debt inte-
gration thus appears to make a contribution to the smoothing of consumption
to GNP as well.
Next, for non-OECD countries in Table 2.8 all of the domestic debt mar-
7Note that transaction costs may imply that the net-of-cost interest rate received on
positive debt balances is less than the cost-inclusive interest rate to be paid on negative
debt balances. This could lead to a more rapid liquidation of positive balances than
build-up of negative balances, but the oppositive should be true as well.
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ket development again enter with negative coefficients, apart from Spread
that enters with a positive coefficient. Two of these variables CredBank and
M3, however, fail to have coefficients that are statistically significant. Thus
the evidence that domestic debt market development matters for non-OECD
countries is somewhat weaker than it is for OECD countries. Turning to the
international variables TotDebt and TotDebt 0, we see that these enter with
negative and significant coefficients in Tables 2.8B through 2.8D. Hence, the
evidence that international debt market integration is important for smooth-
ing consumption relative to GNP is particularly strong for poor countries.
Finally, it is interesting to include both domestic and international debt
variables in the regression to examine their relative importance in smooth-
ing consumption relative to GNP. Analogous to (2.13), we can assume that
domestic agents consecutively have to overcome domestic and international
credit market barriers to smooth consumption relative to GNP. In (2.12),
this means that we can take b2 to equal (1−αcd)(1−αci) where αcd and αci are
domestic and international debt market restriction parameters respectively
(again for an interest rate of zero). Instead of (2.15), we now get
ct−ct−1 = GNPt−GNPt−1−βcdCd,t(GNPt−GNPt−1)−βciCi,t(GNPt−GNPt−1)
+βcdβciCd,tCi,t(GNPt −GNPt−1) (2.17)
where Cd,t and Ci,t are domestic and international debt variables, respec-
tively. In (2.17), the interaction term of the domestic and international debt
variables enters positively to reflect that more domestic debt market devel-
opment reduces the marginal benefit of international debt market integration
in consumption smoothing, and vice versa. To implement (2.17), we take the
domestic debt variable to be either CredPriv or CredBank and the interna-
tional debt variable to be either TotDebt or TotDebt 0.
In Table 2.9, regressions (1) and (2) relate to the sample of OECD coun-
tries, while regressions (3) through (6) relate to the non-OECD countries. We
see that (i) the domestic debt variables enter regressions (1) and (2) for the
OECD sample with negative coefficients with significance levels of at least 10
percent, but not so in regressions (3) through (6) for the non-OECD sample,
and (ii) the international debt variables obtain negative coefficients in regres-
sions (3) through (6) for the non-OECD sample with significance levels of at
least 10 percent, but not so in regressions (1) and (2) for the OECD sample.
This suggests that domestic debt market development (international debt
integration) is a relatively important bottleneck in improving the smoothing
of consumption relative to GNP in OECD (non-OECD) countries. This may
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reflect that poor countries still have rather weak links with the international
debt market, and hence improving these links may be most important in
achieving better consumption smoothing. For rich countries, links with the
international debt market are generally well-established. In these countries,
however, there are still many households that may not have sufficient finan-
cial wealth or may otherwise not be sufficiently "plugged into" the financial
system to enable them to smooth their household consumption. In rich coun-
tries, further domestic financial development may serve to increase the share
of households that can effectively smooth their household consumption and
hence improve overall macroeconomic consumption smoothing. Finally, note
that the debt variables interaction terms enter with positive coefficients in
all regressions of Table 2.9, even if the interaction term is only significant (at
the 5 percent level) in regression 3. This provides some evidence that the
(marginal) benefit of higher domestic debt market development in improving
consumption smoothing decreases with the level of international debt market
development, and vice versa, consistent with (2.17).
2.4.3 Smoothing consumption relative to GDP
Next we present the results of regressions relating consumption growth to
GDP growth following (2.16) to see how equity and debt market develop-
ment jointly affect the smoothing of consumption relative to GDP. For this
purpose, we select CredPriv and CredBank to be two alternative domestic
debt market variables, while MCap is the domestic equity market variable.
At the same time, we select TotDebt and TotDebt’ to be alternative interna-
tional debt market variables and TotEq to be the international equity market
variable.
Table 2.10 presents the results for the world sample. The two domestic
debt variables and the capitalization variable enter with negative and signif-
icant coefficients in the two regressions, which indicates that debt and eq-
uity market development have distinct roles in bringing about consumption
smoothing as suggested by the theoretical model of section 2.2. Interest-
ingly, the interaction terms of CredPriv or CredBank with MCap enter the
two regressions positively and significantly at the 10 and 5 percent respec-
tively, also consistent with the theoretical model. The (marginal) benefit of
higher debt market development in improving consumption smoothing thus
decreases with the level of equity market development, and vice versa. The
marginal benefit of either type of development, however, remains positive
(see the next subsection for an assessment of the implied quantitative ef-
fects), which suggests that domestic debt and equity market are substitutes
in that a relative lack of one can be made up by having more of the other.
Chapter 2. Finance and Consumption Smoothing 25
It would be going too far, however, to say that financial structure (or the
relative development of debt and equity markets) does not matter, as the
marginal effects of the two types of development are not the same (see again
the next subsection for a quantitative assessment). For the international vari-
ables in the world sample, we get qualitatively similar results for the gross,
net, or net dummy measures of both the TotDebt and TotDebt’ variables
with several of the regression coefficients having the expected signs and being
statistically significant.
Table 2.11 presents the results for the OECD sample. In Table 2.11A,
for domestic debt and equity variables we get similar results for the OECD
sample as for the whole world as a whole. Interaction terms are positive
and significant. For the international financial variables, the gross variables
regressions in Table 2.11B are consistent with our model, while Tables 2.11C
and 2.11D provide somewhat less strong support for the model using net and
dummy variables. Overall, however, Table 2.11 suggests that international
equity market integration leads to better consumption smoothing after we
control for international debt market integration. This result is more in line
with expectations based on the theory than those reported in subsection
2.4.1 which suggested that for OECD countries international equity market
integration can amplify rather than reduce shocks of GNP relative to GDP.
Finally, Table 2.12 presents the results for non-OECD countries. Again,
the domestic debt and stock market capitalization variables and their inter-
actions enter with the expected signs and are significant at minimally the 10
percent level. In Table 2.12B, the international financial variables in gross
terms also enter with expected and significant coefficients (in the second re-
gression). The regressions reported in Tables 2.12C and 2.12D, however,
provide less strong support for the theory: in Table 2.12C only the TotDebt’
variables has a negative and significant coefficient according to the theory,
while in Table 2.12D the interaction term of TotDebt’ and TotEq has an
unexpected negative and significant coefficient.
Overall, the results in this section strongly support the theoretical pred-
ications that (i) both equity and debt market development are useful in re-
ducing the co-movement of consumption and GDP and that (ii) the marginal
benefit of having one type of financial market development decreases in the
level of the other type.
2.4.4 Quantitative assessment
Next, we wish to assess the quantitative importance of the estimated coef-
ficients of the previously reported regressions for reducing the variability of
consumption and GNP relative to each other and relative to GDP. To start,
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we wish to know how the estimated coefficients on the stock market variables
in the regressions reported in Tables 2.3 through 2.5 can be used to compute
the implied elasticities of the variance of GNP growth (as a ratio of the vari-
ance of GDP growth). Extending the theoretical framework, we can easily
derive that the ratio of the variance of (differenced) GNP to (differenced)




where we take the interest rate r to be zero.















Remember that αs = βsS where S stands for overall (domestic or interna-
tional) stock market development. To evaluate expression (2.18) we can take
an estimated value for the coefficient βs from one of the tables with regres-
sion results and find an associated value for S by taking the sample mean
of the proxy for stock market development that is a variable in the relevant
regression.
Before turning to the results, note that similarly we can write the variance
of differenced consumption relative to differenced GNP as follows
var(ct − ct−1)
var(GNPt −GNPt−1)
= (1− αc)2 (2.19)
The elasticity of this variance ratio to the debt market transaction para-














8Alternatively, the elasticity of the standard deviation of differenced GNP relative to









= −αs1−αs , which is half of the elasticity of the
analogous variance ratio in (2.18).
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where now αc = βsC with C standing for overall (domestic or international)
debt market development.
Finally, note that the ratio of the variance of differenced consumption to
the variance of differenced GDP is given by
var(ct − ct−1)
var(GDPt −GDPt)
= (1− αs)2(1− αc)2 (2.21)
Now we can find the two elasticities of this ratio with respect to the two



























Table 2.13A first presents the estimated elasticity of the relative variance
of GNP and GDP with respect to proxies for equity market development.
The estimates are based on the coefficients for MCap and Turn in the final
regressions in Tables 2.3A, 2.4A and 2.5A. The figures can be interpreted
to indicate how much the variance of GNP growth relative to GDP growth
changes by having an increase in one of the domestic equity market variables
of one percent. For example, a one percent increase in stock market capital-
ization relative to GDP evaluated at the mean value can reduce the relative
variance of GNP growth to GDP growth rate by 0.079 percent for the OECD
sample. To illustrate that this number is not negligible, we can conduct a
thought experiment as follows. The mean value of OECD countries’ stock
market capitalization relative to GDP is 57% and the relative variance of
GNP growth to GDP growth rate for all OECD countries is 1.003. By in-
creasing the level of stock market capitalization by 50 percent, i.e. up to
85.5%, the relative variance of GNP growth and GDP growth for OECD
countries will decrease by 50%*0.079=3.95%. The new relative variance of
GNP and GDP would be 0.963. As seen in the table, the magnitude of the
effects of domestic equity market development - expressed as elasticities -
on the relative GNP variance is much smaller for non-OECD countries than
for OECD counties. We do not compute analogous elasticity estimates us-
ing international equity measures, as the underlying regression coefficients in
several instances are statistically insignificant in Tables 2.3 through 2.5.
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Table 2.13B provides the estimated elasticity of the variance of consump-
tion growth (relative to GNP growth) with respect to both domestic and
international indicators. These are based on regression coefficients taken
from Tables 6 through 8. In each case, the regression coefficient used is the
one from a regression where the corresponding variable is the only included
financial market variable in the regression. The estimated elasticity for Cred-
Priv for the world sample, for instance, is taken from the first regression in
Table 2.6A. We see that the estimated elasticities in Table 2.13B tend to be
larger than those reported in Table 2.13A. This suggests that credit market
development is more effective in reducing the variance of consumption rel-
ative to GNP than equity market development is in reducing the variance
of GNP relative to GDP. To take an example, a one percent increase of the
sum of the international debt asset and liability stock measured by either
TotDebt or TotDebt 0 evaluated at the mean value decreases the variance of
the consumption growth relative to GNP growth rate by 0.48 percent and
0.28 percent respectively, for non-OECD countries. We also see that the elas-
ticity of this relative consumption variance w.r.t. the domestic debt variables
(CredPriv or CredBank’) is relatively large for OECD countries, while the
elasticity of this relative consumption variance with respect to an interna-
tional debt variable (TotDebt (OECD) vs. TotDebt (non-OECD) or TotDebt’
(non-OECD)) is relatively large for non-OECD countries.
Table 2.13C presents the estimated elasticity of the variance of consump-
tion growth relative to GDP growth rate with respect to debt and equity
market development jointly. The first two lines of Table 2.13C are based
on the second regressions in Tables 2.10A, 2.11A and 2.12A. The third and
fourth lines of Table 2.13C are based on the first regression of Table 2.10B,
the regression in Table 2.11B, and the first regression in Table 2.12B. The
estimated elasticities are generally sizeable. It is seen that domestic equity
and debt market development matters more for OECD countries than for
non-OECD countries in terms of the shown elasticities, while international
equity and debt market integration matters more for non-OECD countries.
These elasticity results are consistent with the "level" results in Table 2.9
comparing the impact of domestic and international debt market develop-
ment on reducing the variability of consumption relative to GNP for OECD
and non-OECD countries.
2.5 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter we use a simple theoretical model to illustrate how a repre-
sentative consumer smooths his consumption under a restricted availability
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of debt and equity market instruments due to imperfect domestic and in-
ternational debt and equity markets. The model yields testable implications
regarding the co-movements of GDP, GDP and consumption for a given level
of domestic or international debt and equity market development. These im-
plications are explored using a variety of empirical proxies for domestic and
international debt and equity market development that are familiar from the
empirical literature on the finance and growth nexus.
The empirical results confirm that the extent to which consumption smooth-
ing is possible in the face of output or GDP shocks depends importantly on
the level of financial development. The domestic and international aspects of
financial development turn out to play distinct roles in reducing consumption
variability. Specifically, we find that domestic debt market development is
more relevant for reducing consumption variability relative to GNP for OECD
member countries than for non-member countries, while international debt
market development is relatively important for OECD non-member countries
in reducing consumption variability. Similarly, we find that debt and equity
market developments have independent roles in reducing the variability of
consumption relative to GDP. They are to some extent substitutes in that
more of one can make up for less of the other. Calculated elasticities suggest
that credit market development is more potent than equity market develop-
ment in reducing the variability of consumption relative to GNP9. Generally,
the calculated elasticities suggest that financial market development can have
economically relevant effects in reducing consumption variability relative to
GNP. Consistent with the theoretical model, we also find empirical support
for the hypothesis that a higher level of equity market development reduces
the potential for debt market development to reduce the variability of con-
sumption relative to GDP, and vice versa.
There are several avenues for further research. At a theoretical level,
existing models of imperfections in international debt and equity markets
can be extended to see how the determinants of these restrictions in the end
determine the scope for international consumption smoothing. At the empir-
ical level, similarly it may be possible to consider some of the determinants
of domestic and international financial development, such as the nature of
legal systems, to see how these determinants impact on actual consumption
smoothing.
At a policy level, the knowledge that financial sector development helps to
smooth consumption should provide an impetus to take measures that pro-
9This study uses annual data. Instead, one could examine the co-movements of con-
sumption and GDP or GNP taking three or five year intervals. Over longer periods, equity
market development may be relatively important in smoothing consumption, as suggested
by findings in Melitz and Zumer (1999).
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mote such development. The results of this chapter suggest that gross stock
variables derived from the balance of payments help to explain a country’s
consumption smoothing possibilities. The gross financial stock variables of
one country are likely to be directly affected by financial sector development
in other countries. This reflects that international consumption smoothing
requires the active involvement of at least two countries. Financial mar-
ket development in one country thus is likely to increase the consumption
smoothing options available to other countries. The potentially beneficial
effects of national financial sector development on consumption smoothing
possibilities and welfare abroad provides policy makers with an additional
reason to aim for financial sector development.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
2A Variable definitions
• Growth rates
GDPg : Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on
constant local currency. Per capita number is obtained by dividing total
GDP by midyear population (Source: WDI).
GNPg : Annual percentage growth rate of GNP per capita based on
constant local currency (Source: WDI).
CONg : Annual percentage growth rate of per capita final consumption
based on constant local currency. Final consumption is the sum of household
final consumption expenditure and general government final consumption
expenditure (Source: WDI).
• Domestic financial variables
MCap : Stock market capitalization as a percent of GDP. Listed domestic
companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the coun-
try’s stock exchanges at the end of the year (Source: WDI).
Turn : Stock market turnover ratio computed as the total value of shares
traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization for the
period (Source: WDI).
CredPriv : Domestic debt to private sector as a percent of GDP. This
domestic debt is financial resources provided to the private sector, such as
through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other
accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries
these claims include debt to public enterprises (Source: WDI).
CredBank : Domestic debt provided by banking sector as a percent of
GDP. Debt is on a gross basis, with the exception of debt to the central
government, which is net. The banking sector includes monetary authorities
and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions, such as sav-
ings and mortgage loan institutions, building and loan associations (Source:
WDI).
M3 : Liquid liabilities as a percent of GDP. Liquid liabilities are the sum
of currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), plus transferable deposits
and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings deposits, foreign cur-
rency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase
agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, com-
mercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by residents
(Source: WDI).
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Spread : Interest rate spread. The spread is the interest rate charged by
banks on loans to prime customers minus the interest rate paid by commercial
or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits (Source: WDI).
• International financial variables
FDI : Stock of foreign direct investment assets and liabilities as a per-
cent of GDP. Estimated by Milesi-Ferretti using cumulative flow adjusted for
relative price variations (Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001).
PortEq : Stock of portfolio equity assets and liabilities a percent of GDP.
Estimated by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti using cumulative flow adjusted for
relative price variations (Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001).
TotEq: Gross stock of international equity as a percent of GDP. Sum of
FDI and Portfolio-Equity (Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001).
IntBank : Gross stock of other investment assets and liabilities as a per-
cent of GDP. Other investment includes trade credit, loans, currency and
deposit, etc. For developed countries (Source: BOPS and IFS, International
Investment Position).
PortDebt : Gross stock of portfolio debt assets and liabilities as a per-
cent of GDP. For developed countries (Source: BOPS and IFS, International
Investment Position).
TotDebt (OECD) : Gross stock of total debt assets and liabilities as a
percent of GDP. Sum of IntBank and Portfolio-debt ; For developed countries.
TotDebt (non-OECD) and TotDebt
0
(non-OECD): Gross stock of portfo-
lio debt and other investment (mainly from banks) as a percent of GDP. For
developing countries (Source: OECD and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001).
Alternative measures of the stock of total debt assets, namely ASSETS2
and CUMLOAN appearing in Lane & Milesi-Ferretti original data set, are




TotDebt (for the world) and TotDebt
0
(for the world): These series com-
bine TotDebt (OECD) for OECD countries with two alternative measures,
TotDebt (non-OECD) and TotDebt
0
(non-OECD), for non-OECD countries
leading to two alternative worldwide measures of gross debt. The alternative
TotDebt and TotDebt’ gross indebtedness measures for non-OECD countries
are the sums of one series of debt liabilities provided by the OECD and two
alternative measures of debt assets as estimated by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2001).
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2B Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variables The whole sample
Growth rates
Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max
GDPg 5907 1.90 5.50 -19.73 42.99
GNPg 5633 1.95 5.91 -19.74 47.35
CONg 4371 2.13 6.62 -19.54 47.56
Domestic Finance
MCap 1142 40.64 54.37 0 549.88
Turn 778 42.23 53.00 0 475.46
CredPriv 5283 34.06 30.66 .56 203.17
CredBank 5150 47.00 39.14 .00 333.99
M3 5012 41.99 34.72 0 753.98
Spread 2869 7.16 7.78 -9.25 91.76
Int. Finance: Gross
FDI 1858 16.01 17.94 0 127.22
PortEq 1724 4.42 16.00 0 343.32
TotEq 1671 21.32 30.28 0 438.11
IntBank
PortDebt
TotDebt 976 80.36 68.29 10.54 606.55
TotDebt
0
1078 93.94 85.09 10.54 606.55
Int. Finance: Net
FDI 1858 -8.29 15.60 -110.90 34.74
PortEq 1724 -.81 9.05 -246.83 97.14
TotEq 1671 -9.67 18.21 -258.80 45.65
IntBank
PortDebt
TotDebt 976 -45.66 39.08 -204.84 99.74
TotDebt
0
1078 -24.40 70.63 -192.23 337.17
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Table 2.1(Continued 1): Summary statistics
Variables OECD countries
Growth rates
Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max
GDPg 1122 2.78 3.07 -14.57 18.18
GNPg 1072 2.72 3.08 -14.90 12.45
CONg 1082 2.59 2.72 -18.07 24.11
Domestic Finance
MCap 388 57.19 57.64 .19 549.87
Turn 255 72.16 54.11 .7 380.3
CredPriv 1094 61.79 37.06 1.68 203.17
CredBank 1094 78.95 43.48 14.24 319.38
M3 789 60.76 31.53 9.94 199.56
Spread 628 4.10 2.57 -9.25 20.46
Int. Finance: Gross
FDI 420 23.57 19.96 .64 127.22
PortEq 308 15.70 20.95 .25 160.98
TotEq 303 45.93 37.36 4.40 251.34
IntBank 515 77.76 69.40 9.77 546.17
PortDebt 355 25.72 22.90 .037 95.64




FDI 420 -1.79 10.67 -55.15 34.40
PortEq 308 -1.65 7.99 -59.26 23.84
TotEq 303 -3.25 11.69 -46.29 22.41
IntBank 515 -14.75 23.61 -194.83 28.34
PortDebt 355 -8.61 20.27 -53.72 75.04
TotDebt 348 -16.04 28.41 -92.28 99.74
TotDebt
0
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Table 2.1(Continued 2): Summary statistics
Variables Non-OECD countries
Growth rates
Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max
GDPg 4785 1.70 5.91 -19.73 42.99
GNPg 4561 1.76 6.38 -19.74 47.35
CONg 3289 1.98 7.47 -19.54 47.56
Domestic Finance
MCap 754 32.13 50.57 0 385.12
Turn 523 27.63 45.89 0 475.46
CredPriv 4189 26.82 23.96 .56 180.17
CredBank 4056 39.65 33.27 .00 333.99
M3 4223 38.49 34.16 0 753.98
Spread 2241 8.02 8.51 -8.85 91.76
Int. Finance: Gross
FDI 1438 15.17 18.10 0 124.28
PortEq 1416 2.01 14.10 0 343.32
TotEq 1368 17.30 27.04 0 438.11
IntBank
PortDebt
TotDebt 628 60.97 33.86 11.02 204.84
TotDebt
0
730 72.61 41.14 12.42 242.59
Int. Finance: Net
FDI 1438 -12.67 16.34 -110.90 32.38
PortEq 1416 -0.66 10.11 -246.83 97.14
TotEq 1368 -13.39 18.98 -258.80 45.65
IntBank
PortDebt
TotDebt 628 -59.11 34.46 -204.84 -10.05
TotDebt
0
730 -32.46 59.63 -192.23 377.17
Notes: The sample consists of yearly data for the period 1960-2001 for a
worldwide set of countries, for OECD countries, and for non-OECD countries,
respectively. International financial variables (FDI, PortEq, TotEq, TotDebt,
TotDebt
0
) are available only for the period 1970-1998.
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CONSg 0.5448* 0.5452* 1
B. Financial Variables
MCap Turn CredPriv CredBank M3 Spread
MCap 1
Turn 0.1590* 1
CredPriv 0.6237* 0.2787* 1
CredBank 0.4875* 0.2591* 0.7647* 1
M3 0.5656* 0.2067* 0.7284* 0.7592* 1
Spread -0.0612 -0.1986* -0.0524* -0.3080 -0.4450* 1
FDI 0.4850* 0.0373* 0.2949* 0.1515* 0.2452* -0.0305
PortEq 0.5739* 0.2103* 0.4797* 0.3673* 0.3900* -0.0314
TotEq 0.5866* 0.1309* 0.4258* 0.2701* 0.3513* -0.0377
TotDebt 0.2195* 0.2662* 0.0430 0.2520* 0.2444* -0.0317
TotDebt
0
0.0089 0.0734 0.1115* 0.2915* 0.3381* -0.0123









TotEq 0.7220* 0.6842 1
TotDebt 0.0140 -0.1305* -0.0350 1
TotDebt
0
0.0450 -0.0048 0.0178 0.9238*
Notes: The sample consists of yearly data for the period 1960-2001 for
a set of OECD and non-OECD countries. International financial variables
(FDI, PortEq, TotEq, TotDebt, TotDebt
0
) are available only for the period
1970-1998. For variable definitions, see the appendix. * indicates significant
at 5% level.
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GDPg 1.014** (0.002) 1.028**(0.005) 1.043**(0.005)
MCap -0.032**(0.007) -0.033**(0.011)
Turn -0.012**(0.005) -0.007**(0.002)
Const. 0.037**(0.014) 0.018**(0.012) 0.015**(0.004)
Obs. 1133 767 761
B. International measures: gross
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Const. -0.053**(0.015) -0.036*(0.015) -0.041**(0.015) -0.042**(0.016)
Obs. 1772 1642 1589 1589
C. International measures: net
(1)0 (2)0 (3)0 (4)0




Const. -0.056**(0.015) -0.033**(0.015) -0.042**(0.016) -0.045**(0.016)
Obs. 1772 1642 1589 1589
D. International measures: dummy
(1)" (2)" (3)" (4)"




Const. -0.066**(0.019) -0.034*(0.016) -0.053**(0.020) -0.052**(0.021)
Obs. 1772 1642 1589 1589
Notes: Results of regressions of the growth rate of GNP on the growth
rate of GDP and an interaction term of a financial market measure in the
left column with the growth rate of GDP. The sample consists of yearly data
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for the period 1960-2001 for OECD and non-OECD countries. International
financial variables (FDI, PortEq, and TotEq) are available only for the period
1970-1998. Domestic financial measures are the relevant domestic financial
variables as a percent of GDP. International gross financial measures are
the relevant foreign assets plus liabilities as a percent of GDP. International
net financial measures are the relevant foreign assets minus foreign liabilities
as a percent of GDP. International dummy financial measures are dummy
variables that take on a value of one if the relevant foreign assets exceed
foreign liabilities and zero otherwise. Estimation by FGLS allows for within
country autocorrelation and across countries heteroskedasticity. For variable
definitions, see the appendix. +,*, ** indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, 1% confidence level; number in parentheses is standard error.
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GDPg 1.010**(0.032) 0.885**(0.091) 0.948**(0.052)
MCap -0.067**(0.020) -0.116(0.105)
Turn -0.084+(0.053) -0.079**(0.038)
Const. 0.014(0.068) 0.073(0.118) 0.014(0.123)
Obs. 388 255 254
B. International measures: gross
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Const. -0.033(0.027) -0.065**(0.031) -0.057*(0.032) -0.069**(0.030)
Obs. 325 246 245 245
C. International measures : net
(1)0 (2)0 (3)0 (4)0




Const. -0.030(0.027) -0.045+(0.033) -0.052*(0.030) -0.047+(0.031)
Obs. 310 231 230 230
D: International measures: dummy
(1)" (2)" (3)" (4)"




Const. -0.040+(0.027) -0.053*(0.032) -0.058**(0.028) -0.050+(0.032)
Obs. 310 231 230 230
Notes: Results of regressions of the growth rate of GNP on the growth
rate of GDP and an interaction term of a financial market measure in the
left column with the growth rate of GDP. The sample consists of yearly data
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for the period 1960-2001 for OECD countries. International financial vari-
ables (FDI, PortEq, and TotEq) are available only for the period 1970-1998.
Domestic financial measures are the relevant domestic financial variables as
a percent of GDP. International gross financial measures are the relevant
foreign assets plus liabilities as a percent of GDP. International net financial
measures are the relevant foreign assets minus foreign liabilities as a percent
of GDP. International dummy financial measures are dummy variables that
take on a value of one if the relevant foreign assets exceed foreign liabilities
and zero otherwise. Estimation by FGLS allows for within country autocor-
relation and across countries heteroskedasticity. For variable definitions, see
the appendix. +,*, ** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
confidence level; number in parentheses is standard error.
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GDPg 1.044**(0.002) 1.064**(0.011) 1.111**(0.018)
MCap -0.018**(0.002) -0.021**(0.005)
Turn -0.014**(0.003) -0.008**(0.003)
Const. 0.078**(0.013) 0.022+(0.013) 0.014+(0.010)
Obs. 743 511 506
B. International measures: gross
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Const. -0.056**(0.026) -0.050+(0.026) -0.053**(0.026) -0.053*(0.026)
Obs. 1115 1164 1111 1111
C. International measures: net
(1)0 (2)0 (3)0 (4)0




Const. -0.057**(0.025) -0.046*(0.026) -0.052**(0.025) -0.052**(0.025)
Obs. 1115 1164 1111 1111
D: International measures: dummy
(1)" (2)" (3)" (4)"




Const. -0.064**(0.028) -0.051*(0.026) -0.061**(0.028) -0.061**(0.028)
Obs. 1115 1164 1111 1111
Notes: Results of regressions of the growth rate of GNP on the growth
rate of GDP and an interaction term of a financial market measure in the left
column with the growth rate of GDP. The sample consists of yearly data for
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the period 1960-2001 for non-OECD countries. International financial vari-
ables (FDI, PortEq, and TotEq) are available only for the period 1970-1998.
Domestic financial measures are the relevant domestic financial variables as
a percent of GDP. International gross financial measures are the relevant
foreign assets plus liabilities as a percent of GDP. International net financial
measures are the relevant foreign assets minus foreign liabilities as a percent
of GDP. International dummy financial measures are dummy variables that
take on a value of one if the relevant foreign assets exceed foreign liabilities
and zero otherwise. Estimation by FGLS allows for within country autocor-
relation and across countries heteroskedasticity. For variable definitions, see
the appendix. +,*, ** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
confidence level; number in parentheses is standard error.
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Table 2.6: Co-movements of consumption growth and GNP growth for
worldwide sample
A. Domestic measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Const. 0.739**(0.046) 0.732**(0.046) 0.682**(0.050) 0.638**(0.042)
Obs. 3968 3956 3707 2302



























Notes: Results of regressions of the growth rate of consumption on the
growth rate of GNP and an interaction term of a financial market measure in
the left column with the growth rate of GNP. The sample consists of yearly
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data for the period 1960-2001 for OECD and non-OECD countries. Interna-
tional financial variables (TotDebt and TotDebt
0
) are available only for the
period 1970-1998. Domestic financial measures are the relevant domestic fi-
nancial variables as a percent of GDP. International gross financial measures
are the relevant foreign assets plus liabilities as a percent of GDP. Interna-
tional net financial measures are the relevant foreign assets minus foreign
liabilities as a percent of GDP. International dummy financial measures are
dummy variables that take on a value of one if the relevant foreign assets
exceed foreign liabilities and zero otherwise. Estimation by FGLS allows for
within country autocorrelation and across countries heteroskedasticity. For
variable definitions, see the appendix. +,*, ** indicates statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level; number in parentheses is standard error.
Chapter 2. Finance and Consumption Smoothing 45
Table 2.7: Co-movements of consumption growth and GNP growth for
OECD countries
A. Domestic measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Const. 0.864**(0.063) 0.869**(0.063) 0.832**(0.073) 0.767**(0.063)
Obs. 993 993 708 617
B. International measures: gross
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Const. 0.675**(0.081) 0.694**(0.084) 0.691**(0.084) -0.689**(0.084)
Obs. 346 281 280 280
C. International measures: net
(1)0 (2)0 (3)0 (4)0




Const. 0.738**(0.082) 0.685**(0.082) 0.694**(0.085) 0.705**(0.083)
Obs. 346 281 280 280
D. International measures: dummy
(1)" (2)" (3)" (4)"




Const. 0.677**(0.086) 0.745**(0.085) 0.791**(0.085) 0.736**(0.084)
Obs. 331 266 265 265
Notes: Results of regressions of the growth rate of consumption on the
growth rate of GNP and an interaction term of a financial market measure
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in the left column with the growth rate of GNP. The sample consists of
yearly data for the period 1960-2001 for OECD countries. International
financial variables (TotDebt and TotDebt
0
) are available only for the period
1970-1998. Domestic financial measures are the relevant domestic financial
variables as a percent of GDP. International gross financial measures are
the relevant foreign assets plus liabilities as a percent of GDP. International
net financial measures are the relevant foreign assets minus foreign liabilities
as a percent of GDP. International dummy financial measures are dummy
variables that take on a value of one if the relevant foreign assets exceed
foreign liabilities and zero otherwise. Estimation by FGLS allows for within
country autocorrelation and across countries heteroskedasticity. For variable
definitions, see the appendix. +,*, ** indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, 1% confidence level; number in parentheses is standard error.
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Table 2.8: Co-movements of consumption growth and GNP Growth for
non-OECD countries
A. Domestic measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Const. 0.560**(0.069) 0.522**(0.068) 0.535**(0.068) 0.533**(0.088)
Obs. 2975 2897 2999 1660


















D. International measures: dummy
(1)" (2)"







Notes: Results of regressions of the growth rate of consumption on the
growth rate of GNP and an interaction term of a financial market measure
in the left column with the growth rate of GNP. The sample consists of
yearly data for the period 1960-2001 for non-OECD countries. International
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financial variables (TotDebt and TotDebt
0
) are available only for the period
1970-1998. Domestic financial measures are the relevant domestic financial
variables as a percent of GDP. International gross financial measures are
the relevant foreign assets plus liabilities as a percent of GDP. International
net financial measures are the relevant foreign assets minus foreign liabilities
as a percent of GDP. International dummy financial measures are dummy
variables that take on a value of one if the relevant foreign assets exceed
foreign liabilities and zero otherwise. Estimation by FGLS allows for within
country autocorrelation and across countries heteroskedasticity. For variable
definitions, see the appendix. +,*, ** indicates statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, 1% confidence level; number in parentheses is standard error.
The data for net stock of international debt for non-OECD countries are
all negative so that all associated dummy variables are equal to zero. The
interaction term between GNPg and TotDebt therefore is dropped from the
regression.
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Table 2.9: Co-movements of consumption growth and GNP growth: the












CredPriv ∗ TotDebt 0.105(0.086)




Variables (3) (4) (5) (6)














Const. 0.187(0.130) 0.582**(0.137) 0.161(0.129) 0.566**(0.137)
Obs. 416 666 416 666
Notes: Results of regressions of the growth rate of consumption on the
growth rate of GNP and interaction terms of the growth rate of GNP with
(i) a domestic debt variable, (ii) an international debt variable, and (iii) the
product of a domestic debt variable and an international debt variable, as
stated in the left column. The sample consists of yearly data for the period
1960-2001 for OECD and non-OECD countries, respectively. International
financial variables (TotDebt and TotDebt
0
) are available only for the period
1970-1998. Domestic financial measures are the relevant domestic financial
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variables as a percent of GDP. International financial variables are measured
in gross terms, i.e. as the relevant foreign assets and liabilities as a percent
of GDP. Estimation by FGLS allows for within country autocorrelation and
across countries heteroskedasticity. For variable definitions, see the appendix.
+,*, ** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level;
number in parentheses is standard error.
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CredPriv ∗ MCap 0.071+(0.047)
CredBank ∗ MCap 0.098*(0.041)
Const. 0.327**(0.062) 0.324**(0.061)
Obs. 901 904







TotDebt ∗ TotEq 0.125*(0.060)
TotDebt ∗ TotEq 0.244**(0.066)
Const. 0.211**(0.070) 0.091(0.072)
Obs. 713 775








TotDebt ∗ TotEq 0.000(0.000)
TotDebt
0 ∗ TotEq 0.000*(0.000)
Const. 0.143+(0.074) 0.246**(0.071)
Obs. 713 775
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TotDebt ∗ TotEq 0.151(1)(0.124)
TotDebt
0 ∗ TotEq 0.301**(0.129)
Const. 0.212**(0.067) 0.162**(0.077)
Obs. 713 775
Notes: Results of regressions of the growth rate of consumption on the
growth rate of GDP and interaction terms of the growth rate of GDP with
(i) a debt variable, (ii) an equity variable, and (iii) the product of a debt
variable and an equity variable as stated in the left columns. The sample
consists of yearly data for the period 1960-2001 for OECD and non-OECD
countries, respectively. International financial variables (TotDebt TotDebt
0
,
and TotEq) are available only for the period 1970-1998. Domestic financial
measures are the relevant domestic financial variables as a percent of GDP.
International gross financial measures are the relevant foreign assets and li-
abilities as a percent of GDP. International net financial measures are the
relevant foreign assets minus foreign liabilities as a percent of GDP. Interna-
tional dummy financial measures are dummy variables that take on a value
of one if the relevant foreign assets exceed foreign liabilities and zero oth-
erwise. Estimation by FGLS allows for within country autocorrelation and
across countries heteroskedasticity. For variable definitions, see the appen-
dix. +,*, ** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence
level; number in parentheses is standard error.
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CredPriv ∗ MCap 0.199*(0.085)
CredBank ∗ MCap 0.211**(0.068)
Const. 0.451**(0.078) 0.442**(0.075)
Obs. 371 371




TotDebt ∗ TotEq 0.147*(0.071)
Const. 0.516**(0.082)
Obs. 239














Notes: Results of regressions of the growth rate of consumption on the
growth rate of GDP and interaction terms of the growth rate of GDP with
(i) a debt variable, (ii) an equity variable, and (iii) the product of a debt
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variable and an equity variable as stated in the left columns. The sample
consists of yearly data for the period 1960-2001 for OECD countries. In-
ternational financial variables (TotDebt, TotDebt
0
, and TotEq) are available
only for the period 1970-1998. Domestic financial measures are the relevant
domestic financial variables as a percent of GDP. International gross finan-
cial measures are the relevant foreign assets plus liabilities as a percent of
GDP. International net financial measures are the relevant foreign assets mi-
nus foreign liabilities as a percent of GDP. International dummy financial
measures are dummy variables that take on a value of one if the relevant for-
eign assets exceed foreign liabilities and zero otherwise. Estimation by FGLS
allows for within country autocorrelation and across countries heteroskedas-
ticity. For variable definitions, see the appendix. +,*, ** indicates statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level; number in parentheses is
standard error.
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CredPriv ∗ MCap 0.023*(0.013)
CredBank ∗ MCap 0.032**(0.012)
Const. 0.276**(0.094) 0.267**(0.096)
Obs. 530 518








TotDebt ∗ TotEq 0.180(0.890)
TotDebt
0∗TotEq 0.714**(0.308)
Const -0.09*(0.140) -0.038 (0.127)
Obs. 414 488
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Notes: Results of regressions of the growth rate of consumption on the
growth rate of GDP and interaction terms of the growth rate of GDP with
(i) a debt variable, (ii) an equity variable, and (iii) the product of a debt
variable and an equity variable as stated in the left columns. The sample
consists of yearly data for the period 1960-2001 for non-OECD countries. In-
ternational financial variables (TotDebt, TotDebt
0
, and TotEq) are available
only for the period 1970-1998. Domestic financial measures are the relevant
domestic financial variables as a percent of GDP. International gross finan-
cial measures are the relevant foreign assets plus liabilities as a percent of
GDP. International net financial measures are the relevant foreign assets mi-
nus foreign liabilities as a percent of GDP. International dummy financial
measures are dummy variables that take on a value of one if the relevant for-
eign assets exceed foreign liabilities and zero otherwise. Estimation by FGLS
allows for within country autocorrelation and across countries heteroskedas-
ticity. For variable definitions, see the appendix. +,*, ** indicates statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level; number in parentheses is
standard error.
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Table 2.13: Estimated elasticities of relative variances w.r.t. financial
variables
A. Elasticity of variance of GNP growth (relative to GDP growth) w.r.t.
equity market variables
World OECD Non-OECD
MCap -0.027 -0.079 -0.012
Turn -0.023 -0.129 -0.008
B. Elasticity of variance of consumption growth (relative to GNP growth)
w.r.t. debt market variables
World OECD Non-OECD
CredPriv -0.06 -0.20 -0.02
CredBank -0.08 -0.23 -0.02
IntBank -0.12
PortDebt -0.20




C. Elasticity of variance of consumption growth (relative to GDP growth)
w.r.t. debt and equity market variables
World OECD Non-OECD
CredBank -0.202 -0.594 -0.123
MCap -0.121 -0.410 -0.075
TotDebt -0.362 -0.144 -0.538
TotEq -0.167 -0.052 -0.301
Notes: Panel A presents the estimated elasticity of the relative variance
of GNP and GDP with respect to proxies for equity market development.
The estimates are partly based on the coefficients for MCap and Turn in
regressions (1)s and (2)s in Tables 3A, 4A and 5A. Panel B provides the
estimated elasticity of the variance of consumption growth (relative to GNP
growth) with respect to both domestic and international indicators. These
are based on regression coefficients taken from Tables 6A, 6B through 8A, 8B.
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In each case, the regression coefficient used is the one from a regression where
the corresponding variable is the only included financial market variable in
the regression. We use international gross regressions (thus Table 2.6B, 7B,
and 8B) for estimating the corresponding elasticities. Table 2.13C presents
the estimated elasticity of the variance of consumption growth relative to
GDP growth rate with respect to debt and equity market development jointly.
The first two lines of Table 2.13C are based on the second regressions in
Tables 10A, 11A and 12A. The last two lines of Table 2.13C are based on the
first regression of Table 2.10B, the regression in Table 2.11B, and the first







During the past ten years, the American and British economies have been
relatively tranquil. Activities have continued to fluctuate, but less violently
than before. Severe recessions have been avoided. But Japan and Germany
have under-performed compared to Anglo-Saxon countries as far as main-
taining economic stability and preventing economic downturn are concerned.
Does financial structure make a difference for macroeconomic fluctuations in
general, and economic downturns in particular? This has not been paid suffi-
cient attention. It is well documented (see, for example, Allen and Gale, 1995;
and Black and Moersch, 1998) that Anglo-Saxon economies have a market-
based financial structure and Japan and Germany have a bank-based finan-
cial structure. Are the different performances in terms of economic stability
of these major economies a mere coincidence with their distinct financial
structure, or are there some causal mechanisms at work?
Exploration of the causes and mechanisms behind output fluctuations
has been a macroeconomic focus for decades. In a frictionless classical para-
digm with full employment of resources, fluctuations in output are regarded
as results of the changes in technology. But it is hard to attribute the eco-
nomic downturn in a large and closed economy, for example, to preferences or
technological changes, since domestic preference and technology are normally
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stable. Half a century ago, the Keynesian framework shifted the focus to the
downward rigidity in money wages and prices to explain economic fluctua-
tions. However, if countries having both more flexible wages and prices do not
reduce volatility in output growth, this explanation becomes unpersuasive.
Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2000) recently found cross-country evidence
showing that (i) in terms of bivariate correlation, wage and price flexibility
are instead associated with greater variability in growth rates; (ii) in multi-
ple variables analyses, wage flexibility indicators can not significantly enter
into output volatility regressions. Noticeably, in the past ten years, aside
from the conventional views, the roles of financial markets and institutions
in explaining output fluctuations have received increasing attention.
In theory, several seminal papers have tried to model the role played
by the financial sector in initiating and propagating economic fluctuations.
Suarez and Sussman (1997) present a model showing how financial factors
can themselves drive economic fluctuations — even without exogenous shocks.
Compared to the endogenous business-cycle models (also see Rajan, 1994),
several existing models explore how, given exogenous shocks, financial ele-
ments can amplify the effects of shocks and consequently propagate economic
fluctuations and economic recessions. This amplifying and propagating mech-
anism can be either through a bank lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder,
1988; Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994) or a balance sheet channel (Hub-
bard, 1998; Bernake and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke et al., 1998). Both endoge-
nous and exogenous models of the finance-fluctuation nexus predict that a
more developed financial system could reduce economic fluctuations. In ad-
dition, by invoking the concept of the macroeconomic multiplier, Blum and
Hellwig (1995) argue in a theoretical paper that capital adequacy require-
ments have a significant pro-cyclical effect on the real economy. Moreover,
Allen and Gale (2000) argue that limited liability induces a "risk-shifting
problem" and pro-risk behavior, which lead to higher asset prices and higher
chances of default, and thus financial crises and economic recessions. Most of
the existing papers, however, focus on how financial intermediaries affect eco-
nomic fluctuations, rather than on a more complex financial structure with
an array of financial contracts. In theory, it is possible that different financial
instruments could potentially have distinct effects on economic fluctuations.
If this is really true, the overall financial development and financial structure
could matter for volatility. Then, merely focusing on financial intermediaries
could be misleading.
Although the finance-growth relationship has attracted quite a lot of at-
tention in the past decade (see, for example, King and Levine, 1993; Rajan
and Zingales, 1998; Neusser and Kugler, 1998; and Levine, 2002), empir-
ical testing of the finance-fluctuation relationship has only been a recent
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effort. Da Silva (2002) finds that more developed credit markets (measured
by whether deposit money banks hold more assets relative to the domestic
assets of the central bank, and whether non-financial private sectors receive
a greater proportion of total domestic credit) exhibit less volatile business
cycles because credit institutions become more capable of screening potential
borrowers. But she finds that whether the financial structure is more market
or bank based does not affect volatility. Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen (2000)
find similar results as Da Silva, although they find weak evidence that an
economy relying more on the stock market relative to banks exhibits more
volatility in consumption; they attribute this relationship to stock market
wealth effects. Beck, Lundberg, and Majnoni (2001) cast doubt on previ-
ous studies that have found a negative relationship between indicators of
financial intermediary development and growth volatility. They argue that
whether financial intermediary development dampens or magnifies shocks de-
pends on the types of shocks. Financial development can dampen real shocks,
but tends to magnify monetary shocks. On average, an economy is hit by
both real and monetary shocks, and the dampening and magnifying effects
of financial intermediaries cancel out each other. Most recently, Acemoglu
et al. (2002) find that in a cross-country regression, financial development
(measured as the ratio of M2 over GDP) has no effects on volatility, after con-
trolling for measures of the quality of institutions. Lopez and Spiegel (2002)
find that although financial development does mitigate economic fluctuations
in the long run, it may exacerbate short-term volatility in isolated episodes.
They suggest that one reason for this discrepancy may be that financial lib-
eralizations are typically only partial, resulting in increased financial market
distortions.
The existing empirical literature on the relationship between finance and
economic fluctuations has mainly focused on financial intermediary measure-
ments, however, and has paid less attention to whether different financial
contract compositions and financial structure matter for fluctuations. In
particular, the roles of equity market development and the relative size of
equity versus debt on volatility have not yet been empirically tested. If,
for example, the role of equity market development in reducing volatility is
empirically positive and can dominate credit or even makes credit play the
opposite role, then empirical studies only including financial intermediaries
in volatility regressions are mis-specified and may result in misleading conclu-
sions. Moreover, since economic downturns are special events, the role played
by financial development and financial structure explaining economic down-
turns is worthwhile to study. Current empirical studies lack, in particular, a
focus on the finance-downturn relationship.
This chapter models a particular mechanism describing how financial
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structure can matter for economic fluctuations, in general, and economic
downturns, in particular. In the model, the financial structure is determined
by some key underlying parameters, including state verification cost, a bank-
ruptcy cost, productivity, and the risk-less interest rate. At a firm level,
although debt financing is cheaper than equity financing (since debt needs
to be verified fewer states), more debt increases the probability of going into
costly bankruptcy with firms bearing the bankruptcy cost. Equity financing
can instead avoid bankruptcy costs by nature. The advantages and disadvan-
tages of debt vs. equity are balanced by firms when making capital structure
choices. At the aggregate level, a more bank-based financial structure leads
to a higher proportion of firms going into bankruptcy when certain negative
shocks occur, with more bankruptcy costs amplifying the unfavorable situ-
ation. As consequences, the variance of production and the possibility and
severity of economic downturns are greater in an economy with a bank-based
financial structure than in the economy with a market-based structure.
We also test empirically whether countries with a bank-based financial
structure have a higher variance of GDP growth and a greater possibility
and more severe economic downturns. Controlling for commonly used vari-
ables in explaining growth volatility (see, for example, Karras and Song,
1996) and adding credit and equity size indicators simultaneously into re-
gressions, we find that credit variables can not enter into the regression with
significant signs, although a non-linear relationship is found when a credit
square term is included. Greater credit is associated with less volatility in
the GDP growth rate, but only to a certain extent, beyond which the larger
financial intermediaries actually serve to magnify the shocks to the economy.
Measurements of equity market size (market capitalization) instead present
a consistently significant role in reducing GDP growth volatility —regardless
of whether or not the credit square term is included. We get the financial
structure proxy by taking the ratio of equity market measurements to credit
measurements and significantly find that a more market-based financial sys-
tem is associated with less GDP growth-rate volatility. Moreover, using the
Tobit model, we find that the ratio of credit to GDP increases the likelihood
and severity of economic downturns, whereas the stock market capitaliza-
tion ratio decreases the probability and severity of a downturn. The relative
size measure, i.e. the financial structure indicator, enters into the Tobit re-
gression with expected signs, suggesting that financial structures that feature
debt more prominently than equity are more vulnerable to a growth collapse.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the underlying
theoretical model. Section 3.3 describes the data and empirical specifica-
tions. Section 3.4 presents and interprets the empirical results. Section 3.5
concludes.




There are infinitely many entrepreneurs in the economy, indexed by i and
with measure of 1. The production function of each entrepreneur has an
identical formula:
ỹi = η(Ãa + Ãf,i)k (3.1)
Two separate of shocks enter into the production function: an economy-
wide aggregate shock Ãa and a firm-specific shock Ãf,i. Both shocks are
identically independently distributed on range [0,1] with uniform distribu-
tion. E(Ãa + Ãf,i) = 1. Therefore E(ỹi) = ηk
Capital k is the major input for production, and η is the capital pro-
ductivity parameter. Suppose η > 1 + r0; thus, ηk > (1 + r0)k (r0 is the
riskless interest rate), indicating that capital productivity is large enough
that in an expected sense more than gross cost of capital can be produced.
The capital productivity parameter η could be attributed to the "ideas" or
technologies invested by the entrepreneur into the production process. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume each entrepreneur uses a unit amount of
capital. Therefore, we disregard capital scale differences among firms. Then,
(3.1) can be simplified to
ỹi = η(Ãa + Ãf,i) (3.2)
Creditors and non-controlling shareholders
Capital is raised either by borrowing money from creditors or issuing public
shares on the stock market. Denote borrowing capital by γ. Since total capital
is one unit, γ can be understood both as the proportion and as the total
amount of borrowing. The entrepreneur has to give up partial ownership of
the firm to get the rest of the capital 1−γ from the stock market. Suppose a
share s of the firm’s ownership is given to public shareholders issued at price
p per unit. Then,
sp = 1− γ (3.3)
The financiers (either the creditors or the public shareholders) can not
directly observe the realization of the shocks, nor the realized yi. But the
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entrepreneurs, as “insiders", can. In this regard, entrepreneurs are controlling
shareholders, whereas public shareholders are non-controlling ones.
Features of debt and equity contracts
Debt and equity contracts differ in two ways. First, debt is a cheaper way
of financing than equity. Since financial returns paid by entrepreneurs to
financiers are based on reported yi, both types of financiers have to verify
whether entrepreneurs are telling the truth. Verifying the truth is not with-
out cost (Townsend, 1979). In the end, it is the entrepreneurs who have
to bear this cost. Due to the unobservability of realized yi, both ways of
financing are costly for entrepreneurs. However, the extent of necessity to
verify differs between these two types of contracts. Creditors need to verify
only in case of claimed bankruptcy. If no bankruptcy is reported, then credi-
tors do not need to verify, and get a fixed payment. Instead, non-controlling
shareholders are supposed to share the realized production proportionately
with entrepreneurs no matter what states happen; they thus need to verify
the claimed production at all levels (Townsend, 1979). Because owners of
publicly held shares need to verify more states than owners of debt, it is rea-
sonable to assume that equity is a more expensive way of financing compared
to debt. Assign αd (0 ≤ αd ≤ 1) and αe (0 ≤ αe ≤ 1) as the cost parameters
of debt and equity financing respectively, proportionate to the amount of
borrowing and equity issuing; then 0 ≤ αd ≤ αe ≤ 1.
Second, debt and equity financing also differ in terms of bankruptcy costs.
Bankruptcy is only a concept associated with debt financing. There is no
possibility of bankruptcy if a firm is totally financed by equity. When going
into bankruptcy there is a cost of β percentage (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) of the total
capital. Here, since the total capital input is one unit, β can be understood
both as a percentage and an absolute number.
We can understand bankruptcy cost in a broader sense. Not only does
it include direct bankruptcy costs (legal, accounting, and other professional
fees, reorganization costs, etc.) and indirect bankruptcy costs (loss of key
personnel, loss of management time and efforts, lost sales from falling de-
mand as a result of customer concerns over future service difficulties, etc.),
but also the costs associated with low efficiency in allocating resources and
costly weak corporate control in debt financing recognized by the literature.
A country case study by Kang and Stulz (1998) shows that, far from being
the promoters of rational investment, Japanese banks impose soft budget
constraints, over-lending to declining firms that require radical reorganiza-
tion. According to Morck and Nakamura (1999), Japanese banks, instead of
facilitating governance, collude with enterprise managers to deter external
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threats to their control and to prop up troubled bank group firms. Lastly,
as a result of the existence of "bankruptcy chains" due to interconnections
among firms, the likelihood of bankruptcy can become a variable of systemic
concern, and effects of a negative shock on more than one firm may mate-
rialize. These negative bankruptcy externalities can also be included into
bankruptcy costs in a broad sense, especially from the macroeconomic point
of view, even if they are not taken into account by the entrepreneur.
In sum, although debt is cheaper in terms of state verification cost, debt
possibly induces a bankruptcy cost that would never happen with only equity.
3.2.2 A firm’s capital structure choice problem
Bankruptcy probability
A firm goes into bankruptcy if the realized total production is smaller than
the amount of debt owed plus the interest payment; i.e. if yi < γ(1 + r), In
terms of the random shocks, if




a firm goes into bankruptcy. Here, r is the interest rate charged by creditors,
which will be endogenously determined later.
The probability of going into bankruptcy is




Notice that the sum of two uniformly distributed random variables Ã (Ã =
Ãa + Ãf,i) has the density function:
f(Ã) = Ã (if 0 5 Ã 5 1)
f(Ã) = (2− Ã) (if 1 < Ã 5 2)
By assuming γ(1+r)
η
< 11, we get (3.5).
1The limitation among underlying parameters to ensures this inequality will be pre-
sented in section 3.2.3.
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Returns
When a firm goes into bankruptcy, shareholders (both controlling and non-
controlling shareholders) get nothing. Only when shocks are positive enough,
as stated in (3.4), can shareholders get the return after a fixed payment to
the creditors. Therefore, the total expected return to all shareholders isR 2
γ(1+r)
η
(ηÃ− γ(1 + r))f(Ã)dÃ. Since the entrepreneur gives up partial own-
ership to public shareholders, the entrepreneur’s part of return is




(ηÃ− γ(1 + r))f(Ã)dÃ (3.6)
corresponding to her share of ownership 1− s.






(ηÃ− γ(1 + r))f(Ã)dÃ− (1− γ)αe = (1− γ)(1 + r0) (3.7)









f(Ã)dÃ− γαd−βP = γ(1+ r0) (3.8)
These two no arbitrary conditions basically says that the expected return of
non-controlling shareholders and creditors by investing capital to entrepre-
neurs’ project is the same as the return by investing into the riskless asset.
By (3.3), (3.7) and (3.8), we get
s =
(1− γ)(1 + r0 + αe)
η − γ(1 + r0 + αd)− βP
(3.9)
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The entrepreneur’s capital structure choice problem
The entrepreneur problem is to choose γ to
Maximize η − (1 + r0)− αdγ − αe(1− γ)− βP









f(Ã)dÃ− γαd − βP = γ(1 + r0)
The constraint (i) is the normal boundary constraint. Constraint (ii)
is the creditors’ no arbitrage condition. Plugging in (3.5) and simplifying
constraint (ii) under the assumption that γ(1+r)
η
< 1,we get
r − r0 =
γ2(1 + r)3
6η2




Examining this equation, we find three reasons why interest rate charged by
creditors is higher than the risk-free interest rate: to compensate the low
returns in the states of bankruptcy; to compensate the monitoring activity;
to compensate the cost arising from bankruptcy.
Entrepreneurs maximizing the return is equivalent to their minimizing
the cost of capital. Therefore, the entrepreneur’s problem is simplified to
choose γ in order to (plug in (3.5))
Minimize αdγ + αe(1− γ) + β
γ2(1 + r)2
2η2
subject to (i). 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
(ii). r − r0 =
γ2(1 + r)3
6η2
+ αd + β
γ(1 + r)2
2η2
The solution of this problem is stated in appendix.
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Static analyses of γ∗
Examining the optimal capital structure choice, γ∗, we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Higher bankruptcy costs lead to a lower level of debt; a
greater difference between the costs associated with state verification of equity
and debt leads to a higher level of debt; higher productivity gives rise to a
higher level of debt; and a higher riskless interest rate give rises to a lower
level of debt.
Proof. see appendix.
This proposition characterizes how the optimal debt level is determined
within a firm. Higher bankruptcy costs make the debt more costly (thus less
attractive) and reduce the optimal leverage. The less expensive the equity
financing associated with state verification is, the less the cost advantages of
debt are, and the less attractive the debt financing is, and hence the smaller
leverage is. Given other factors, higher productivity transforms the same
amount of capital into more output, reducing the chance of insufficiency of
output for paying debt back, tending to increase leverage. Lastly, a lower
riskless interest rate reduces the capital costs of debt more than those of
equity, leading to increased leverage.
Identical firms make the same decisions. Therefore, at the macro level,
the financial structure of this economy can be measured by θ = 1−γ
γ
. By
definition, a higher θ corresponds to a market-based financial structure. In-
tuitively, proposition 3.1 tells us that an economy with high bankruptcy
costs, relatively cheaper equity, low productivity, and a high riskless interest
rate tends to have a market-based financial structure.
3.2.3 Aggregate problem
Proportion of bankrupted firms
Before the shocks are realized, each firm makes a capital structure decision
based on the knowledge of the distributions of the sum of two shocks. After
this decision has been made, both firm-specific shocks and aggregate shocks
are realized. Given the aggregate shock Ãa = Aa, the probability of anyone
firm going into bankruptcy is
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γ(1+r)
η








2(αe − αd)2η2 + β2(1 + r0 + αd)2−β(1+ r0+αd))
(3.13)
It is obvious that 0 < γ(1+r)
η
< 2.Throughout the calculation, we assume
γ(1+r)
η
< 1. We see that if




Since there are infinitely many identical firms, the proportion of firms
going into bankruptcy is the same as the probability of one firm going into
bankruptcy. Depending on how large the realized aggregate shocks are, two
types of situations exist.
A "good situation" happens when γ(1+r)
η
5 Aa 5 1. In this range of aggre-
gate shocks, the aggregate shocks are sufficiently large that even firms facing
the worst possible firm-specific shock (Af,i = 0) will not go into bankruptcy.




A "bad situation" happens when the realized aggregate shocks are small:
i.e., 0 5 Aa < γ(1+r)η . In this situation, bankruptcy is inevitable. The prob-




−Aa is the pro-
portion of firms going into bankruptcy. The lower the aggregate shock, the
higher the proportion of the firms that go into bankruptcy. The highest
proportion of firms going into bankruptcy is γ(1+r)
η
when Aa = 0.
Aggregate production
Aggregate production net of state verification costs (and bankruptcy costs)
in these two situations is
1. Good situation: YG = (Aa + 0.5)η − (1 + r0)− αdγ − αe(1− γ).
2. Bad situation: YB = (Aa+0.5)η− (1+r0)−αdγ−αe(1−γ)− (γ(1+r)η −
Aa)β.
Hereby, 0.5 comes from the law of large numbers (i.e., at the aggregate
level, the firm-specific shocks approach their expectations).
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3.2.4 Macroeconomic downturns
How aggregate production changes with the aggregate shock can be shown
in Figure 3.1, as indicated by the right-up sloped line with a kink at M.
The sub-line to the left of point M corresponds to YB, which is steeper than
the sub-line corresponding to YG, which is to the right of point M (Slope
η + β > η). This shape of the line captures the following idea. Not only do
the unfavorable aggregate shocks negatively affect the aggregate production
(indicated by the right-up slope of the line), but also the bankruptcy costs
reduce the aggregate production further, amplifying the negative effects of
unfavorable shocks (indicated by the two sublines). When unfavorable shocks
get larger, more firms go into bankruptcy and the amplification effects be-
come larger as well. In the extreme, when Aa = 0, the maximal amplification
effect occurs, which corresponds to the difference of these two sublines’ inter-
cepts on Y axis, measured by γ(1+r)
η
β.We call it as the "bankruptcy-induced
downturn amplification mechanism".
We define the vertical projection of M (point N in the figure, which is
γ(1+r)
η
far from O) as "cutting point" since this point divides the "Good
situation" from the "Bad situation". Noticeably, as shown in the figure the
change of γ(1+r)
η
has double effects. First, bigger γ(1+r)
η
(N moves away from
O) leads to a higher probability of the "Bad situation" happening. Second,
given that the aggregate shocks are in the "bad" range, bigger γ(1+r)
η
increases
the proportion of the firms going into bankruptcy. Therefore, bigger γ(1+r)
η
not only increases the probability of a "Bad situation", but also increases the
extent to which the downturn is amplified.
γ(1+r)
η
is determined by underlying parameters (see (3.13)). We can get the
following proposition stating the relationship between underlying parameters
and γ(1+r)
η
. This proposition is specifically about the position of the cutting
point in Figure 3.
Proposition 3.2 Higher bankruptcy costs lead to a smaller cutting point;
higher differences between the state verification costs of equity and debt lead to
a bigger cutting point; higher productivity gives rise to a bigger cutting point;
and a higher non-risk interest rate gives rise to a smaller cutting point.
Proof. see appendix.
A comparison of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 reveals that γ and γ(1+r)
η
move in
the same direction when underlying parameters change. Because γ indicates
to what extent the economy has a bank-based financial structure, and γ(1+r)
η
measures the probability and indicates the magnitude of an amplified down-
turn, propositions 3.1 and 3.2 together tell us that a bank-based financial
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system gives rise to a higher probability of an amplified economic downturn
and a more significant amplified downturn if downturn occurs. This is a
directly testable hypothesis.
3.2.5 Aggregate output variance
This subsection uses graphs to show how the changes of underlying parame-
ters can affect the variances of output. All of the analyses can be proved in
a more rigorous way, but simple graphs also work well.
Change of bankruptcy costs
Figure 3.1 shows the effects of increasing bankruptcy costs on output volatil-
ity. There are three effects. First, increased bankruptcy cost make debt fi-
nancing less advantageous. A shift of financing from debt to equity increases
the total state verification costs, and thus lowers the total output everywhere.
In the Figure, the dotted line is below the straight line. Second, increased
bankruptcy costs reduce γ(1+r)
η
(move from N to N 0),and thus increase the
possibility of a "Good situation" and reduce the variance of output. Third,
the increase of β means that the cost per bankruptcy increases. Therefore,
the production line in "Bad situations" becomes steeper, increasing the vari-
ance of production. In sum, when bankruptcy costs become higher, the
change of the variance of output is ambiguous.
Change of relative costs associated with state verification
Figure 3.2 shows how the output changes if equity becomes relatively more
expensive. First, more expensive equity increases reliance on cheaper debt,
increasing the level of production. In this figure, the dotted line is above
the straight line. Second, relatively expensive equity financing increases the
cutting point from N to N 0, thus decreasing the possibility of a "Good
situation". Because the straight and dotted lines parallel each other, and the
steeper part of the dotted line becomes "longer" after the cost change, the
variance of production will increase.
Change of the productivity parameter
Figure 3.3 shows how output changes when the productivity parameter in-
creases. First, higher productivity will increase reliance on debt, since an
individual firm’s bankruptcy probability goes down. The level of production
will therefore increase. Second, when increasing productivity, both parts of
the dotted production line become steeper, but since the cutting point moves
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to the right the even steeper line becomes "longer". Therefore, the variance
of production goes up.
Change of the riskless interest rate
Figure 3.4 shows how production changes when the riskless interest rate in-
creases. First, higher interest rate reduces the level of production because it
shifts the capital structure towards the more expensive way of financing. Sec-
ond, when increasing the riskless interest rate, both parts of the production
line are parallel with the original ones, but since the cutting point moves
to the left, the steeper line becomes "shorter". Therefore, the variance of
production goes down.
Table 3.1 summarizes the analyses in subsections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 of the re-
lationships between underlying parameters, financial structure, output vari-
ance, and economic downturn.
Table 3.1: Theoretical Summery: relationships between underlying para-
meters, financial structure, variances of output, and probability and severity
of economic downturn
Financial structure Variance of GDP Economic downturn
β ↓ more bank based undetermined higher probability,
more severe
(αe − αd) ↑ more bank based ↑ higher probability
r0 ↓ more bank based ↑ higher probability
η ↑ more bank based ↑ higher probability
It is hard to observe underlying parameters, such as bankruptcy cost, etc.
What we can easily observe is the absolute and relative sizes of credit and
equity markets. The model predicts that (1) A bank-based financial struc-
ture has a higher probability of a "bad situation", and a greater amplified
downturn if that happens; (2) A bank-based financial structure tend to have
higher variances of output, although the effects of lower bankruptcy costs on
the variance of output is ambiguous. The remaining part of the chapter tests
these predictions.
3.3 Data and empirical specifications
3.3.1 Data
The data analyzed in this study cover 175 countries from 1960 to 2002 at
the longest. Two sources of data are combined: the World Development
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Indicators (WDI, 2003) for GDP growth rate and various control variables,
and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) data for domestic financial
variables2. The ending year of the available financial data from Beck et al.’s
dataset is 1997. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are provided
in appendix.
Growth rate variables
Annual GDP per capita growth rates are from the WDI data set. We use a
simple and straightforward method to get the measure of economic volatility,
which is the dependent variable: the standard deviation of annual growth
rate over a certain period3, namely sd_GDPg. We also construct an annual
Downturn variable from GDP growth-rate data, as an alternative dependent
variable, defined later.
Financial development and structure variables
Two variables are used as measures of domestic credit and equity market
size, respectively. They are CredPriv (Claims on private sector by deposit
money banks as a share of GDP) and Mcap (Stock market capitalization as
a share of GDP). CredPriv measures the size activity of the financial inter-
mediary sector, channelling funds to investors in the private sector. Thus,
it excludes credits to governments, state-owned enterprises, and cross claims
on other financial intermediaries. Furthermore, it includes credits not only
by deposit banks, but also by other financial intermediaries, such as finance
companies and life insurance companies. Mcap measures the size of the stock
market relative to GDP. There are alternative variables measuring financial
development commonly used in the empirical literature, such as the ratio of
the assets of deposit money banks to the sum of the assets of deposit money
banks and the central bank, the ratio of the claims to the non-financial pri-
vate sector divided by the total domestic credit, stock market total value
2WDI also contains domestic financial data. But the starting year for the available data
is much later than Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine’s and they lacks information on other
financial data except credit and equity. Moreover, there are minor differences among the
financial variables both contained in the two data sets. That Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine’s data are more widely used and supposed to be more reliable provides us another
reason to use their financial data.
3There are several ways to extract the business cycle component of the output, such
as linear detrending, first difference, moving average, HP filter, and the most recently BP
filter. First difference is simple and suitable for data of difference stationary. Logarithm of
GDP per capita is regarded difference stationary. Therefore, first difference of logarithm
of annual GDP per capita (approximately equal to GDP per capita annual growth rate)
is used here as the way of detrending.
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traded, stock market turnover ratio, etc. However, the efficiency, liquidity,
and structure (except credit vs. equity) of the financial system is not empha-
sized by the theoretical model developed in section 3.2. Instead, the model
mainly describes how the absolute and relative size of the credit and equity
contract may matter for economic volatility and downturn. Corresponding
to the model, we only apply size measurements in the regressions.
To consider the widest range of financial instruments possible, we also use
two other size indicators of financial development: PriBonCap (Private bond
market capitalization to GDP) and LongPriDe (Long-term Private Debt Is-
sues to GDP), both from Beck et al.’s data set. To classify these variables
properly, we recall the model in section 3.2, which actually focuses on the
mechanism of which bankruptcy costs associated with a credit contract can
amplify an economic downturn. To reflect this, we regard these financial
instruments as closer to equity than to the credit contract because they are
either tradeable or have a long time maturity, making the issuers suffer less
from bankruptcy. The mechanism emphasized by the model is therefore less
workable for these financial instruments. The summation of Mcap, PriBon-
Cap, and LongPriDe is referred to as Capital.
Noticeably, there is no one-to-one relationship between financial structure
and financial development. All of the measures of financial development can
be dramatically different among countries with a similar financial structure;
countries in similar phase of financial development can have quite different
financial structures (Stulz, 1999). For example, Japan and the U.S. have
a similar level of financial development, yet different financial structures;
Mexico and the Netherlands have a similar financial structure, yet quite a
different degree of financial development (Tadesse, 2001). It is therefore
necessary to distinguish financial structure from financial development. In
the chapter, apart from the size indicators of credit and equity showing the
degree of financial development of a particular country in time, we also calcu-
late a proxy to show the relative importance of these two ways of financing,
namely Struc. It is defined as stock market capitalization divided by private
sector claims of deposit banks(Mcap/CredPriv). Larger Struc indicates that
an equity contract is relatively more important in the country. If we define a
market-based financial system as one that relies more on equity contracts, we
can say that a country with a higher Struc variable has a more market-based
financial system.
Instrumental variables
A set of instrumental variables is used to control for the possibility that both
the financial structure and the degree of growth volatility are being caused
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by third factors. The "law and finance" literature (see La Porta, Rafael et
al., 1997, 1998, for a general discussion, and Modigliani and Perotti, 1997, for
security markets, in particular) could help us to find instrumental variables
explaining financial structure but not growth rate volatility. The basic mes-
sage in this area of literature is as follows. A good legal environment protects
potential financiers against expropriation by the managers and entrepreneurs.
The cost for entrepreneurs of raising capital from outside financiers, either
by equity or by debt, therefore will be lower, the more protection of the
outsiders’ rights is offered by the law itself and by the enforceability of the
law. As a consequence, the width, depth, and scope of the financial system
will be more expanded in a better legal environment. Although the "law and
finance" literature focuses more on the law effects on the overall financial de-
velopment, we can apply them to explain the financial structural differences
as well. Here, the financial structure is once more defined as the relative
importance of the equity vs. credit contract.
First, a natural hypothesis is that an economy with greater shareholders’
rights protection will possess a more market-based financial structure4. Sec-
ondly, the degree of law enforceability could influence the financial structure
in either direction, depending on which way of financing generates, by na-
ture, potentially more conflicts of interests between insiders and outsiders.
Thirdly, as argued in the theoretical model, one reason why equity contracts
are more expensive than debt contracts is that equity contracts need more
states to be verified. Therefore, if the general information disclosure stan-
dards in a country are more strict, then the cost difference between debt and
equity is expected to be smaller, equity could be relatively cheap, and the
financial structure could be more market based.
To reflect these three considerations, we choose Srights (Minority share-
holders’ rights), Crights (Creditor rights), and Law (Rule of law) as proxies
for shareholders’ rights protection, creditors’ rights protection, and law en-
forceability, to explain cross-country differences in financial structures. We
additionally include Account (Accounting standards) as a measurement for
the strictness of information disclosure, and expect that a higher standard of
accounting is associated with a more market-based financial structure. All
these indicators are found in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny
(1998).
Finally, the theoretical model shows that the financial structure is deter-
mined by the following underlying parameters: the cost difference between
4La Porta, et al. (1998) also shows that (1) the United States is actually one of the
most anticreditor common-law countries; (2). German-civil-law countries are protective
of secured creditors and generally not of shareholders.
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equity and debt financing, bankruptcy costs, the riskless interest rate, and
the productivity parameter. In principle, all of these could be used as ex-
planatory variables for financial structure. However, in order to be used as
instrumental variables, they also need to be exogenous of growth volatility.
Theoretically, it is not clear whether the riskless interest rate and the pro-
ductivity parameter are exogenous of growth rate. So we are reluctant to
choose them as instrumental variables. Moreover, since it is hard to get
cross-country data on bankruptcy costs, it is not yet feasible for us to use
bankruptcy cost as one of the instrumental variables. In the chapter, we use
only the above-mentioned legal variables, all more or less actually related to
the state verification cost difference between equity and debt financing, as
instrumental variables for financial structure.
Controlling variables
In addition to the instrumental variables, other variables usually considered
to be determinants of the volatility of economic activity are also included in
the regressions.
Two variables control for the monetary and fiscal aspects of the economy.
Controlling for the effects of monetary policy, Inflation (defined as the aver-
age annual rate of change of the GDP deflator) shows the rate of price change
in the economy as a whole. We do not use direct measures of monetary pol-
icy, like the level of M1, M2, or the standard deviations of M1 and M2 growth
rates, etc., either because the levels of M1 and M2 are significantly correlated
with CrediPriv, or because the standard deviations of M1 growth rate and
M2 growth rate are subject to severe endogenity problems. Gov_consump,
the General government final consumption expenditure (as a percentage of
GDP), is used to test whether government size has any stabilizing effects.
The openness of the country, both economically and financially, also can
potentially influence the volatility of economic activity. Thus, this study
includes the following two variables indicating the degree of one country’s
connection with the rest of the world. Trade is the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP, measuring the strength
of external economic links. PrivCapFlow refers to the net capital flows (both
debt and non-debt flows) as a percentage of GDP, capturing the financial
aspect of a country’s connection with the rest of the world.
Moreover, since the change of exchange rate could be understood as a
kind of external shock influencing GDP volatility, we include e_change ( the
absolute value of real effective exchange rate change in percentage) to take
this into consideration.
Finally, we also include OECD (equal to 1 if the country is an OECD
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member country5) to capture other non-controlled fixed factors related to
development stages that could affect growth volatility, such as industrial
structure, institutions, etc.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for all data in the study.
3.3.2 Empirical specifications
To test how financial development and structure can affect economic volatil-
ity and downturns, we run two types of regressions, one for explaining the
standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate, and one for explaining the
probability and degree of economic downturns, by using an array of financial
variables and control variables as independent variables.
To explain growth rate volatility, we use two specifications:
(sd_GDPg_pc)i,t = β0+β1X1,i,t+β2X2,i,t+...βnXn,i,t+α1Crediti,t+α2Equityi,t+ i,t
(3.15)
(sd_GDPg_pc)i,t = β0 + β1X1,i,t + β2X2,i,t + ...βnXn,i,t + α1Struci,t + i,t
(3.16)
X1 to Xn are n control variables, as listed above. Crediti,t and Equityi,t
are credit and equity market development indicators, and Struc is a proxy
indicating a particular country’s financial structure. Subscript i denotes the
country identity, and t is the period over which variables are collapsed either
in terms of standard deviation (for the GDP growth rate and net capital
flows) or in terms of mean value (for the rest). The broadest time span of
our data is between 1960 and 2002. We construct three data sets according
to the number of periods into which the data are divided. We first calculate
the corresponding mean and standard deviations of certain variables over the
entire period, thereby obtaining a cross-country data set with one observation
for each country. We also divide the entire period into two sub-periods: 1960
to 1981 and 1982 to 2002, thereby obtaining a panel with two time-period
dimensions. Three periods are constructed as well, with 1974, 1988 and 2002
as ending years. An ideal characterization of the amplitude of the GDP
growth volatility in each country and each time period would require a large
5We use the latest OECD member country list including the following 30 countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep., Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
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number of annual observations. However, we face a trade-off: as we increase
the number of years in each period, perhaps increasing the accuracy with
which we characterize volatility, we reduce the number of periods we can use
in estimation, thereby reducing estimation efficiency. We use these three ways
of collapsing the data to take this trade-off into consideration. In addition,
we can check whether the regression results are sensitive to period divisions.
Our theoretical model mainly captures the amplification effects of finan-
cial factors on economic downturns. Expressed differently: rather than sym-
metrically studying how economic booms and recessions can be amplified by
financial factors, the model instead focuses on how economic downturns can
be propagated due to bankruptcy costs and generally the relative cost of debt
finance. This leads us to consider two other specifications in order to more
directly test this one-sided focused theory.
Downturni,t = β0+β1X1,i,t+β2X2,i,t+...βnXn,i,t+α1Crediti,t+α2Equityi,t+ i,t
(3.17)
Downturni,t = β0+ β1X1,i,t + β2X2,i,t + ...βnXn,i,t +α1Struci,t + i,t (3.18)
HereDownturni,t = 0, ifGDPg_pci,t ≥ 0;Downturni,t = GDPg_pci,t,if
GDPg_pci,t < 0, i.e., we set the values of the dependent variable to zero for a
non-negative growth rate and keep the original numbers for negative growth
rates. Among all of our observations, approximately 19.90% have a negative
growth rate. We thus, in fact, create a censored data set. We use a Tobit
model for estimations.
3.4 Empirical results
This section presents two sets of regression results. First, we examine how
financial variables can influence growth rate volatility. We employ three ways
of measuring time periods and use credit and equity variables separately or
equity divided by credit as explanatory variables. Secondly, we consider the
effects of financial development and structure on the probability and extent
of economic downturns. For this purpose, we do not collapse data over years.
Instead, we run regressions on annual panel data directly. Similar to our
approach to growth rate variance regressions, we use the absolute and relative
size of equity and credit development as explanatory variables, respectively,
checking their roles in accounting for economic downturns.
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In cross-country growth-rate volatility regressions, we use robust stan-
dard error methods to correct for possible cross-country heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation. Fixed or random effects panel-data techniques could
be used for growth-rate volatility regressions with two or three time periods.
Nevertheless, note that the panel-data estimators are asymptotically normal
as T →∞. In small samples, especially when the number of groups exceeds
the number of periods, the panel-data estimators yield overly optimistic stan-
dard errors, and lead to overconfidence of the results. Therefore, rather than
fixed or random effects panel-data techniques, FGLS methods is applied for
these two classes of panel regressions, allowing for possible heteroscedasticity
across country panels and autocorrelation over time (specifically, we assume
AR(1) autocorrelation) within a panel. Tobit estimation methods are applied
when economic downturns are to be explained.
3.4.1 Finance and GDP growth-rate volatility
Aggregating time dimensions differently, Tables 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6 present the
results on how finance can impact growth-rate volatility. All of these regres-
sions are based on specifications (3.15) and (3.16).
Table 3.3 shows the cross-section regression results: A1 includes credit and
equity indicators separately and simultaneously; A2 additionally contains
a credit term squared; A3 replaces equity indicators with the equity plus
capitalization ratio to GDP of private bonds and long-term debt; and B uses
the relative size measure of equity vs. credit. Since Mcap always enters into
regression with negative significant signs no matter whether CredPriv(square)
is included, we can say that a bigger stock market (measured by market
capitalization) is conducive to reducing growth-rate volatility.
As shown in A1, CredPriv itself can not significantly affect growth-rate
volatility; this seeming insignificance of credit variables is probably due to
non-linearity effects, however. This guess is verified in A2 when CredPriv
(square) is added to the regression. A larger credit market is associated with
less volatility, but only to a certain extent— a credit market that is very large
will increase growth-rate volatility6.
6One explanation of the non-linearity is suggested by the ambiguous effects of bank-
ruptcy cost on variance of output as shown in section 3.2. If in the range of relative high
bankruptcy cost, "steeper effect" dominates "good situation effect", and vice versa for the
range of relative low bankruptcy cost, decrease of bankruptcy cost in the range of relative
high bankruptcy cost (therefore more credit) will decrease output volatility, and vice versa
for the case of decreasing bankruptcy cost in the range of relative low bankruptcy cost.
Therefore we can observe that more credit is reducing volatility of output only to a certain
extent. Another explanation is suggested by Beck, et. al. (2001). If rich countries suffer
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By replacing Mcap with Capital and running first regressions of A1 and
A2, regressions in A3 aim at checking whether equity financing in a broad
sense plays a similar role as equity in a narrow sense. Indeed, we find that
Capital can still significantly reduce growth-rate volatility, although the non-
linearity effects of CredPriv disappear. Results of Table 3.A3 confirm to a
certain extent our treatment of private bonds and long-term debt as quasi-
equity, based on the argument that the issuers of these financial instruments
risk a lower chance of paying bankruptcy costs.
Struc enters significantly into three out of four regressions in B, show-
ing that a market based financial system is beneficial for reducing growth
volatility. Therefore, not only the absolute sizes of equity and credit matter
for growth volatility, but also their relative size.
By adding different combinations of various control variables, Table 3.3’s
results also point out how other economic factors affect growth volatility.
First, a high percentage of government consumption relative to GDP is as-
sociated with increased growth-rate volatility, implying that the relative size
of government consumption is destabilizing rather than stabilizing volatil-
ity. This could be due to the fact that discretionary government spending
is subject to long lags, leading to its destabilizing effects. Secondly, Trade
enters into the regressions (1) of A1, A2, and B with positive signs. These
show that although (theoretically speaking) a more open economy may have
greater opportunities to export domestic shocks abroad, the heightened ex-
posure to external shocks dominates this effect, and openness effects on net
are to increase volatility. Noticeably, the effects of Trade become insignificant
when more control variables are included, as in (2), (3), and (4) of A1, A2,
and B. However, since the sample size changes over different combinations
of control variables, (1) and (2), (3), (4) are not very comparable. OECD
dummy can always enter into regressions with negative signs in all regressions
in Table 3.3, which is intuitively reasonable: on average, OECD countries, as
mature economies, have less volatile growth rates compared to non-OECD
countries. Moreover, high volatile net private capital flows are associated
with a high volatility of growth rate. Countries with higher inflation rates
have a more volatile growth. Probably one reason is that higher inflation
could signal active discretionary monetary policies, which is usually believed
to be destabilizing by monetarists. Lastly, the average absolute value of
the annual real exchange rate change enters significantly with positive sign
into two out of three of the regressions numbered as (4) in A1, A2, and B,
monetary shocks more than real shocks and vice versa for poor countries, non-linearity
between credit size and volatility is simply the reflection of rich countries tend to have
more advanced credit market development than poor countries.
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indicating the destabilizing effects of real exchange rate instability.
To account for the possibility that both financial structure and growth
volatility are being caused by third variables, Table 3.4 chooses some legal in-
strumental variables to extract the exogenous components of financial struc-
ture, examining whether these exogenous components still play similar roles.
Table 3.4A takes Struc as a dependent variable to see how legal and other
variables could explain to what extent a country is market based or bank
based. In all four specifications, Srights (measuring to what extent minority
shareholders are protected by rules and laws) presents significantly positive
signs, which is consistent with our expectations. Moreover, higher account-
ing standards and better accounting practice, as information contained in
Account, enter into regressions with positive signs. One explanation of this
result could be that a market-based system requires more pieces of informa-
tion to be disclosed and more accurate information to be revealed compared
to a bank-based system. Law and Crights can’t significantly enter into these
regressions — probably because Srights and Account indicators already re-
flect information contained in these two variables. Due to data limitations
on Srights and Account (when they are chosen as IV variables for Struc) the
analogous regression as in Table 3.3B (1) only has 39 observations. For the
sake of comparison, we restrict ourselves to these 39 observations and run two
regressions: one with IV and one without. The results are shown in Table
3.4B. Using IV methods yields the expected sign of Struc with significance,
whereas not using IV results in the interested variable Struc being not sig-
nificant. It is therefore the exogenous component of Struc that explains the
change of growth rate volatility. In this respect, IV improves the regressions.
Table 3.5 presents the results for two-time-period panel regressions, and
Table 3.6 shows the results for three time periods. The number of obser-
vations in all regressions increases correspondingly. In terms of the coeffi-
cients’ signs and significancy, these two panel regressions obtain results sim-
ilar to those in cross-section regressions (except for some minor differences).
Regarding financial variables, for example, equity is conducive to reducing
growth rate volatility, whereas credit is so only to a certain extent7. In terms
of relative size of equity vs debt, a market-based system is better at reducing
growth volatility. The consistency of panel results with that of cross-section
further supports the conclusion of our empirical analyses on the relationship
between finance and volatility.
7Replacing Mcap with Capital in these panel regressions, the results of cross section
remain.
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3.4.2 Finance and economic downturns
By assigning zero to a non-negative growth rate, and keeping the original
values of negative growth rates, we create a censored panel data set. The
regressions of Downturn, the "censored" dependent variables, on financial
development and structure indicators are based on specifications (3.17) and
(3.18).
Table 3.7A presents the results on the basis of (3.17). As shown in A1,
CredPriv significantly enters into the regression with a negative sign, and
Mcap with a positive sign among all combinations of controlling variables.
These results strongly imply that larger credit to private sectors relative to
GDP actually increases the probability of having negative growth and the
severity of a downturn happening8 (and vice versa for larger stock market
capitalization relative to GDP). A2 adds a credit square term into the regres-
sions. We find that the credit square term is not always significant, and that
CredPriv and Mcap keep the same results as when the credit square term is
not included, although the significance of CredPriv decreases a bit.
Comparing Table 3.7A’s results with those in Tables 3A, 5A, and 6A
with growth rate volatility as a dependent variable, we get the same miti-
gating effects of equity development on growth-rate volatility as on economic
downturns. The nature of the effects of credit development on volatility
and downturn are different, however. Non-linearity impacts of credit size on
growth-rate volatility can’t be found in the downturn regressions. Instead,
we find an amplifying linear effect of credit size on downturns. This is more
or less consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model elaborated in
section 3.2.
Control variables in Table 3.7A impact the probability and severity of
economic downturn in a similar direction to those on volatility as presented
in Tables 3.3A, 3.5A, and 3.6A. Larger government consumption increases the
probability and the degree of a negative growth rate. Openness, measured by
Trade, can’t significantly influence the possibility and severity of economic
downturns. OECD countries, on average, suffer fewer and smaller downturns.
Moreover, the net positive private capital flows increase the probability and
severity of downturns. Finally, a higher inflation rate and a larger absolute
real exchange rate change are both associated with a higher probability and
a more severe downturn.
8The estimated parameters of Tobit model have a double interpretation: one as the
impact of a change in independent variable on the probability of having non-zero dependent
values, and one as the impact of a change in independent variable on the level of the non-
zero dependent variable. Both effects automatically have the same sign (see Verbeek,
Chapter 7).
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Table 3.7B presents the results on the basis of specification (3.18). Be-
cause CredPriv and Mcap enter into downturn regressions simultaneously
with negative and positive signs, respectively, it is not surprising that Struc
( constructed by dividing Mcap with CredPriv) can significantly enter into
downturn regressions with a positive sign (as shown in Table 3.7B). This im-
plies that relatively more equity financing will decrease the probability and
severity of economic downturns. Other control variables have similar effects
and interpretations as in Table 3.7A.
Throughout the regressions in Table 3.7, we add another control variable,
mv5_GDPg, which is the moving average of GDP per capita growth rate
of the previous five years. We add this control variable because countries
that are growing faster have a lower probability of an actual downturn. The
change in growth rates required for a recession are larger, for example, and
the shocks that are required to put an economy into recession are thus larger.
Not surprisingly, we find a significant positive sign for this control variable.
3.5 Discussion and conclusions
The basic message of the chapter can be summarized as follows. In theory,
an individual firm’s optimal capital structure choice and the resultant macro
financial structure of a country are endogenously shaped by the country’s
underlying parameters, such as bankruptcy costs, state verification costs,
the riskless interest rate, and a productivity parameter. The financial struc-
ture differences across countries therefore basically reflect the cross-country
differences of these parameters. Due to the "bankruptcy-induced downturn-
amplification mechanism" associated with debt financing, a bank-based fi-
nancial structure tends to exacerbate the volatility of GDP growth, and
the chances and the severity of an economic downturn. Empirically, we
find strong evidence consistent with these theoretical predictions: (1) Equity
market size can be good at reducing GDP growth rate volatility; Credit mar-
ket size doesn’t significantly matter for growth rate volatility linearly, and
only matters non-linearly: a larger credit market size can reduce growth-rate
volatility, but only up to a certain level of credit market size; (2) Credit mar-
ket size increases the probability and severity of an economic downturn (vice
versa for equity market size); the non-linearity effects of credit disappear
when explaining economic downturns; (3) A bank-based financial structure
tends to have a more volatile growth rate and a higher probability and a
more severe economic downturn.
Compared with the existing theoretical literature on the relationship be-
tween finance and economic fluctuations, our simple model offers another
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particular mechanism to evaluate how finance can affect fluctuations. Admit-
tedly, the consistency of empirical findings with the predictions of this model
can only partially validate the model, since our empirical specifications and
data limitations constrain us from discriminating the "bankruptcy-induced
downturn-amplification mechanism" from other finance-fluctuation mecha-
nisms as listed in the introduction of the chapter. This shortcoming is espe-
cially true for regressions using growth rate variance as a dependent variable.
Nevertheless, the regressions using Downturn as a dependent variable resem-
ble more a closer and direct test of the theoretical model. The relevance of
the mechanism specified in the model is therefore supported empirically.
Previous empirical studies accumulatively establish the mitigating effects
of credit market development on macroeconomic volatility. Nevertheless,
most of them do not include equity market development indicators into re-
gressions. In this study, we find that when stock market capitalization is
included into the regressions for growth-rate volatility, the credit indicators
become insignificant; it is thus actually equity market development that plays
a role in reducing volatility. High correlations between these two indicators
may explain the difference in results between our study and the previous
ones. Our study shows, specifically, that it is equity market development
that matters more dominantly. Even more strikingly, in regressions using
Downturn as the dependent variable, we find that credit market size actually
increases the probability and severity of economic downturns, which con-
trasts significantly with previous views. In Downturn regressions, a larger
equity market continues to play the role of reducing the chances and severity
of economic downturns.
Policy measures that stimulate the absolute and relative sizes of equity
market development may be consequently prescribed in order to achieve
smaller volatility and fewer and less severe economic downturns. Levine
(2002) concludes that financial structure does not help explain long-term eco-
nomic growth. He therefore takes a neutral position regarding which financial
structure to promote. Others (Allen and Gale, 1999; and Christensen and
Drejre, 1998) argue that which financial structure better facilitates growth
depends on the sources and types of growth. For developing countries, for
example, a bank-based financial structure is preferred. Our study shows that
financial structure is not neutral, as far as reducing macro volatility and pre-
venting economic downturns are concerned. Furthermore, our argument that
market-based financial structure is preferred in order to maintain stability
may put policy makers in developing countries in a difficult position if they
happen to believe that a bank-based structure is better for growth.
To classify financial structures as either "bank-based" or "market-based"
is not that straightforward, sometimes confusing, or even misleading, since a
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bank- or market-based financial structure can have different meanings. One
meaning is relationship-based versus arm-length financing, which character-
izes the anonymous, blind, and competitive nature of market-based financial
system vs. a bank-based financial system. An economy with a competitive
(although large) banking system, however, is closer to an arm-length than
a relationship-based financial system (Rajan and Zingales, 2003); to thus
classify this economy as a bank-based system is too superficial. The second
meaning is a universal bank versus banks with separate financial services.
Nowadays, the restrictive regulation separating lending activity from invest-
ment is becoming looser in many countries. Thus an economy with a typical
universal banking system can have sizeable equities dealt by banks. Through-
out the chapter, we use the common terminology of bank- vs. market-based
financial system, but we distinguish one financial system with another partic-
ularly by the relative size of debt vs. equity contracts. With this meaning, it
is possible, then, that the distinction between bank-based and market-based
financial systems does not coincide with the distinction between debt-based
vs. equity-based financial systems. More exactly, within the context of this
chapter the difference between bank- and market-based financial systems is
defined on the basis of the characteristics setting debt contracts apart from
equity contract: the extent of the necessity of verifying states and the close-
ness of each contract’s association with bankruptcy cost. When we say, for
example, that one country has a bank-based financial system, we mean that
the debt contract is relatively more prevalent than the equity contract in
size, and that the characteristics associated with this financial structure are
lower state verification costs yet possibly more bankruptcy costs. Both our
theoretical and empirical results concerning the financial structure’s role in
volatility are particularly defined along this line. And we believe that this
conceptual dimension of the financial structure matters especially for macro-
economic volatility.
Chapter 3. Finance, Volatility, and Downturns 86
Appendix to Chapter 3
3A Proofs
Solution to the optimal capital structure problem
The problem:
Minimize αdγ + αe(1− γ) + β
γ2(1 + r)2
2η2
subject to (i). 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
(ii). r − r0 =
γ2(1 + r)3
6η2




L(γ, r,m) = αdγ + αe(1− γ) + β
γ2(1 + r)2
2η2






]− k1γ − k2(1− γ)
k1γ = 0, k1 ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0
k2(1− γ) = 0, k2 ≥ 0, 1− γ ≥ 0
First order conditions:
−(αe − αd) +
β(1 + r)2γ
η2
−mβ (1 + r)
2
2η2
−mγ (1 + r)
3
3η2










r − r0 =
γ2(1 + r)3
6η2
+ αd + β
γ(1 + r)2
2η2
If k1 > 0, then we need γ = 0; therefore, k2 = 0. Then, from the simplified
F.O.C.s, we get k1 = (αd − αe)−mβ (1+r)
2
2η2
< 0. Contradiction. So k1 = 0.
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When k1 = 0, if k2 > 0, then γ = 1. From the simplified F.O.C.s, we can
solve for (k2,m, r) without contradictions. Therefore, we could get a corner
solution γ∗ = 1.
When k1 = 0 and k2 = 0, we arrive at the problem for solving interior
solutions.
Plugging in k1 = 0 and k2 = 0 to F.O.C.s, we solve this equation system
for γ and r. We get,
γ1,2 =
2[±((αe − αd)2η2 − β2(1 + r0 + αd)2)
q
2(αe − αd)2η2 + β2(1 + r0 + αd)2
+β3(1 + r0 + αd)
3]
3(αe − αd)3η2(1 + r0 + αd)2
(3.19)
r1,2 =
−3β2(1− r0 − αd)(1 + r0 + αd)2 − 2(αe − αd)2η2(1 + 3r0 + 3αd)
±3β(1 + r0 + αd)2
q
2(αe − αd)2η2 + β2(1 + r0 + αd)2
6β2(1 + r0 + αd)2 − 4(αe − αd)2η2
(3.20)
Furthermore we try to calculate out γ1 ∗ r1 and γ2 ∗ r2 :
γ1 ∗ r1 =
2(αe − αd)η4[6β2r0(1 + r0 + αd)2 + (αe − αd)2η2(1 + 3r0 + 3αd)2]
3η2(1 + r0 + αd)
Since αe > αd, this expression is positive. However,
γ2 ∗ r2 = −
3β(αe − αd)2η2(1 + r0 + αd)2 + 2β3(1 + r0 + αd)3
+[(αe − αd)2η2(1 + 3r0 + 3αd)
+2β2(1 + r0 + αd)
2]
q
2(αe − αd)2η2 + β2(1 + r0 + αd)2
3(αe − αd)3η2(1 + r0 + αd)
which is negative when αe > αd, proving that γ2 and r2 in fact have opposite
signs, which is not possible in theory. Therefore, the only reasonable optimal
capital structure choice is (γ∗, r∗) = (γ1, r1), both taking the plus signs of
(3.19) and (3.20).
From the first-order conditions, we can get two border solutions:
1. γ∗ = 0 if αe = αd. If there is no difference between equity and debt
financing costs associated with state verification, there is no need to
borrow, since the firm is fully equity financed.
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2. γ∗ = 1 if
12β3(1 + r0 + αd)
4 = (αe − αd)η2[12β2(1 + r0 + αd)2 − 8(αe − αd)2η2
+9(1 + r0 + αd)
2(αe − αd)2]
One particular example for γ∗ = 1 is the following. When 8η2 =
9(1+ r0+αd)
2, β = 0 is a sufficient condition for full debt financing to
be optimal. Put differently, under a certain relationship between the
productivity parameter and the riskless interest rate, if the bankruptcy
cost is negligible, there is no need to issue equity, since the firm is fully
debt financed.
Proposition 3.1
















2β(1 + r0 + αd)[(αe − αd)2η2 + β2(1 + r0 + αd)2
−β(1 + r0 + αd)
q
2(αe − αd)2η2 + β2(1 + r0 + αd)2]
−(αe − αd)3η2
q
2(αe − αd)2η2 + β2(1 + r0 + αd)2
Since the expression in the bracket of the nominator is positive, and the





Proof. It can be proved by taking derivatives of expression (3.13) w.r.t.




β(1 + r0 + αd)[β(1 + r0 + αd)−
q
2(αe − αd)2η2 + β2(1 + r0 + αd)2]
−(αe − αd)η2
q
2(αe − αd)2η2 + β2(1 + r0 + αd)2
Since the expression in the bracket of the nominator is negative, and the
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3B Figures
 









Figure 3.1: The effects of increasing β on output volatility
 










Figure 3.2: The effects of increasing αe − αd on output volatility
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Figure 3.3: The effects of increasing η on output volatility
 











Figure 3.4: The effects of increasing r0 on output volatility
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3C Variable definitions
• Dependent variables (Source: World Development Indicators dataset,
2003)
sd_GDPg: standard deviations of GDP per capita growth rate over cer-
tain periods (1960-2002).
Downturn: constructed annual data, equal to zero if GDP per capita
growth rate is non-negative; equal to GDP per capita growth rate if GDP
per capita growth rate is negative (1960-2002).
• Financial system development and structure indicators (Source: Beck,
Thorsten, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine (2000))
CredPriv : Claims on private sector by deposit money banks as a share of
GDP (1960-1997).
Mcap: Stock market capitalization as a share of GDP (1960-1997).
PriBonCap: Private bond market capitalization to GDP; only available
for limited countries between 1990 to 1997.
LongPriDe: Long-term Private Debt Issues to GDP; available for limited
countries between 1980 to 1997.
Capital: equity type financial instruments, constructed as the sum of
Mcap, PriBonCap, and LongPriDe.
Struc: constructed financial structure measurement, defined as stock mar-
ket capitalization divided by private sector claims of deposit banks (Mcap /
CredPriv) over the same period (1960-1997).
• Instrumental Variables (Source: La Porta et al. (1996)).
Srights: Anti-director rights. An index aggregating shareholder rights.
The index ranges from 0 to 5; the higher the number, the more minority
shareholders are protected. The index is formed by adding 1 if: (1) the
country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not
required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting;
(3) cumulative voting is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in
place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder
to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to
10% (the sample median).
Crights: Creditor rights. An index aggregating creditor rights. The index
ranges from 0 to 4; a higher number means more protection to creditors.
The index is formed by adding 1 if: (1) the country imposes restrictions,
such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends, to file for reorganization;
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(2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the
reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) the debtor
does not retain the administration of his property pending the resolution of
the reorganization; (4) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution
of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt
firm.
Law: Rules of law. Assessment of the law and order tradition in the
country produced by the country risk rating agency International Country
Risk (ICR). Average of the months of April and October of the monthly
index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for
less tradition of law and order (La Porta (1996) changed the scale from its
original range going from 0 to 6).
Account: Accounting standard. Index created by examining and rating
companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items.
These items fall into seven categories (general information, income state-
ments, balance sheets, funds flow statements, accounting standards, stock
data, and special items). A minimum of three companies in each country
were studied. Non-financial companies represented 70 percent, and financial
companies represented the remaining 30 percent. A higher number corre-
sponds to a higher accounting standard.
• Controlling variables (Source: World Development Indicators dataset,
2003)
GovConsump: General government final consumption expenditure (as %
of GDP). It includes all government current expenditures for purchases of
goods and services (including compensation of employees)(1960-2002).
Inflation: annual growth rate of the GDP deflator. GDP deflator is the
ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. It
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole (1960-2002).
Trade: The sum of exports and imports of goods and services as % of
GDP (1960-2002).
(sd_)PrivCapFlow: (Standard deviation) of net capital flows as % of
GDP. Net private capital flows consist of private debt (commercial bank lend-
ing, bonds, and other private credits) and non-debt flows (FDI and portfolio
equity investment) (1960-2002).
e_change: absolute value of real effective exchange rate change in per-
centage. The real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange
rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a weighted average of
several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator or index of costs (1960-
2002).
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OECD: dummy variable, equal to one if a country is a member of the
OECD.
Chapter 3. Finance, Volatility, and Downturns 94
3D Tables
Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variables # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Country 1 175
Year 1960 2002
GDPg_pc 6015 1.83 6.70 -52.10 138.90
Downturn 6015 -1.33 3.648 -52.10 0
CredPriv 5333 34.69 31.16 0.66 203.16
MCap 1653 37.07 51.25 0 531.26
PriBonCap 281 20.89 22.99 0 110.78
LongPriDe 498 2.54 3.60 0 18.40
Capital 128 79.68 61.28 6.54 317.46
Stuc 1569 .61 .64 0.00 6.58
GovConsump 5591 15.98 7.08 2.58 76.22
Inflation 6034 17.37 58.21 -55.82 975.93
Trade 5713 71.63 43.03 1.53 296.02
PriCapFlow 3304 3.07 6.32 -82.87 145.21
e_change 2021 11.19 40.19 0.00 785.06
OECD 9065 0.14 0.35 0 1
Srights 49 3.00 1.31 0 5
Crights 47 2.30 1.37 0 4
Law 91 3.45 1.58 0.86 6
Account 41 60.93 13.40 24 83
Notes: PriBonCap, LongPriDe, Capital, and StucOnly are available for
limited countries between 1990-1997. Srights, Crights, Law, and Account are
used as instrumental variables, all of which have one observation for each
country.
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Table 3.3: Finance and GDP growth rate volatility: cross-section results
A1. Financial development as explanatory variables: no Credit squared
term included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CredPriv -0.003(0.017) 0.007(0.024) 0.030(0.025) 0.040*(0.027)
Mcap -0.014*(0.011) -0.034**(0.015) -0.031**(0.015) -0.028**(0.014)
GovConsump 0.080*(0.060) 0.220**(0.095) 0.183**(0.108) -0.029(0.129)
Trade 0.014***(0.006) -0.016(0.014) -0.008(0.015) 0.024(0.020)
OECD -2.210***(0.600) -1.675**(0.778) -1.501**(0.695) -1.207*(0.780)
sd_PrivCapFlow 0.808***(0.248) 0.559**(0.272) 0.066(0.276)
Inflation 0.024***(0.008) 0.035***(0.011)
e_change 0.019*(0.013)
Const. 3.578***(0.852) 1.198(1.126) 0.546(1.046) 1.834(1.426)
# Obs. 108 72 72 37
A2. Financial development as explanatory variables: Credit square term
included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CredPriv -0.044(0.039) -0.135***(0.049) -0.081**(0.044) -0.064(0.073)
CredPriv(square) 0.0003*(0.0002) .0019***(0.001) .0014***(.0006) .0012*(.0008)
Mcap -0.015*(0.011) -0.040***(0.013) -0.036**(0.015) -0.036***(0.011)
GovConsump 0.109**(0.064) 0.222**(0.098) 0.191**(0.110) -0.003(0.123)
Trade 0.013**(0.006) -0.013(0.013) -0.008(0.014) 0.023(0.019)
OECD -2.000***(0.681) -1.377**(0.758) -1.312**(0.702) -1.258*(0.788)
sd_PrivCapFlow 0.780***(0.223) 0.588**(0.259) 0.209(0.288)
Inflation 0.020***(0.008) 0.028***(0.009)
e_change 0.015(0.017)
Const. 4.037***(0.943) 2.986**(1.337) 2.015**(1.151) 3.015*(2.020)
# Obs. 108 72 72 37
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# Obs. 26 26
B. Financial structure as explanatory variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Struc -0.505(0.400) -1.023**(0.445) -0.816**(0.456) -1.309*(0.928)
GovConsump 0.101*(0.065) 0.238**(0.101) 0.199**(0.113) 0.008(0.121)
Trade 0.009**(0.005) -0.017(0.015) -0.011(0.017) 0.020(0.021)
OECD -2.692***(0.453) -1.690**(0.725) -1.306**(0.600) -0.928*(0.640)
sd_PrivCapFlow 0.781***(0.275) 0.603**(0.329) 0.171(0.290)
Inflation 0.022**(0.008) 0.032***(0.010)
e_change 0.025**(0.013)
Const. 3.592***(0.788) 1.385*(0.855) 1.229*(0.850) 2.565**(1.393)
# Obs. 108 72 72 37
Notes: *(**, ***): statistical significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) confi-
dence levels; number in parentheses is standard error; dependent variable is
sd_GDPg.
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Table 3.4: Finance structure and GDP growth rate volatility: cross-
section results with instrumental variables
A. Legal determinants of financial structure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Srights 0.126***(0.046) 0.145***(0.046) 0.116***(0.047) 0.113**(0.051)
Account 0.012***(0.004) 0.016***(0.005) 0.015***(0.005)
Law 0.023(0.033) -0.049(0.038) -0.048(0.039)
Crights 0.031(0.039)
Const. -0.380*(0.228) 0.218(0.180) -0.337*(0.223) -0.387*(0.245)
# Obs. 40 48 40 39
B. Results comparison between with and without IV variables






# Obs. 39 39
Notes: *(**, ***): statistical significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) confidence
levels; number in parentheses is standard error; dependent variable of A is
Struc and dependent variable of B is sd_GDPg; IV variables used in B are
Srights and Account.
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Table 3.5: Finance and GDP growth-rate volatility: panel results for two
time periods
A1. Financial development as explanatory variables: no Credit squared
term included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CredPriv -0.011(0.010) -0.022(0.018) 0.005(0.017) -0.011(.019)
Mcap -0.011*(0.008) -0.014(0.012) -0.020**(0.012) -0.006(.012)
GovConsump 0.023(0.035) 0.078*(0.055) 0.044(0.051) 0.012(.099)
Trade 0.017***(0.005) 0.003(0.011) 0.012(0.011) 0.026**(.015)
OECD -1.534***(0.416) -0.848**(0.481) -0.652**(0.370) -0.554(.649)
sd_PrivCapFlow 0.725***(0.222) 0.444**(0.214) 0.056(.252)
Inflation 0.028***(0.006) 0.029***(.010)
e_change 0.008(.013)
Const. 3.797***(0.597) 2.258(0.815) 1.331*(0.816) 2.068*(1.565)
# Obs. 149 90 90 45
A2. Financial development as explanatory variables: Credit square term
included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CredPriv -0.043**(.024) -0.094***(0.039) -0.081**(0.044) -0.064(0.073)
CredPriv(square) .0002**(.0001) .0008**(.0003) .0014***(.0006) .0012*(.0008)
Mcap -0.013*(.008) -0.026**(0.013) -0.036**(0.015) -0.036***(.011)
GovConsump 0.042(.036) 0.104**(0.057) 0.191**(0.110) -0.003(0.123)
Trade 0.017***(.005) 0.002(0.010) -0.008(0.014) 0.023(0.019)
OECD -1.363***(.468) -0.643*(0.451) -1.312**(0.702) -1.258*(0.788)
sd_PrivCapFlow 0.691***(0.217) 0.588**(0.259) 0.209(0.288)
Inflation 0.020***(0.008) 0.028***(.009)
e_change 0.015(0.017)
Const. 4.169***(.666) 3.240***(1.027) 2.015**(1.151) 3.015*(2.020)
# Obs. 149 90 90 45
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B. Financial structure as explanatory variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Struc -0.529*(0.375) -0.513*(0.364) -0.698**(0.339) -1.165*(0.778)
GovConsump 0.030(0.036) 0.088*(0.058) 0.048(0.051) -0.001(0.098)
Trade 0.012***(0.005) 0.001(0.012) 0.012(0.013) 0.029**(0.015)
OECD -2.160***(0.343) -0.921**(0.510) -0.616**(0.346) -0.452(0.606)
sd_PrivCapFlow 0.659***(0.232) 0.407*(0.252) -0.024(0.243)
Inflation 0.030***(0.006) 0.036***(.010)
e_change 0.021**(0.010)
Const. 3.761***(0.588) 1.884***(0.666) 1.499***(0.614) 1.970*(1.387)
# Obs. 149 90 90 45
Notes: *(**, ***): statistical significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) confi-
dence levels; number in parentheses is standard error; dependent variable is
sd_GDPg.
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Table 3.6: Finance and GDP growth rate volatility: panel results for
three time periods
A1. Financial development as explanatory variables: no Credit squared
term included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CredPriv -0.012(0.010) -0.022*(0.017) 0.008(0.014) -0.002(0.014)
Mcap -0.009*(0.007) -0.015*(0.010) -0.020**(0.010) -0.015*(0.009)
GovConsump 0.026(0.037) 0.099**(0.053) 0.061(0.048) 0.068(0.077)
Trade 0.017***(0.005) 0.002(0.011) 0.010(0.012) 0.022**(0.011)
OECD -1.342***(0.406) -0.478(0.555) -0.305(0.360) -0.273(0.559)
sd_PrivCapFlow 0.828***(0.208) 0.506**(0.222) 0.254(0.224)
Inflation 0.033***(0.006) 0.034***(0.008)
e_change 0.047***(0.013)
Const. 3.573***(0.614) 1.578**(0.778) 0.654(0.714) -0.220*(1.034)
# Obs. 190 107 107 49
A2. Financial development as explanatory variables: Credit square term
included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CredPriv -0.048**(0.023) -0.084***(0.034) -0.022(0.030) -0.002(0.040)
CredPriv(square) .0002**(.0001) .0007***(.0003) .0003*(.0002) .0000(.0003)
Mcap -0.011*(0.007) -0.026**(0.011) -0.024**(0.011) -0.015*(0.011)
GovConsump 0.047(0.039) 0.125***(0.052) 0.075*(0.046) -0.067(0.074)
Trade 0.017***(0.005) 0.000(0.010) -0.008(0.011) 0.022**(0.010)
OECD -1.156***(0.453) -0.327(0.520) -0.249(0.355) -0.273(0.560)
sd_PrivCapFlow 0.812***(0.208) 0.519***(0.222) 0.254(0.243)
Inflation 0.031***(0.006) 0.034***(0.007)
e_change 0.047***(0.014)
Const. 4.005***(0.684) 2.523***(0.993) 1.132(0.952) 0.221(1.734)
# Obs. 190 107 107 49
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B. Financial structure as explanatory variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Struc -0.547*(0.378) -0.588*(0.430) -0.682**(0.387) -1.413**(0.803)
GovConsump 0.032(0.037) 0.113**(0.056) 0.066*(0.048) 0.059(0.078)
Trade 0.012***(0.005) -0.00(0.013) 0.009(0.013) 0.025**(0.012)
OECD -2.000***(0.352) -0.465(0.588) -0.254(0.339) -0.169(0.536)
sd_PrivCapFlow 0.743***(0.227) 0.476**(0.253) 0.153(0.212)
Inflation 0.035***(0.006) 0.038***(0.008)
e_change 0.048***(0.013)
Const. 3.509***(0.604) 1.196**(0.642) 0.909**(0.550) 0.286*(0.921)
# Obs. 190 107 107 49
Notes: *(**, ***): statistical significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) confi-
dence levels; number in parentheses is standard error; dependent variable is
sd_GDPg.
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Table 3.7: Finance and economic downturn: censored panel data regres-
sion
A1. Financial development as explanatory variable: no credit squared
term included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CredPriv -0.016**(0.008) -0.060***(0.017) -0.065***(0.017) -0.066***(0.022)
Mcap 0.016**(0.008) 0.069***(0.021) 0.067***(0.021) 0.072***(0.027)
mv5_GDPg 0.891***(0.085) 0.853***(0.105) 0.792***(0.104) 0.802***(0.146)
GovConsump -0.047*(0.035) -0.170***(0.067) -0.196***(0.067) -0.159*(0.119)
Trade 0.003(0.006) 0.009(0.011) 0.010(0.011) 0.010(0.020)
OECD 1.852***(0.474) -0.878(0.979) -0.757(0.967) 3.785*(2.025)
PrivCapFlow -0.155*(0.102) -0.148*(0.101) -0.096(0.139)
Inflation -0.012***(0.004) -0.009**(0.005)
e_change -0.021*(0.013)
Const. 2.491***(0.666) 5.704***(1.103) 6.513***(1.151) 5.321***(1.965)
χ2 test 141.64*** 87.51*** 94.10*** 56.06***
Log-likelihood -975.50 -554.46 -550.60 272.40
# Countries 88 56 56 30
# Obs. 1064 520 520 224
#uncensored 239 137 137 73
A2. Financial development as explanatory variable: credit squared term
included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CredPriv -0.028*(0.019) -0.040(0.035) -0.055*(0.035) -0.085*(0.067)
CredPriv_squa 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.001)
Mcap 0.016**(0.008) 0.071***(0.021) 0.068***(0.021) 0.067**(0.032)
mv5_GDPg 0.896***(0.085) 0.854***(0.105) 0.793***(0.104) 0.799***(0.147)
GovConsump -0.039(0.037) -0.177***(0.068) -0.199***(0.068) -0.158*(0.119)
Trade 0.002(0.006) 0.009(0.011) 0.010(0.011) 0.009(0.020)
OECD 1.874***(0.474) -0.848(0.980) -0.743(0.968) 3.808**(2.026)
PrivCapFlow -0.156*(0.102) -0.149*(0.101) -0.098(0.139)
Inflation -0.012***(0.004) -0.009**(0.005)
e_change -0.021*(0.013)
Const. 2.632***(0.704) 5.392***(1.191) 6.347***(1.253) 5.683***(2.332)
χ2 test 142.94*** 87.64*** 94.06*** 56.21***
Log-likelihood -975.36 -554.25 -550.55 -272.36
# Countries 88 56 56 30
# Obs. 1064 520 520 224
#uncensored 239 137 137 73
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B. Financial structure as explanatory variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Struc 1.422***(0.474) 3.222***(0.894) 3.072***(0.882) 3.543***(1.323)
mv5_GDPg 0.869***(0.084) 0.815***(0.104) 0.762***(0.105) 0.763***(0.147)
GovConsump -0.060**(0.035) -0.177***(0.067) -0.200***(0.067) -0.183*(0.118)
Trade 0.001(0.006) 0.004(0.011) 0.005(0.011) 0.006(0.019)
OECD 1.573***(0.429) -0.569(0.978) -0.424(0.970) 4.267***(2.050)
PrivCapFlow -0.213**(0.100) -0.212**(0.099) -0.172(0.140)
Inflation -0.010**(0.004) -0.006(0.005)
e_change -0.018*(0.013)
Const. 1.824***(0.647) 3.945***(1.016) 4.556***(1.058) 3.304***(1.941)
χ2 test 145.00*** 84.34*** 88.98*** 52.12***
Log-likelihood -973.55 -555.27 -552.81 274.27
# Countries 88 56 56 30
# Obs. 1064 520 520 224
#uncensored 239 137 137 73
Notes: *(**, ***): statistical significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) confi-








The main arguments underlying the presupposition that inequality is good
for economic growth are investment indivisibility and incentives considera-
tions. The traditional wisdom of a trade-off between equality and efficiency
follows similar arguments. In the past 15 years, however, accumulated stud-
ies have explored whether and how inequality could be bad for economic
growth. Among this burgeoning body of literature, Persson and Tabellini
(1994) use a median voter approach to show how income inequality leads
to redistribution pressure, and which distortions, in turn, discourage invest-
ment and reduce economic growth. Benabou (1996), applying a social conflict
approach, states that inequality-induced social conflict reduces the security
of property rights and increases the predatory activities of the poor, thereby
discouraging accumulation and retarding economic growth. Approaching the
issue from demand side, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that ex-
treme concentration of wealth in the hands of the very rich will manifest
itself in the demand for handmade and imported luxuries rather than for
domestic manufactures, thereby slowing down the industrialization process
and economic growth. The conventional wisdom has been challenged also by
a number of recent empirical studies. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson
and Tabellini (1994), and Perotti (1996) have all found a negative correla-
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tion between average growth and measures of inequality over the 1960-1986
period.
This chapter constructs a special theoretical model to examine how in-
equality could be bad for economic growth when the credit market is im-
perfect. It is no new idea that wealth distribution could affect the level of
output and economic growth when the credit market is imperfect. This line
of research, which dates back to Loury (1981), has been recently explored
by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor
and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997), and Ahgion
et.al. (1998). The essential point is that financial market imperfections
(such as informational asymmetries, transaction costs, and contract enforce-
ment costs) might be especially binding on individuals with low wealth who
lack collateral, credit histories, and connections, thereby preventing them
from accessing profitable investment opportunities (in either human or phys-
ical capital). The efficiency loss generated by this market imperfection will
thus rise with the number of individuals whose financial constraint is binding.
Higher inequality typically implies a larger share of the population below the
threshold level of wealth, and hence larger efficiency losses. However, the
current literature presents the following features. First, some of these papers
have followed a partial equilibrium approach by focusing on the demand side
of financial markets. An economy comprises a fixed number of firms, each of
which needs funds to finance a project of fixed size. Firms are distinguished
by their level of net worth, which determines the capacity (if any) and source
of finance. Thus total credit in the models is completely determined on the
demand side of the market. Second, the existing papers often consider only
one source of finance when both demand and supply sides are analyzed and
interest rates are determined at equilibrium. Thus, a rich structure of fi-
nancing is neglected. Third, some of the authors mentioned above stress the
link between the rate of growth of the economy, the distribution of wealth
and occupational choices when credit markets are imperfect. But financial
institutions are not modeled clearly and financial institutions do not adapt
actively to the economic environment.
This chapter, in a general equilibrium framework, shows how the exis-
tence of two specific financial institutions exhibiting technological differences
in overcoming moral hazard problems leads to rich connections between rich
and poor people, on the one hand, and production efficiency and economic
growth, on the other. In the model, an agent’s decisions are endogenous —
both whether to participate on the supply or the demand side of the credit
market, and in which financial markets to participate. The size of the invest-
ments and the equilibrium interest rates are also endogenous. This chapter
examines how an "informal" credit market could emerge endogenously; this
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would release some of the financially constrained poor individuals operating
within the mere "formal" credit market, thereby increasing aggregate output
and economic growth.
Quite often, credit markets are inherently imperfect, with moral hazard
and adverse selection problems due to information asymmetry. Develop-
ing countries (especially the rural areas of developing countries) particularly
struggle with information asymmetry problems in the credit market. This
can be attributed to the insufficiency of the legal or institutional infrastruc-
tures, the widely dispersed locations of rural households, the paucity of the
poor in the rural economy, etc. We list the following two quotations: one de-
scribes (the severity of) credit constraints in rural credit markets; the other
shows the importance of the ability of lenders to provide collateral in obtain-
ing credit in rural areas.
"The plot questionnaire does ask whether a given rural house-
hold would be willing to borrow more (presumably at prevailing
interest rates) to finance labor, fertilizer, or herbicide; that is,
would profits be increased? Here eight out of twelve farmers in
Yang Pieng say yes, they are ”credit constrained”; three say that
they fear debt; two say that they are not brave enough to take
the risk; two cite there is that no place to borrow or lack of
money;..."(Townsend ,1995).
"In rural credit markets, high default rates have prevented the
institutions from being self-financing: recurrent and often large
injections of government funds have been required. And despite
these subsidies, many of these credit programs have had little suc-
cess in reaching farmers without collateral or with below-average
income." (Hoff and Stigltz, 1990).
One particular consequence of rural credit market imperfections is the
prevalence of "informal" credit markets in rural developing countries, which
include credit cooperations and associations, moneylenders, usury, pawn-
shops, etc. (Besley and Coate, 1995; and Banerjee, et al., 1994). In a study
on Taiwanese rotating saving and credit associations in rural areas, Besley
and Levenson (1996) claim that, on average, 20 percent of households par-
ticipate in such an association every year. Kan (2000) shows that informal
financial channels were heavily relied upon by small businesses in Taiwan
during the period 1977-1992. In the case of Korea, the informal credit mar-
ket was also of considerable importance (Cole and Park, 1983). Ghate (1992)
reviewed the data showing that at the mid of 1980s the share of informal rural
borrowing in China accounted for one-third to two-thirds of total borrowing.
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It is interesting to note that most policy-makers in developing countries op-
pose this way of rural financing and take all kinds of measures to forbid and
eradicate them. In practice, however, it is not easy to enforce these policy
measures effectively. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s China
launched multiple "financial rectification campaigns" to shut down private
money houses, which, nonetheless, continued to operate underground — not
only in the costal south, but also in northern central provinces such as Henan
(Tsai, 2002, Chapter 5). These puzzling facts have motivated the attempts
in this chapter to model the precise role of informal financial institutions
in the development process, and thus to evaluate the hostile policy stance
toward the informal credit markets in rural areas of developing countries.
Generally speaking, there are several features displayed by borrowers, or
their credit needs, that explain reliance on the informal market. First, in-
formal credit institutions may have informational advantages compared to
formal ones (Besley, 1995). Therefore, for borrowers who possess no (or in-
sufficient) collateral, the informal credit institutions may be in a position to
lend to them without collateral, merely on the basis of first-hand information
on the borrower, or on the strength of community ties. Secondly, some kinds
of informal lenders, such as produce traders, input dealers and raw-material
suppliers, who have transactions with the borrowers, may be in a more flex-
ible position to devise collateral substitutes such as the interlink of credit
with marketing, employment or leasing transactions. Interlinking lenders
could easily cut off these other transactions with the borrowers, which pro-
vides the additional incentives (possibly strong) for borrowers to repay the
credit on time. Thirdly, the loan may be a small or short-duration loan,
for which the transaction costs may be so high as to place the loan beyond
the profitable reach of the formal sector because of its greater reliance on
the pooling of deposits and maturity transformation. Fourthly, from the de-
mand side, whenever timeliness is crucial (as in emergencies, or whenever a
business opportunity must be seized immediately), the speed with which the
informal sector can make loans gives it an advantage over the formal sector.
From the supply side, when there exists significant delayed disbursement of
formal credit, informal credit institutions emerge (Chaudhuri and Gupta,
1994). Fifthly, the formal sector is subject to a variety of regulations relat-
ing to capital reserve and liquidity requirements, ceilings on lending and the
deposit interest rate, mandatory credit targets, and audit and reporting re-
quirements. Together with constraints imposed by the internal bureaucratic
procedures of large-scale formal sector institutions, these requirements raise
transaction costs in the formal sector to levels well above those in the infor-
mal sector. Credit controls may also prevent the formal sector from making
loans for a variety of purposes, including consumption loans, so that the bor-
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rower has no alternative but to approach the informal sector. This chapter,
within the context of an economy with a heterogeneous ability to provide
collateral, will particularly focus on the informal credit markets’ advantages
arising from their not relying on collateral, to explain the emergence of these
markets and to analyze their efficiency and economic growth implications.
The theoretical part of this chapter studies a "family business" economy
with overlapping generations. The economy features infinite families, each
of which is both a consumption and a production unit. Two generations live
in each family at the same time: the young and the old (we can interpret
them as the son and father, respectively). The young works for the old. The
young gets wage income and the old gets capital income. We introduce het-
erogeneity into this overlapping generation model by relaxing the assumption
that the old have identical capital endowments. To simplify the calculation
without loss of generality, we assume that the young consume only in the
second period (when they are old). They thus save all of their wage income
as the next period’s capital. The capital inequality is therefore the result of
the previous period’s wage-income inequality.
The key argument is as follows. The agents differ in terms of the capital
they have at the beginning of the period. They have access to the credit mar-
kets to borrow or lend in order to undertake the optimal investment level,
and borrowers have limited liability. When there are information asymme-
tries in the credit market, the presence of limited liability of borrowers im-
parts a preference for risk among borrowers. This is because limited ability
on the part of borrowers implies that lenders bear all the downside risk. On
the other hand, all returns above the loan repayment obligation accrue to
borrowers. We assume two types of financial institutions intermediating sav-
ings between borrowers and lenders: modern commercial banks and informal
credit institutions. Each financial institution relies on a specific technology
to ensure that moral hazard behavior doesn’t happen. The cost of monitor-
ing is infinite for modern banks; banks thus rely on collateral requirements
to provide incentives for borrowers not conducting moral hazard behavior.
This kind of intermediary officially exists within the framework of the law
or official documents. If we call this intermediary the "formal’ one, and
consider it more or less exogenously given, then the second kind of inter-
mediary is more "informal" and does not rely on collateral to solve moral
hazard problems. Because of their proximity to the borrowers, the informal
financial institutions could directly monitor the project undertaken at a cost
related to the loan size. We call it the "informal credit market" since it is
out of the reach of official supervision and the legal framework1. Given the
1However, there is no enforcement problem in an informal contract. A formal contract
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"formal" credit market, the informal one emerges endogenously (i.e. if only
a formal credit market exists, there must be some agents distinguished by
the initial capital having incentives to promote the formation of the informal
credit markets). In equilibrium, the poor are willing to rely on the informal
market for borrowing; agents with medium-high wealth levels have access
to the formal credit market for borrowing, but the poor segment of these
medium-high wealth individuals are financially constrained; the rich agents
are lenders and self-finance their projects. When interpreting the model, we
think this model is more rural specific because many of the features of the
model are actually abstracted from stylized facts in rural areas.
The empirical part of this chapter uses cross-province data of China in-
stead of the cross-country data that are most often used to check the relation-
ship between initial inequality and growth. The advantage of one-country-
cross-region data analyses is that they avoid the institutional and geograph-
ical disturbances that are inherently unavoidable in cross-country data re-
gressions. A robust negative relationship between inequality and growth is
obtained. Moreover, the policy dummy variable signalling permission or pro-
scription of the informal credit market presents a positive sign, which is to a
certain extent consistent with the theoretical model’s prediction.
Several papers are closely related to the current study. The Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) model features a moral hazard problem when firms choose
projects in which to invest. Specifically, they could choose to work less dili-
gently to get private benefits, but at the cost of a higher chance of project
failure. Firms do not have enough of their own capital to reach the invest-
ment size requirements and have to rely on external finance — either direct
or indirect finance. At equilibrium, only well-capitalized firms can finance
their investments directly. Poorly capitalized firms cannot invest at all. The
firms in-between finance their investments with a mixture of direct and indi-
rect finance. Aghion and Bolton (1997) drop the assumption of production
function convexity and asks for a fixed initial capital outlay in the risky
“entrepreneurial” activity with high return, giving rise to the poor merely
relying on the “backyard” activity with a deterministic low return, if they
can not borrow or do not want to borrow. By assuming that the "entre-
preneurial" activity’s probability of success increases with the costly effort
of the undertakers, the model predicts that the lower the borrower’s initial
wealth, the less effort she devotes to increasing the probability of success of
her project because she has to share a larger fraction of the marginal returns
is enforced by legal institutions. We think that compliance in an informal contract is
ensured by the threat of reduction or elimination of access to credit in the future because
of repeated interactions.
Chapter 4. Credit Market Imperfections and Growth 110
from her effort with the lenders. Given the equilibrium rate of return the
lenders requires, the poorest individuals get credit rationed or constrained
— since their efforts are distorted such that they could not pay the lenders
at their expected return. In the equilibrium of the model, the individuals
are segmented endogenously according to their wealth levels: the very poor
and the rich are lenders and the intermediate individuals are borrowers. The
poor undertake the backyard activity and the borrowers and the rich the en-
trepreneurial one. In Banerjee and Newman (1993)’s paper the poor remain
poor, irrespective of their skill level, because the impossibility of borrowing
forces them to occupational choices that do not correspond with their ca-
pabilities: all of the poor end up as wage labourers, mid-income individuals
become self-employed, and the rich become labour employers. Inequality is
perpetuated and resources get inefficiently allocated. To explain the evolu-
tion and the coexistence of debt and equity finance, Boyd and Smith (1998)
develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which producers of capital
choose between two different types of technology that are financed in two
different ways. The first, with a publicly observable low expected return, is
financed by means of equity at no expense. The other, with non-observable
(by lenders) high yield, is financed by means of debt subject to a standard
costly state verification. There is thus a critical level of per capita income
below which only a debt market exists. As capital accumulation takes place,
the cost of state verification increases, due to a fall in the relative price of
capital; a stock market then emerges as firms begin to make more use of the
observable technology and less use of the unobservable technology, implying
an increase in the amount of equity finance relative to debt finance.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section is the theoretical
model. In this section, we first find the equilibrium for two benchmark cases
in which financial markets are either frictionless or completely closed down.
As credit markets are often imperfect (arising from the moral hazard prob-
lem, for example) rather than frictionless or completely closed down, we then
characterize two different financial institutions (namely the "formal" and the
"informal" financial institutions) with different technologies in solving moral
hazard problems, and derive their respective equilibriums. Finally, we allow
for the coexistence of the two credit institutions, and show at equilibrium
which individuals participate in which financial market, and what the effi-
ciency and growth implications are of the coexistence of the two institutions.
Section 4.3 contains the empirical evidence for rural China. We conclude in
section 4.4.
Chapter 4. Credit Market Imperfections and Growth 111
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Key ingredients of the model
There are several stylized facts in rural areas of developing countries. The
key ingredients and structure of our model are mainly abstracted from these
stylized facts. We first list these facts and then explain their connection with
the model.
• Agricultural activities are more likely to exhibit diminishing marginal
returns;
• Rural production activities need less set-up investment compared with
the urban ones;
• Asymmetric information in credit markets prevails in the spatially large
countryside; since banks have difficulty monitoring the activities under-
taken by borrowers, they often require collateral; at the same time, the
informal credit market is often prevalent in rural areas of developing
countries;
• The rural household is both a consumption unit and a production unit.
In the pioneering investigation carried out at northern Thai villages by
Townsend (1995), his fundamental basis for theoretical inference is decreasing
returns to capital investment. He argues that agricultural production activi-
ties have the prominent nature of diminishing marginal returns to capital. In
our model, diminishing returns to capital investment also play a prominent
role. Our basic idea is as follows. Diminishing marginal returns to capital
input means that at low investment levels marginal returns are high. From
the social point of view, the poor’s production increase from one additional
unit of investment will sufficiently compensate the rich’s production loss from
the one unit decrease of investment. However, if credit constraints prevent
the agents from smoothing their differences of investment, then inequality
will harm growth.
It is also easily observed and understood that rural activities require less
set-up capital compared with modern factories. Correspondingly, our model
assumes convexity of the production set. If, instead, investment involves a
minimum project size, generating a threshold level of wealth below which
agents do not invest, then the poor will be excluded from investment be-
cause of this barrier. Then wealth concentration helping more individuals go
beyond the threshold wealth level could be growth-enhancing, implying that
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inequality could positively effect growth. However, what we want to focus
on here is the credit constraints instead of the minimum sunk capital con-
straints. Non-convexity is the assumption in Aghion and Bolton (1997) and
Galor and Zeira (1993). Furthermore, non-convexity is also originally seen
as a key ingredient in models with explicit credit rationing. In this chapter,
there is no credit rationing analyzed2.
As far as rural credit markets are concerned, much of the existing litera-
ture argues similarly (see Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990) — that banks in rural areas
have found it difficult to screen and monitor borrowers directly, and there-
fore rely heavily on collateral3. Informal intermediaries are also popular in
rural areas. Paulson and Townsend (2001) show that the average per capita
income of households or entrepreneurs borrowing in the formal sector seems
to be larger than that of agents borrowing in the informal sector, and the
rates charged to the latter borrowers are higher than those charged to the
formal sector”s entrepreneurs. Bouman (1989) argues that the prevalence of
the informal credit market is the self-response of the ”penny” rural economy.
In our model, both asymmetric information in credit markets and the coex-
istence of ”formal”and ”informal”credit markets are ingredients. There are
many ways to model the imperfections of credit markets. We will consider
problems created by moral hazard. This simplification makes the coexistence
of formal and informal credit markets tractable. Given the characteristics of
formal and informal credit markets respectively, we show that the emergence
of the informal credit market is fully endogenous in our model.
Our model is based on household-production activity, which is in line with
the last stylized fact in rural areas. But why don’t rural households pool their
capital? Diminishing returns can basically offer the answer. Townsend (1995)
provides evidence of the decreasing returns that are central to the resulting
inefficiency: both in developing and developed rural areas, the household
is usually the most efficient unit of production. Similarly, another question
arises: why can’t one household hire the labor of others? There are many
justifications for this simplification, including the problem of labor contract
enforcement in rural areas, the particular difficulties in monitoring between
principal (employer) and agent (employee) in agricultural activities, and the
great distances between households. Although the production and consump-
tion of individual households are separated in terms of the possibility of
2In our model specified soon, banks ask for collateral to solve moral hazard problems.
We assume that collateral is perfectly observable by the banks. This provides another
reason why there is no credit rationing in our model.
3Siamwalla et al. (1990)’s paper shows the importance of land as collateral in rural
formal finance, "the sphere of operation of commercial banks and cooperatives... has been
almost exclusively in the villages where land titles have been issued".
Chapter 4. Credit Market Imperfections and Growth 113
pooling labor and capital input, there is still one connecting point across
them: the credit market — if they have access to it.
4.2.2 Set-up
Household
We consider a closed economy with an infinite, discrete time horizon, t =
0, 1, 2, ... This economy features one homogeneous good that serves both as
capital and consumption good. There are non-altruistic overlapping gener-
ations. Both generations have mass of 1 and remain constant in size over
time. The generation born at the beginning of period t is called generation t,
and is young during period t. Generation t becomes old in period t+ 1 and
dies, exiting the model at the end of period t + 1. A new generation t + 1
is born in period t + 1. A continuum of households, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1],
lives in this economy. At time t, each household therefore is comprised of
two persons: the old (t− 1) generation and the young (t) generation.
Assume that each household produces separately (i.e., each household
is one production unit, and households do not pool their own capital and
labor). At time t, the old’s capital and the young’s labor are combined
for household-level production. The young gets her labor income and the
old gets his capital income. Assume the young consumes only when she is
old, and thus saves all of her wage payment of the current period as capital
input of the next period. Moreover, to maximize the expected second-period
consumption, young people also could borrow and lend among themselves.
When t+1 arrives, young people become old and consume after the payment
of wage bills to the new-born young and the payment on intragenerational
borrowing and lending.
Technology






t = 0, 1, 2, ...t, t + 1... Here, s is constant5. 0 < α < 1. wt,i is household i’s
capital input saved from the wage income of the young generation t− 1. lt,i
4We will introduce risks in production later.
5It will be shown soon that the aggregate economic growth rate of the economy can be
positive if s is sufficiently large (see footnote 10). Therefore, we put s into the production
function to make the growth rate of the economy more reasonable.
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is the young generation t’s labor input supplied inelastically (i.e.lt,i = 1, for
all t and i).
Two points are worth mentioning. First, we assume that all households
have an identical production function to capture the idea that investment
opportunity is equally distributed. We can thus focus on how capital level
inequality can generate motivation for intragenerational borrowing and lend-
ing and how capital inequality could possibly affect economic growth. Sec-
ond, this production function implies that each household incorporates the
aggregate production level of the previous period as one common production
factor. This specification could be justified by "spill-over" effects between
two consecutive periods; the previous production thus affects the common
production condition for the current period6.
Risks in production and the moral hazard problem
Assume that when t arrives7 the household level capital endowment wt,i is
observable to all households and financial intermediaries. Given wt,i, house-
holds undertake production activity. When intragenerational borrowing and
lending is possible, each household’s realized capital input can come from
two sources: the household’s own period beginning capital wt,i and exter-
nal borrowing (lending), denoted by bi, from (to) other households (bi ≥ 0
corresponds with borrowing; otherwise lending). The realized capital input
(denoted by kt,i) of household i is thus
kt,i = wt,i + bt,i (4.2)
After completion of the production, the old get the capital income. Their
consumption is the capital income minus a financial payment due to bor-
rowing or lending (financial payment is positive when borrowing happens;
otherwise negative).
We further assume that production risks exist at the household level:
with certain probability the production activity fails and there is no output.
The law of large numbers leads to no risk existing at the aggregate level.
Moreover, the household’s production is possibly subject to a moral hazard
problem, like in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Taking risk and moral hazard
possibility into consideration, the household level production function can be
specified as follows.
An household can choose between two projects: the less risky project and
the more risky one. The two projects differ not only because one has a higher
6This specification could make growth rate calculation easier.
7In the appendix, we caculate the dynamic capital linkage at the beginning of each
period of this economy.
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probability of failure, but also because only the more risky project offers a
private benefit θ. We depart from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) by assuming
that the private benefit is received only if the project is successful.







t−1 with probability p
0 with probability 1− p







t−1 + θ] with probability q
0 with probability 1− q
Here we assume p > q, capturing the risk difference of the two projects.
The private benefit (θ > 0) can be interpreted alternatively as opportunity
costs from managing the project diligently, which increases the probability
of success from q to p. Because project choices are the same among house-
holds, there is no adverse selection problem. Only incentive issues need to
be considered.
Consumption
In general for the production function taking Cobb-Douglas form, capital
and labor income are α and 1 − α share, respectively, of output. Although
production risks exist in this chapter’s setup, we assume that the young get
certain wage equal to the expected value of marginal product of labor ((1−α)
share of the expected output) regardless the possible state of nature8. Given
wt,i and bt,i, the expected consumption of the old from undertaking the "safe"
project (S project) and the "risky" project (R project) is thus the α share of
the output net of financial payment, i.e.:





cRt,i = sqα(wt,i + bt,i)
αl1−αt,i (y
1−α
t−1 + θ)− qbt,iRt
Here Rt is the interest rate required by financial intermediaries’ loans. Be-
cause lt,i = 1, the above equation could be simplified as
8Implicitly, we assume that there are perfect insurance markets that ensure the labor
income of the young. This is a strong assumption. We assume there is no moral hazard
on the part of the young. Hence, this could be reasonable.
Chapter 4. Credit Market Imperfections and Growth 116
cst,i = spα(wt,i + bt,i)
αy1−αt−1 − pbt,iRt
and
cRt,i = sqα(wt,i + bt,i)
α(y1−αt−1 + θ)− qbt,iRt
We make two assumptions about the size of these two expected consump-
tion equations.
Assumption (1)
For anywt,i, when bt,i = 0, cst,i > c
R
t,i.At any wealth levels, when there is no
borrowing or lending, the expected consumption from taking the safe project
is larger than that from the risky project. Therefore, without borrowing
and lending (so that households finance their investment only by their own
capital), all households automatically choose the safe project. Simplifying








Thus, any lenders will automatically choose the safe project and only borrow-
ers can have incentives to choose the risky project. Assumption (1) restricts








Calculating this relationship, we get
spα2(wt,i + bt,i)
α−1y1−αt−1 − pRt < sqα2(wt,i + bt,i)α−1[y1−αt−1 + θ]− qRt
An additional unit of borrowing invested into a risky project yields higher
additional consumption than the same unit invested into the safe project.
Although by assumption (1) both lenders and neither-borrower-nor-lender
automatically choose the safe project, borrowers could prefer to choose the
risky project, due to assumption (2) when the borrowing amount is suffi-
ciently high. Assumption (2) therefore assures that the moral hazard problem
exists.
Figure 4.1 presents assumptions (1) and (2) graphically. It shows for a
given wealth level how the expected consumption when undertaking safe and
9This is because p > q.
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risky (line ”S” and line ”R”) projects changes with respect to b. In this
figure, line ”S” crosses the vertical axis (which corresponds to bi = 0) at
point A, which is above the crossing point B of line ”R”. Moreover, line ”S”
is less steep than line ”R”. As a result, line "S" lies above line "R" whenever
bi < 0; but when bi > 0, line "S" lies above line "R" only up to certain
amount of borrowing (b1 in the figure).
Financial intermediary
A financial intermediary exists in this economy to channel funds from lenders
to borrowers. Since a moral hazard problem exists, the financial intermedi-
ary, apart from channelling funds, will also need to play a role in solving
the moral hazard problem. The financial intermediary could rely on differ-
ent technologies to solve the moral hazard problem, according to which we
distinguish two different financial intermediaries: the "formal" one and the
"informal" one. Before making this distinction, we first study two extreme
cases.
4.2.3 Two extreme cases
The perfect credit market
In general, when the credit market is perfect, there are neither transaction
costs nor information costs. Within the framework of the model’s set-up, we
regard perfect credit markets as a particular case in which the one that fi-
nancial intermediaries can monitor the projects undertaken by the borrowers
perfectly and costlessly. The perfect monitoring ability will force the borrow-
ers to undertake the safe project. As far as lenders are concerned, they will
automatically, by assumption (1), undertake the safe project. All households
will therefore choose the safe project when the credit market is perfect.
The perfect credit market equilibrium can be defined as
(a). Households maximize expected consumption
Household i with capital wt,i chooses bt,i to maximize the expected con-
sumption from undertaking the safe project, i.e.
max cst,i = spα(wt,i + bt,i)
αy1−αt−1 − pbt,iRt
for all i.
(b). Market-clearing conditionZ 1
0
bt,idi = 0
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We obtain the following proposition similar to Ahgion et al. (1998).
Proposition 4.1 In the perfect credit market equilibrium, all households
end up investing the same amount wt,i + bt,i ≡ k̄t = (1 − α)yt−1 (for all i),
regardless of the distribution of capital at the beginning of the period across
households. The growth rate of this economy is ln spα + α ln(1 − α), which
is also independent of the initial distribution of capital.
Proof. see appendix.
By this proposition, ∂(wt,i+bt,i)
∂wt,i
= 0 and ∂bt,i
∂wt,i
< 0. The investment level is
the same for the households. The poor households with wt,i < (1 − α)yt−1
are borrowers, and the poorer the household is, the more it will borrow. The
wealthy households with wt,i > (1−α)yt−1 are lenders, and the wealthier the
household is, the more it will lend. The perfect credit market fully equalizes
the investment level of the poor and the rich.
When the credit market is perfect, the growth rate of this economy is
constant10, independent of the wealth distribution. Therefore, when the
credit market is perfect, the change of initial capital distribution has only
individual household welfare implications and has no effects on aggregate
economic growth.
Closing down the credit market
Conversely, when credit markets are highly imperfect and credit therefore is
scarce and costly, equilibrium investments will remain unequal across house-
holds. Consider the extreme situation in which the credit market is com-
pletely closed down, and borrowing and lending are simply not possible.
This situation can happen if, for example, there is a severe contract enforce-
ment problem. In this situation, all households have to fully self-finance their
investment from their own initial capital. By assumption (1), all households
then prefer to choose the safe project.
Proposition 4.2 If there is no credit market at all, investment levels
across households will be unequal and be the same as their initial own capital.
Not only does the initial capital distribution matter for economic growth, but
also the more unequal distribution of initial capital is, the lower the rate of
economic growth will be.
Proof. see appendix.
As explained at set-up, the distribution of εt,i can be viewed as the in-
dicator of capital distribution inequality. Since α < 1, (εt,i)
α is a concave
10The growth rate is positive when spα(1− α)α > 1, i.e., when s > 1pα(1−α)α .




εt,idi = 1. Therefore (see equation (4.17)), greater




wt,idi = (1−α)yt−1) will reduce aggregate output and the economic
growth rate. Not surprisingly, the economic growth rate in the economy with-
out a credit market is smaller than the growth rate in the economy featuring
a perfect credit market.
We could intuitively explain the negative relationship between inequal-
ity and growth when the credit market is closed. Without the possibility
of borrowing and lending, unequal distribution of capital and the resultant
unequal levels of investment underutilises the poor’s productivity, whereas it
overutilises the rich’s one from the socially optimal point of view. To show
this, we compare the investment level of this case with the investment level
of the perfect credit market case (which can be considered as the socially op-
timal result11). See equations (4.14) and (4.16): the poorer the household is,
the lower its investment compared with the perfect credit market case, and
the higher the marginal productivity of its investment; the richer the house-
hold is, the higher its investment compared with the perfect credit market
case, and the lower the marginal productivity of its investment.
4.2.4 The "formal" credit market
Assumption (2) gives rise to moral hazard problems of borrowers of big
amounts (i.e., when the desired borrowing amount is sufficiently high and
a borrower successfully obtains it, without effective monitoring by the fi-
nancial intermediary, the borrower prefers to choose the risky project. This
section characterizes one kind of technology to overcome this moral hazard
problem. This kind of financial intermediary is not able to monitor borrow-
ers due to infinite monitoring costs. The infinity of monitoring costs of the
intermediary could be either because of the large scale of transaction volume,
limiting the intermediary’s capacity of monitoring each transaction), or be-
cause of long geographic distances between intermediary and the borrower.
This kind of financial intermediary therefore requires borrowers to provide
collateral to serve as an incentive mechanism, inducing the borrowers that
are prone to choose the high-risk project to select the safe project.
In reality, banks often ask borrowers to provide collateral, and particularly
in rural areas the dispersed locations of households make it difficulty for banks
to monitor borrowers directly and effectively. Banks are therefore the main
form of financial intermediary analyzed here.
11So, the central planner can redistribute wi, such that εi = 1 for all i. The redistribution
policy has the substitution function for the perfect capital market.
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αy1−αt−1 − pbt,iRt (4.3)
Subject to
(IC) cst,i = cRt,i (4.4)
i.e., spα(wt,i + bt,i)αy1−αt−1 − pbt,iRt = sqα(wt,i + bt,i)α(y1−αt−1 + θ)− qbt,iRt
(PC) rt 5 pRt
Young people choose the optimal amount of borrowing or lending to max-
imize their expected consumption when old. There are two constraints. The
incentive compatibility (IC) constraint prevents borrowers from undertaking
the risky project. The (IC) constraint says that the expected consumption
from undertaking the safe project is larger than that obtained from the risky
project. (PC) refers to the participation constraint of banks, in which rt
is the risk-free deposit interest rate and Rt is the interest rate charged on
borrowers by banks. It basically says that the competitive banks12 receive an
expected profit no smaller than zero. At equilibrium, Rt will be set such that
the (PC) binds and banks get zero profit. If the projects chosen by borrowers
are risky ones, then the probability that banks get their loans payments back
will be reduced to q, leading to a negative profit of banks. Therefore, the
(IC) constraint is imposed by banks to ensure that borrowers will choose the
relatively safe project. We assume that both households and banks are risk
neutral.
Proposition 4.3 In a "bank equilibrium", there exists two critical initial
capital levels: w̄t and w¯ t
. When wt,i ≥ w̄t, households are lenders and they
have the same investment level. Lenders lend more if they initially have more
capital; otherwise, households are borrowers.
There are two types of borrowers. Relatively rich borrowers with capital
wt,i, such that w̄t > wt,i ≥ w¯ t, are not financially constrained; they investat the same level as lenders and borrow more if they have less capital. The
relatively poor borrowers with capital wt,i, such that wt,i < w¯ t
, are financially
constrained; they borrow and invest more only if they have more initial capital
to provide as collateral.
12The precise structure of the market is unimportant for what follows, other than in
determining the division of the surplus between the borrowers and banks.
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Proof. see appendix.
This proposition says that (1) The rich young are lenders and the poor
young are borrowers; (2) Among the borrowers, the relatively rich ones can
freely borrow up to their desired amount, but the relatively poor ones can
not and are financially constrained; (3) These financially constrained poor
borrowers borrow and invest more if they have more capital. The reasonable
explanation for the last point is that those who are less poor have more initial
capital to serve as collateral in the asymmetric information credit market.
Banks are thus willing to grant them more loans.
A careful examination of these financially constrained borrowers reveals
an unfortunate situation: although the poorer individuals have a higher mar-
ginal product of capital, which means that it makes sense to grant them more
loans from the socially optimal point of view, they are less able to get access
to the credit market.
Lemma 4.4 Compared with the perfect credit market equilibrium, when
the credit market features asymmetric information and banks rely on collat-
eral to provide incentives for borrowers to undertake safe projects, in the bank
equilibrium the investment level of lenders and relatively rich borrowers (all
are the same) is higher than that of the perfect credit market equilibrium.
The equilibrium interest rate is lower than that of the perfect credit market
equilibrium and the lender-borrower dividing capital level is higher than that
of the perfect credit market equilibrium.
Proof. see appendix.
This lemma says that the information asymmetries, if they exist in the
credit market, reduce the aggregate financial activities. As a consequence,
the investment levels of the lenders and the rich borrowers are higher than in
the perfect credit market case; the marginal rate of return and the interest
rate level are thus lower than in the perfect credit market case. Moreover,
some of the lenders in the perfect credit market case become borrowers in
the credit market with asymmetric information.
Lemma 4.5 The severity of the moral hazard problem can be character-
ized by θ and p
q
.The larger the θ and the closer p
q
towards 1, the more severe
the moral hazard problem and the larger are w̄t and w¯ t
. At the extreme, when
θ goes to infinity or p
q
goes to 1, there will be no credit available in the econ-
omy, which proceeds to close down the credit market; At the other extreme
( θ goes to zero or p
q
goes to infinity),we go back to the perfect credit market
situation.
Proof. see appendix.
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As θ is the size of the private benefit when the borrower undertakes the
risky project, given other conditions a larger θ leads to stronger incentives
to undertake the risky project. The moral hazard problem becomes more se-
vere. As a consequence, lending activities diminish, more households become
borrowers (w̄t increase) and more households become financially constrained
(w
¯ t
increases). Interestingly, θ can not only be understood as an inherent
characteristic of the projects themselves, but also can be interpreted as one
measurement of the monitoring ability of banks: banks that can monitor the
project thus reduce θ (see Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). By this interpre-
tation, the banks’ enhanced monitoring ability reduces the severity of the
moral hazard problem. As p
q
gets closer to 1, the "safety" difference between
the two projects gets smaller, which leads to stronger incentives to undertake
the risky project. At extremes of the values of θ and p
q
, we go to either the
perfect credit market situation or the no credit market situation.
Figure 4.2 compares this situation with the perfect market case. The
imperfection of the credit market makes the critical value w̄t move to the
right of the mean wealth level (1− α)yt−1. Therefore, some of the lenders in
the perfect credit market case become borrowers here. The investment level
line (line kf , segment MN) of the lenders and the rich borrowers in the formal
credit market case lies above that in the perfect credit market case (line kp,
segment M’N’), as do the borrowing and lending lines (segment XY of line
bf and segment X’Y’ of line bp). The investment levels of poor borrowers
(segment OM of line kf) decrease with the capital levels (which is zero for
households with zero capital). Their borrowing levels (segment OX of line
bf) also decrease to zero.
4.2.5 The "informal" credit market
We will now characterize the second kind of technology to mitigate the moral
hazard problem, and call it the "informal" credit market. To keep the model
simple, we do not consider the risk diversification role of the informal market
(banks may allow better risk diversification) and the interaction between the
formal-informal sector (see Pinaki Bose, 1998) for this consideration).
A special feature of the informal credit market is that the intermediaries
in this market rely directly on monitoring activity, due to the small scale
and the few transactions and the closer geographic proximity of borrowers,
to solve the moral hazard problem — rather than on collateral (as banks do
in the formal credit market). However, this monitoring activity is costly13
13The papers surveyed by Townsend (1995) broadly suggest that information at the
village level may indeed be acquired at a cost.
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(i.e., they observe at a cost whether or not the undertaker enjoys private
benefits, and impose a large enough punishment, which makes choosing the
risky project less preferable from the outset). Denote C(l) as the monitoring
cost when the loan size to be monitored is l. By spending C(l), the inter-
mediary can observe the project choice of borrowers and can ask them to
undertake the safe project. Therefore, if borrowers can obtain a loan from
the informal credit market, they will have to undertake the less risky project.
For simplicity (similar to Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997), we assume that the
cost function is linear in loan size,
C(l) = πl (4.5)
Denote rt, R
0
t as the payment rate of lenders and borrowers, respectively,
in the informal credit market. A no arbitrage condition requires that the
lenders’ risk-free deposit interest rate in the informal credit market is the
same as the one in the formal credit market. The relationship between rt
and R
0
t is established under the assumption of competitive informal interme-
diaries. The zero profit condition leads to
pR
0
tl = C(l) + rtl (4.6)







Proposition 4.6 In the informal credit market equilibrium, two critical
capital levels exist: w̌t and ŵt.When wt,i ≥ w̌t, households are lenders, and
they have the same investment level. Lenders lend more if they have more
capital. When wt,i 5 ŵt, households are borrowers and they have the same
investment level, which is smaller than that of lenders. Borrowers borrow
more if they have less capital. The households with capital in between are
neither borrowers nor lenders14. They financially stay in autarky and invest
their capital in the safe project.
Proof. see appendix.
This proposition tells us that (1) The rich young are lenders and the
poor young are borrowers; (2) Due to the cost of monitoring, the middle
14In a Ricardian model with a constant unit labor requirement of n commodities, Dorn-
busch, et al. (1977) prove that international transport costs give rise to an intermediate
range of commodities that are non-traded. The result obtained here basically shares a
similar logic.
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class households are financially autarkic; the measure of these households is
a decreasing function of the monitoring cost parameter π. (3) Although some
households are excluded from borrowing and lending activities, unlike in the
formal credit market, the poor borrowers’ borrowing ability is not restrained
by their own capital (i.e., their ability to get access to the credit market is
not constrained by their ability to provide collateral).
Lemma 4.7 Compared with the perfect credit market equilibrium, in the
informal credit market equilibrium, which features asymmetric information in
the credit market and directly monitoring of production by informal financial
intermediary at a cost, the investment level of lenders is higher than in the
perfect credit market equilibrium; the investment level of borrowers and the
equilibrium interest rate are also lower.
Proof. see appendix.
Again, this lemma says that the information asymmetries, if they exist
in the credit market, reduce the aggregate financial activities. As a conse-
quence, the investment level of the lenders is higher than in the perfect credit
market case (lenders can lend below the socially optimal level). The invest-
ment level of the borrowers is also lower than in the perfect credit market case
and some of the borrowers and lenders in the perfect credit market case be-
come financially autarkic in the situation of a credit market with asymmetric
information.
Lemma 4.8When π approaches zero, the result corresponds to that of the
perfect credit market case; When π approaches infinity, the result corresponds
to the case of closing down the credit market.
Proof. see appendix.
Figure 4.3 compares this situation with the perfect market case. The
bold lines ki and bi are investment and borrowing lines, respectively, in the
informal credit market. w̌t and ŵt are critical capital levels.
4.2.6 Coexistence of the "formal" and "informal" credit
markets
If only the formal credit market exists, we obtain the following result for
households with wt,i < w¯ t
(see the proof of proposition 4.3)
spα2(wt,i + bt,i)
α−1y1−αt−1 − pRt > 0
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which says that the marginal product of capital of these households is bigger
than the interest rate. Among these households, the poorest households
undertake even less investment. Such a household’s marginal product of
capital will thus be even higher than the interest rate. If given one unit of
additional loan, the household earns even more than the loan repayment.
Those with initial capital wt,i < w¯ t
must therefore be eager to obtain more
loans, if possible. What’s more, the eagerness of the poorest households is
the highest.
Thus, we expect the endogenous emergence of some other kinds of credit
markets to meet their thirst. The poor are not able to get enough loans from
the existing formal credit market because they don’t have enough collateral.
Thus the emerging credit market grants loans that are not based on collateral.
The way we model the so-called informal credit market could be one choice.
Now the two credit markets coexist. We first need to know who will go to
what type of credit markets by value comparison. We then characterize the
levels of investment and the borrowing or lending amount of all households.
Proposition 4.9 In the coexistence equilibrium, the existence of the in-
formal credit market increases the production activity of the poorest house-
holds who are financially constrained if only the formal credit market exists.
Therefore, the coexistence of formal and informal credit markets leads to im-
proved efficiency. Specifically, there exists a critical capital level w̃t < ŵt for
all households with wt,i < w̃t; they borrow from the informal credit market
rather than from the formal credit market. The poorest segment of households
consequently gets around the no borrowing constraint.
Proof. see appendix.
This proposition shows that the most disadvantaged households in the
formal credit market will opt for informal financing. Although they have
to pay a higher interest rate, their expected consumption is still higher by
entering into the informal credit market than it would be by participating in
the formal credit market.
Lemma 4.10 The existence of the informal credit market increases the
aggregate financial activities: more households become lenders, the lenders
lend more than if only the formal credit market exists (thus have a low in-
vestment level), and the interest rate of the economy increases. There are still
households (borrowers with intermediate capital levels, i.e., w̃t < wt,i <w¯ t
)
who are financially constrained. The less costly the informal credit market
(measured by the cost parameter π), the smaller the segment of the finan-
cially constrained households. At the extreme, when π → 0, no households
are financially constrained.
Proof. see appendix.
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Figure 4.4.1 shows the value functions of the formal and informal credit
market cases and how households are segmented according to their capital
levels. We see that the households with a capital level below w̃t will enter
into the informal credit market. The bold lines in Figure 4.4.2 show how
at equilibrium the borrowing (lending) levels and investment levels change
with respect to capital. The existence of the informal credit market raises
the borrowing levels and investment levels of all individuals with wt,i < w̃t.
Because w̄t and w¯ t
are in fact endogenous to the existence of an informal
credit market, Figure 4.4.2 shows who would want to enter the informal
market, given that nobody else is in this market (hence for given w̄t and w¯ t
).
Since the existence of the informal credit market releases some of the
formerly financially constrained households, the aggregate growth rate of the
economy when the formal and informal credit markets coexist will be higher
than the growth rate if only the formal credit market exists.
4.3 Empirical evidence
A number of recent empirical studies on the relationship between inequal-
ity and economic growth were initiated from the puzzle raised by Lucas
(1993)15. More evidence was then presented by Clarke (1992), and Persson
and Tabellini (1994). Benabou (1996) made an intensive and extensive re-
view of these findings. These empirical studies use cross-country regressions,
however, which are unavoidably tangled with national, cultural, political and
geographical disturbances — although some of these studies try to control for
these disturbances by using geographical dummy variables (Deininger and
Squire, 1998), for example. If it is possible, instead, to use cross-regional
data within one single country, then these disadvantages associated with
cross-country regressions could be lessened. Towards this end, this section
will conduct cross-regional regressions using Chinese provincial data to check
the inequality-growth relationship.
Three points must be mentioned at the outset. First, because we have
to be more cautious of spatial autocorrelation16 in cross-region regressions,
we choose the Lagrangian multiplier error dependence test to ascertain its
strength and to determine whether we need to take measures to correct it.
15Lucas pointed out a fact. In 1960, the Philippines and South Korea had about the
same standard of living and many similar initial conditions. Yet, From 1960 to 1988, GDP
per capita in the Philippines grew at about 1.8 percent per year, whereas GDP per capita
grew at 6.2 percent per year in Korea. One proposed explanation on this huge difference
is the initial income distribution effects. The high initial inequality (measured in many
ways) in the Philippines is sharply opposite to the situation in Korea.
16For readers not familiar with spatial autocorrelation, see Anselin, L. (1988).
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Second, similar to cross-country growth regressions, the concern is with the
robustness of the results. In this exercise, we take the reasonable extreme
bound analysis (Granger and Uhlig, 1990) approach for the purpose of sensi-
tivity check. Third, we introduce dummy variable representing the different
regional policy attitudes towards the informal credit market to know whether
the empirical evidence can fit the theoretical model’s predictions.
4.3.1 Data description
Most of the data (except the inequality measurement and the dummy vari-
able) are from the China Statistical Yearbooks. The analyzed period starts
in 1988 and lasts until 1997. The cross-sectional data are drawn from 22
provinces, three municipalities (such as Beijing) and four autonomous regions
(Tibet, although an autonomous region, is excluded, due to missing data).
The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of rural household
per capita net income from 1988 to 1997, denoted as ANNUGROW.
The explanatory variables are as follows:
GINI88: rural Gini coefficient in 1988 measured by a Lorenz curve (Zhu
and Wen, 1994)
INVEST: average investment to GDP ratio from 1988 to 1997
LABGROW: average annual growth rate of rural labor from 1978 to
198717
EDUCA88: average years of education received by rural labor force in
1988
LNFIXCAP: log value of productive fixed assets per capita in 1988
EMPLOY88: ratio of employee in TVE18 (including part-time employee)
to the total labor force in 1988
LNPOPU88: log amount of the total rural population in 1988
DUMMY: dummy is equal to 1, if the policy towards the informal rural
credit market is relatively friendly or supportive, or if there is no stated or
actual policy towards the informal rural credit market, or if there is policy,
but the enforcement ability is very poor; otherwise, the dummy is equal to 0,
if the policy attitude towards the informal credit market is hostile and there
are visible and effective adverse impacts on the rural informal credit market
due to the policy.
GINI88 is our focus variable. INVEST and LABGROW are meant to
explain the role of different factor supplies. We use the labor growth rate ten
years before in order to avoid endogenity problem. Since the saving tendency
17The reason for using ten years before is explained momentarily in this subsection.
18TVE means Township and Village Enterprises.
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is relatively exogenous, INVEST (as defined by ratio to GDP) has less of an
endogenity problem. EDUCA88 is the initial human capital stock and LN-
FIXCAP is the initial physical capital stock. Both stocks capture the degree
of relative maturity or backwardness. EMPLOY88 has an approximate func-
tion to distinguish the strength of leading or lagging sectors. LNPOPU88 is
the indicator of the initial population size of the economy, which is expected
to relate to market size, degree of externalities and so on. DUMMY is in-
cluded to test empirically the role of the informal credit market on growth.
See Table 4.1 for more detailed descriptions of data statistics.
4.3.2 The basic model
Besides GINI88, we will use INVEST, LABGROW and EDUCA88 as the
explanatory variables in the basic model. Specifically,
ANNUGROW i = β0+β1GINI88 i + β2INVEST i + β3LABGROW i+β4EDUCA88 i
Table 4.2 displays the results. It shows that all explanatory variables are
significant at the 5% level (except the constant). GINI88 has negative effects
on economic growth. As we expect, the education level and the investment
ratio have significant positive effects on the growth rate, as does labor supply.
One concern is heteroskedasticity, which is tested for by using the Breusch-
Pagan test. The Ho hypotheses (there is no heteroskedasticity) can’t be
rejected at the 5% level.
4.3.3 The full model
Reasonable extreme bounds analysis
Following the Barro-type growth model, the recent empirical literature on
economic growth has identified a substantial number of variables that are
related to the economic growth rate. One main problem in empirical growth
models is that both the sign and significance of the "focus" variable are
sensitive to the inclusion, or exclusion, of other explanatory variables (Sala-
i-Martin, 1997; and Levine, 1992). This problem was pointed out initially by
Leamer (1983). For clarity’s sake, let us consider the following model:
y = βIXI + βBXB + βpXp + u (4.8)
XI is the variable of interest and βI is the coefficient of interest. XB is the
vector of the variables that is to some degree generally accepted by many
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econometric models. Xp is the subset of a variable pool. The variable pool
includes the variables potentially related to the dependent variable or ones
that are less accepted. u is N(0, σ2Ω). When all of these three kinds of
variables have been included into the regression, we obtain the full model.
It comes as no surprise that the focus coefficient βI varies with respect to
changes in the combinations of Xp.
An initial answer to this question was given by Leamer himself. He took
the extremes taken by the alternative specification as the ”extreme bounds”.
The extent of these bounds are considered as measurements of the fragility
of the estimate of βI (as alternative specifications are used). One criticism of
the use of extreme bounds, however, is that the actual extremes may come
from models that most economists would find unreasonable in some way. An
example: extremes could be obtained from the specification having a lower
R2 (goodness-of-fit) value. This consideration leads us to revisit the paper
by Granger and Uhlig (1990). In their original work, they restrict the range
of reasonable specifications by placing a restriction on R219.
It is commonly known that the basic model has the lowest R2min value
due to fewer variables included, whereas the full model generates the highest
R2max. It may be thought that specifications that achieve R
2 values not too
far from R2max would produce narrower extreme bounds for βI . Grange and
Uhlig consider model specifications achieving R2 values greater than or equal
to
R2δ = (1− δ)R2max + δR2min (4.9)
For small δ, these model specifications may be considered as being ”reason-
able” specifications because they are not far away from the best ”full” model
in terms of goodness-of-fit.
The full model setup
In order to set up the full model and to conduct sensitivity analysis, we
carefully choose four other variables, all of which are relatively significant
and have different explanatory angles. The four variables: LNFIXCAP, EM-
PLOY88, LNPOPU88 and DUMMY.
19Granger and Uhlig don’t argue that R2 is an ideal measure of the quality of the model,
but they do state that it is a possibly relevant statistic and that some exact results are
achievable by using it.
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ANNUGROW i = β0 + β1GINI88 i + β2INVEST i
+ β3LABGROW i + β4EDUCA88 i +β5LNFIXCAP i
+ β6EMPLOY88 i + β7LNPOPU88 i + β8DUMMY i
Now we arrive at the full model. Table 4.3 shows the results, which
indicate that the basic four variables still have the same sign and remain
significant at 10%. As the indicator of the initial capital stock per capita,
LNFIXCAP has a positive effect on long-run growth. This result shows that
in the more mature areas as measured by per capita fixed assets will have
higher growth. Initial population size has a significant positive effect on
growth. Finally, the policy dummy has a positive sign. This shows that in
rural China for the period from 1988 until 1997 the informal credit market
had a somewhat positive effect on growth. In provinces with a hostile policy
toward the informal credit market the growth rate would be lower, holding
other variables constant.
Spatial autocorrelation
Before conducting the reasonable extreme bound analysis, we will check the
validity of the assumptions underlying the full regression model. Three things
are important: the normal distribution of residuals, homoskedasiticity and
spatial autocorrelation. The histogram of residuals from the full model allow
us to see, approximately, that the residuals are normally distributed. Again,
we use the Breusch-Pagan test to check the H0 hypothesis of homoskedas-
ticity, and find that we can accept it. The third consideration is spatial
autocorrelation, which is considered to be at the core of the disciplines of
regional science and geography.
To this end we will in this exercise use the popular test, the Lagrangian
Multiplier Error Dependence. For simplicity, we will use the contiguity or
connectivity matrix as spatial weights matrix W. In this matrix, each ob-
servation is represented both as a row and as a column. In each row, the
non-zero column elements correspond to contiguous regions. This simplifica-
tion means that only the ”contiguous border” is important. Furthermore, we
will assign the same weight to each region contiguous to a considered region.
Due to these two simplifications, the sum of each row of W is 1, and the
non-zero elements in each row are equal. An example: the first row of this
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Beijing has two contiguous provinces, Tianjing and Hebei, numbered as the
second and third observations, respectively. Both of these two continuous
provinces have been assigned equal weights. The LM-ERR statistic is dis-
tributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom. The statistic value for the full
model is 2.879, which is smaller than the critical value at 5%. We will accept
the H0 that there is no spatial autocorrelation, indicating that the Chinese
rural areas of each province are relatively independent of each other.
Sensitivity analysis
This section employs the reasonable extreme bound analysis as the approach
in sensitivity analysis. Table 4.4 is the result. We know that the focus
coefficient remains the same sign when R2 is at the top 10% level (δ = 0.1)
and top 40% (δ = 0.4) level. The same result holds in the conventional
unrestricted extreme bound analysis(δ = 1.0)20. These results confirm a
robust and negative relationship between initial inequality and growth.
4.4 Discussion and conclusions
This chapter aims at building up a rural-specific model to analyze how in-
equality can negatively affect economic growth when the credit market is
of imperfection due to the information asymmetry problem. The main con-
clusion of the model is as follows. First, the imperfection of credit market
tends to result in overinvestment of the rich and underinvestment of the
poor, shrinkage of the total credit activity and an increase of the equilibrium
interest rate. When the imperfection is so strong that the credit market
is completely closed down, these effects are strongest. When financial in-
stitutions (it doesn’t matter whether they are formal or informal financial
institutions) exist to help solve the information asymmetry problem, these
effects are lessened but still exist. Second, both kinds of financial institutions
favor or disfavor certain segments of households. Specifically, the reliance of
the formal credit market on collateral provision leads to the poor becom-
ing financially constrained, since they do not have enough own capital to
be invested in the project. The more severe the moral hazard problem, as
measured by the size of the private benefit and the closeness of the success
probability of the risky and the safe project, the more the disfavored poor will
become financially constrained. Reliance of the informal financial institutions
20δ = 0 corresponds to only one specification: the full model. Therefore, the upper and
lower bounds of GINI88 are the same. Both are equal to the coefficient of GINI88 in
Table 4.3.
Chapter 4. Credit Market Imperfections and Growth 132
on direct monitoring rather than on collateral favors the poor relatively and
helps them mitigate the financial constraint. However, since their monitor-
ing activity is not free, the informal financial institution leads to some of the
intermediate households staying in financial autarky. Since these households
may raise financing up to the desired level from formal credit institutions
without paying any additional monitoring costs, they may be disfavored by
the informal financial institution. Third, the co-existence of the formal and
informal credit institutions could therefore combine the advantages of the
two institutions, thereby enhancing efficiency and economic growth.
We have not done much work on the dynamics of distribution under
the contexts with various credit institutions because the main focus of the
chapter is to study, given a certain distribution, the efficiency and growth
implications of the co-existence of formal and informal credit. Some papers
try to understand the relationship between inequality (poverty), the financial
market, and economic growth. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) develop a
model that predicts a nonlinear relationship between financial development
and income inequality during the process of economic development. At early
stages of development, only the rich can afford to access and profit from
financial markets, so that financial development intensifies income inequal-
ity. At higher levels of economic development, financial development helps
an increasing proportion of society, thereby reducing inequality. Aghion and
Bolton (1997) also show in their "trickle-down" model that the process of
capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities; in later
stages, however, it reduces them, mimicking a "Kuznets curve". Beck, et
al. (2004) use a cross-country sample to study empirically whether financial
development disproportionately raises the incomes of the poor and alleviates
poverty. They found that countries with better-developed financial inter-
mediaries experience more rapid declines in measures of both poverty and
income inequality.
Within this chapter’s current context, we can point out some preliminary
dynamic implications of the model. When the credit market is perfect, we
see that all households, regardless of their initial capital endowments, will
end up at the same first-best investment level, leading to the same wage in-
come of the young and the completely equal capital endowment of the next
period. Therefore, when the credit market is perfect, the inequality could
only last for one period, and the economy will quickly converge to a com-
pletely equal society. When only the formal credit market operates, because
borrowers who have enough wealth to put up as collateral can obtain credit
up to the desired amount and earn more income as a result, existing capital
asset inequality within the borrowing class could be projected and possibly
magnified into the future, a phenomenon that may cause the persistence of
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poverty (also see Mookherjee and Ray, 1999). A full workout of the dynamic
version of our model would provide answers to (a) How does the evolution
of the formal-informal financial structure depend on the initial distribution
of wealth? (b) How is the evolution of wealth distribution influenced by the
development of financial markets? (c) How do capital market imperfections
affect income inequality? It is clear that these answers would depend on the
initial aggregate endowment, on its distribution, and the specific character-
istics of the financial institutions operating in the economy.
The empirical analyses in the chapter are more like a test of the gen-
eral relationship between distribution and growth, rather than a specifically
devised check of a particular mechanism highlighted by the model relating
inequality with growth: the credit market imperfections and segmentations.
Although we include the policy attitude dummy variable into the regressions,
this is far from sufficient towards this end. More precise and detailed em-
pirical work is thus needed, given the availability of data. There are several
proposals for the future: to check whether a positive relationship exists be-
tween distribution and the informal credit market share of the entire credit
market; to find appropriate measurements of the degree of credit market im-
perfections and to test whether the less the severity of this problem, the less
the negative impacts will be from inequality on growth; to get survey data
— for example, on who gets what kind of finance in rural China, in order to
check the credit market segmentation hypothesis.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
4A Proofs
The capital distribution dynamics
Proof. At time 0, the old person of household i has initial capital endowment
w0,i, which is a share ε0,i of the initial aggregate capital endowments:
w0,i = ε0,iy−1 (4.10)




ε0,idi = 1. w0,i owned by the old is supplied as capital









For a homogeneous production function of degree one, the wage payment
to the young simply equals to the labor share of total production, i.e. (1−
α)y0,i. The young save all of their labor income as the next-period capital
input w1,i,i.e.,
w1,i = (1− α)y0,i = (1− α)swα0,il1−α0,i y1−α−1 (4.11)
Since labor is suppled inelastically, l0,i = 1 (for all i). Substituting l0,i = 1
and (4.10) into equation (4.11), we get
w1,i = (1− α)s(ε0,iw0)αy1−α−1 = (1− α)sεα0,iy−1 (4.12)















By (4.12) and (4.13), we get












w1,i = ε1,i(1− α)y0
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and








































(1− α)yt−1 = (1− α)yt−1
The aggregate capital supply is the labor share of the previous period’s ag-
gregate output (i.e., the aggregate saving rate is (1− α)).
Proposition 4.1
Proof. Household i with initial capital wt,i chooses bt,i to maximize the
expected consumption from the safe project, i.e.,
max cst,i = spα(wt,i + bt,i)
αy1−αt−1 − pbt,iRt










Using the loan market clearing condition
R 1
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Therefore,
bt,i = (1− α)yt−1 − wt,i
bt,i + wt,i = (1− α)yt−1 = k̄t (4.14)










= ln spα+ α ln(1− α) (4.15)
Proposition 4.2
Proof. By assumption (1), when there is no borrowing and lending, all
households choose the safe project in which to invest, and the household’s
investment level is the same, i.e.,
kt,i = wt,i (4.16)
Household i’s expected consumption is
cst,i = spα(wt,i)
αy1−αt−1






































α = 1 (” = ” only if




αdi 5 0. Comparing (4.15) with (4.17), the
growth rate in the case of closure of the credit market is no larger than that
in the case of a perfect credit market. Only for the situation of completely
equal society in terms of initial capital distribution, is the growth rate in
these two cases the same. Furthermore, greater inequality between εt,i for
a given aggregate εt,i will further reduce the aggregate production and the
economic growth rate.
Proposition 4.3





αy1−αt−1 − pbt,iRt (4.18)
Subject to
(IC) cst,i = cRt,i (4.19)
i.e., spα(wt,i + bt,i)αy1−αt−1 − pbt,iRt = sqα(wt,i + bt,i)α(y1−αt−1 + θ)− qbt,iRt
(PC) rt 5 pRt
At equilibrium, rt = pRt. Denote γi as the Lagrangian multiplier. The FOC
is
spα2(wt,i + bt,i)
α−1y1−αt−1 − pRt + γi[spα2(wt,i + bt,i)α−1y1−αt−1 (4.20)
−pRt − sqα2(wt,i + bt,i)α−1(y1−αt−1 + θ)− qRt] = 0
and
γi = 0, cst,i = cRt,i, and γi(cst,i − cRtt,i ) = 0
(i). By assumption (2), if bt,i ≤ 0 (the lenders), then constraint (4.4)










1−α − wt,i (4.21)
The dividing capital level w̄t above which households are lenders could be






1−α = w̄t. (4.22)
In sum, households with wt,i > w̄t are lenders, and have the same investment
level






(ii). Households with wt,i < w̄t are borrowers. For these households,
it is possible that (IC) binds. Assume that b̂t,i = b(wt,i) is the amount of
borrowing at which level (IC) binds, i.e. b(wt,i) satisfies,
spα(wt,i+b(wt,i))
αy1−αt−1 −pb(wt,i)Rt = sqα(wt,i+b(wt,i))α(y1−αt−1 +θ)−qb(wt,i)Rt
(4.23)
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= sqα2(wt,i + b(wt,i))








α−1y1−αt−1 − sqα2(wt,i + b(wt,i))α−1(y1−αt−1 + θ)] +
db̂
dwt,i
{[spα2(wt,i + b(wt,i))α−1y1−αt−1 − pRt]− [sqα2(wt,i + b(wt,i))α−1(y1−αt−1 + θ)− qRt]}
= 0
By assumptions (1) and (2), db̂
dwt,i
> 0.Furthermore, for a given capital level
wt,i, if bt,i > b̂t,i = b(wt,i), then cst,i < c
R
t,i.(By assumption (2), starting from
b̂ at which level cst,i = c
R
t,i, an additional unit of increase of b will give rise
to a greater increase of expected consumption from the risky project than
from the safe project). Without the (IC) constraint, we can get the optimal





1−α −wt,i. According to
this, households with low capital levels desire to borrow more if no incentive
constraint is imposed. However, facing the binding (IC) constraint, lower
capital households can borrow only at lower levels ( db̂
dwt,i
> 0). Therefore,
there exists a wealth level w
¯ t
, such that






1−α − wt,i; (4.24)
(iib) when wt,i < w¯ t
, (IC) binds and
bt,i = b̂t,i = b(wt,i) (4.25)
The dividing wealth level w
¯ t
and the corresponding borrowing amount b






































1−αsαyt−1[p− q − θqy1−αt−1 ]
(p− q)Rt















1−αsαyt−1[p− q − θqy1−αt−1 ]
(p− q)Rt
(4.26)
For households wt,i <w¯ t
, γi > 0. See (4.20); by assumption (2), we get
spα2(wt,i + bt,i)
α−1y1−αt−1 − pRt > 0
Intuitively, all of the relatively poor households have investment levels smaller
than the desired level; thus, the marginal return of investment is greater than
the expected cost of borrowing.
In sum,






wt,i = w̄t, bt,i = 0























Rt can be solved by this market clearing condition.
Lemma 4.4
Proof. Suppose w̄t 5 (1 − α)yt−1. It is easy to show that using the per-
fect credit market as comparison reference, the aggregate supply of credit
increases, whereas the aggregate demand of credit decreases. This direction
of change will violate the market clearing condition. Therefore, it is impos-
sible that w̄t 5 (1−α)yt−1. The only possibility is that w̄t > (1−α)yt−1.The
comparison of interest rate and investment levels between the perfect credit
market and imperfect credit market cases can be accomplished easily if we
know w̄t > (1− α)yt−1.
Lemma 4.5
Proof. b(wt,i; θ, pq ) is defined by (4.23). By assumptions (1) and (2), it is














> 0. Then, we can easily
prove how w̄t and w¯ t
change with θ and p
q
.




→ ∞. There is no credit












1−α < 0. Nobody gets financially constrained and we
return to the perfect credit market situation.
Proposition 4.6




αy1−αt−1 − rtbt,i (4.27)
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1−α − wt,i (4.28)





1−α , bt,i < 0. These households
are lenders.




αy1−αt−1 − pbt,iR0t (4.29)
There is no incentive constraint for borrowers because of the perfect moni-


















1−α − wt,i (4.31)
















1−α , the borrowers’ investment level is
smaller than that of the lenders.
(iii). Households with capital levels such that w̌t = wt,i = ŵt are neither
borrowers nor lenders. They invest all of their capital and will certainly




































1−α , it is easy to show that us-
ing the perfect credit market as reference, the aggregate supply of credit
increases, whereas the aggregate demand of credit decreases. This direction
of change will violate the market clearing condition. It is therefore impossible






The comparison of interest rate levels and investment levels between the
perfect credit market and imperfect credit market cases can be easily accom-
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Lemma 4.8
Proof. When π goes to zero, we return to the perfect credit market case;
When π goes to infinity, we see that there will be no demand for borrowing
(see 4.31, when π →∞, bt,i = −wt,i ≤ 0). There will thus be no credit supply.
This corresponds to the case of closing down the credit market.
Proposition 4.9
Proof. See (4.21), (4.24), (4.25), (4.28) and (4.31), We get the optimal
amount of borrowing or lending from the expected consumption maximiza-
tion problem as a function of the initial capital. Plugging these expressions
to cst,i, we obtain "value functions".
(i). In the formal credit market, the value functions of different capital
levels are as following:


































wt,i ∈ [0,w¯ t), c
s
t,i(wt,i) = spα(wt,i + b(wt,i))
αy1−αt−1 − pb(wt,i)Rt
Therefore, the slopes of these value functions are
wt,i ∈ [w¯ t,∞),
∂cst,i(wt,i)
∂wt,i
= pRt (we can obtain the same result by using
the envelope theorem).












(ii). In the informal credit market, the value functions of different capital
levels are as the following:
















































1−α + (π + pRt)wt,i



































= π + pRt
(iii). Compare these two cases.
Importantly, no arbitrary condition stipulates that Rt is the same in two
markets. Then, w̄t of the formal credit market case will be the same as w̌t of
the informal credit market case. By (i) and (ii) we can thus easily compare
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the levels and the slopes of the value functions of these two cases at different
levels of capital. Figure 4.4.1 shows these two value lines.
(iv). To prove the existence of w̃t we proceed as follows.
For the value line of the formal credit market, we calculate out the levels
and slopes of two special points:




When wt,i = ŵ, it is easy to prove that for a sufficiently small θ, or large
p
q
or large yt−i or small π, ŵ >w¯ t






















For the value line of the informal credit market:














|wt,i=0= π + pRt <∞;







We can prove that when π > 0, (4.32) > (4.33).
Therefore, there exists w̃t < ŵ, at which these two value lines cross each
other.
Lemma 4.10
Proof. Since the aggregate demand of credit increases when the informal
credit market exists, the threshold capital level above which households are
lenders (w̄) must move to the left to increase the aggregate supply of credit.
More households thus become lenders, and the former lenders in the situation
of the mere existence of formal credit market lend more. Since the investment
level of lenders is therefore reduced, the interest rate will be higher in the
coexistence situation than that in mere formal credit market situation. It
is also very easy to prove the relationship between π and the size of the
households remaining financially constraint in the coexistence situation.
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4B Figures
Figure 4.1: Two Assumptions
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Figure 4.2: "Perfect" vs. "Formal"
Figure 4.3: "Informal" vs. "Perfect"
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Figure 4.4.1: Coexistence — value comparions
Figure 4.4.2: Coexistence — equilibrium
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4C Tables
Table 4.1: Data Description
Variables Obs. Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Deviation
ANNUGROW 29 0.0106 0.0720 0.0484 0.0154
GINI88 29 0.2010 0.3250 0.2640 0.0362
INVEST 29 0.3025 0.4455 0.3872 0.0412
LABGROW 29 -0.0218 0.0287 0.0102 0.0129
EDUCA88 29 4.2632 8.2912 6.4795 0.9418
LNFIXCAP 29 5.7902 8.0942 6.8238 0.5711
EMPLOY88 29 0.0912 0.6300 0.2517 0.1349
LNPOPU88 29 5.6795 9.1203 7.6078 1.0261
DUMMY 29 0.0000 1.0000 0.3679 0.4234
Table 4.2: Basic Model
Variables Coefficients Std.Error t-value
Constant 0.005 0.028 0.186
GINI88 -0.149 0.063 -2.349
INVEST 0.094 0.044 2.136
LABGROW 0.567 0.248 2.286
EDUCA88 0.012 0.004 3.002
F=5.332 P-value=0.002 R2t=0.459
Table 4.3: Full Model
Variables Coefficient Std.Error t-value
Constant -0.221 0.077 2.870
GINI88 -0.173 0.076 2.276
INVEST 0.081 0.040 2.025
LABGROW 0.312 0.183 1.705
EDUCA88 0.007 0.003 2.290
LNFIXCAP 0.018 0.010 1.800
EMPLOY88 0.053 0.042 1.262
LNPOPU88 0.012 0.005 2.400
DUMMY 0.015 0.009 1.667
F = 6.700 Significancy = 0.001 R2t = 0.802
Table 4.4: Sensitivity Analysis on the Focus Coefficient of GINI88
δ = 1.0 δ = 0.1 δ = 0.4 δ = 0.0
Upper -0.024 -0.087 -0.124 -0.173
Lower -0.313 -0.285 -0.203 -0.173
Chapter 5
The Political Economy of
Interest Rate Liberalization
and a Chinese Case Study
(1980-2004)
5.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the determination of interest rates (deposit and loan
interest rates) — not as the demand-supply equilibrium by the decentral-
ized market mechanism, but as the outcome of a political economy process
in which the regulator makes centralized choices to maximize its objective
function, taking various political economy factors into consideration. Al-
though since the late 1980s many countries(both developed and developing)
have started to liberalize interest rates, some countries still have interest
rates regulated — sometimes to a significant extent — by the government.
Academics have long been interested in explaining the unwillingness or de-
lay of the government in giving up its intervention in interest rates. The
existing literature has already provided several normative justifications for
interest rate controls. "Mild financial repression" policies (Bencivenga and
Smith, 1992), for example, may imply controlled interest rates, serving as
tax instruments for the purpose of optimizing the overall tax structure. "Fi-
nancial restraint" policies (Hellmanna, Murdock and Stiglitz, 1997) attempt
to create more rents for banks to further mobilize national savings, and "de-
velopmental state" policies use controlled interest rates to support specific
industries, etc. This chapter applies a political economy approach in an
attempt to provide, both theoretically and empirically, a positive interpreta-
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tion of the control of interest rates and their deviations from the domestic
market—clearing rates (when the economy is closed) or from the international
rate (when the economy is open).
In theory, in the absence of any political distortions and normative eco-
nomic considerations, the regulator’s social welfare maximization problem
will lead to interest-rate choices that mimic the competitive market results.
However, when the regulator has a particular bias towards certain sectors, or
when some agents in the economy are able to overcome the free-rider problem
to lobby regulators, then the regulator’s maximization problem may lead to
interest-rate choices that are different from competitive results and induce
deadweight loss. Over time, the political forces (such as the relative size of
lobby vs. non lobbying groups) and the new institutional surroundings (such
as the possibility of access to the international financial market) will result
in dynamic changes of the extent of the deviations from market competitive
results. Since interest-rate liberalization means that market forces mainly
determine interest rates, market results will thus emerge; agents will favor
or oppose interest-rate liberalization depending on whether they were disfa-
vored or favored in the previous political economy equilibrium. To capture
these ideas, this chapter builds up a lobbying-for-interest-rate model with
ideological bias, in both a closed and an open economic setting.
Over the past two decades, China’s transformation into a dynamic private-
sector-led market economy and its rapid integration with the world economy
(through both trade and financial linkages) have proven landmark events in
global economic history. Economists worldwide have tried to understand the
logic of China’s reform path and its not yet solved puzzles. One phenomenon
that has yet to receive adequate attention is the fact that the market-oriented
reform of the financial system in China has lagged far behind the other as-
pects of the reform. By 1999, the degree of marketization1 of the financial
system was only 15%, whereas the degree of maketization of the Chinese
economy as a whole was 50% (Hu and Wu, 2002); by 2000, more than 90% of
the commodity prices in China were determined by free market forces, rather
than a central plan (Hu and Wu, 2002). Interest rates were still under direct
control, however. In October 1992, China officially set the ultimate goal of
its reform as “socialist market economy”. Although many economists since
then have started to advocate interest-rate liberalization in China, interest-
rate liberalization remained in its infancy until the year 2000. Only quite
recently, thus has China accelerated the pace of interest-rate liberalization.
1Hu and Wu measure the extent of marketization from 9 aspects with 24 specific indica-
tors, including the extent of government ownership, market entry restrictions, the degree of
government intervention on prices, the development of market intermediary organizations,
the mobility of labor, and the rule of law, etc.
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Although one can try to justify interest-rate control in China by relying
on various normative reasons, the relevance and soundness of these reasons
remain questionable. For example, Shuai (2001) applies the "financial re-
straint" argument to justify interest-rate control in China, regarding the
controlled interest rate as a way to transfer rents to Chinese banks to deepen
the Chinese financial system. He overlooks, however, the fact that the "finan-
cial restraint" (Hellmanna, Murdock and Stiglitz, 1997) theory assumes that
banks are privately owned and have independent incentives. Banks could
therefore put more effort into deepening the financial system when more
rents could be obtained. Most Chinese banks are state-owned, however, and
do not have independent incentives. Rents, if created, are retained by the
public sector, rather than going to the private sector. Finally, the "financial
restraint" policy requires a positive real interest-rate and a reasonable size
of the interest rate spread, neither of which existed in China.
In the case study part of the chapter, we try to answer why China ac-
tually controls its interest rate (rather than pondering why China should or
should not control it). In other words, we attempt to find a positive, rather
than a normative explanation for China’s continuing interest-rate control.
This alternative perspective in understanding the maintenance of interest-
rate control can also be extended to explain the recent tendency of liber-
alizing interest rates. We believe the far-lagged interest-rate liberalization
(compared with the great extent of marketization of most other aspects of
economy in China) offers a particularly nice case for testing the political
economy model of interest-rate determination that we have constructed.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 conducts a literature
review to facilitate an understanding of the political economic reasons behind
financial regulations and deregulation. We also review the literature on the
debates on interest-rate liberalization. Section 5.3 constructs the theoretical
political economy model. Section 5.4 focuses on the Chinese case over the
period 1980 to 2004. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Literature review
The chapter’s study of interest-rate liberalization in a political economy
framework basically combines the traditional literature on financial liber-
alization with the newly emerging literature on political economy of finance
and financial (de)regulation.
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5.2.1 Interest-rate liberalization debate
Financial deepening theorists (McKinnon, 1973; and Shaw, 1973) have advo-
cated financial liberalization for some time. Their key argument: compared
to financial repression2 (in which situation interest rates are normally regu-
lated and set below the market equilibrium level), interest rates determined
by the free market have positive effects on economic growth. This follows
from the resulting increase of investment efficiency3, the further mobilized
savings increasing the level of investment, and the enhancement of compe-
tition among intermediaries increasing the efficiency of financial intermedi-
aries. Cumulative evidence supports the orthodox theoretical argument. Fry
(1980) shows that, in Asian countries, a 1% increase of the real interest rate
towards the equilibrium-level rate would cause economic growth to increase
by 0.5%. Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983) conducted an econometric analysis of
21 developing countries in the period of 1971–1980, and found that the real
interest rate is positively correlated with financial asset increase and GDP
growth. In order to avoid the shortcomings of omitted variables, Roubini and
Sala-I-Martin (1992) applied the multiple variables method and found the
growth-enhancing impacts of financial liberalization: on average, countries
with an interest rate 5% below average exhibit a growth rate 1.4% lower than
countries with positive interest rates. As to the relative importance of chan-
nels through which interest-rate liberalization could lead to a high economic
growth, Gelb (1989) finds that most of the positive association between real
interest rates and growth stems from the investment efficiency effect rather
than the level of investment.
In recent years, however, the contrasting experiences of the newly indus-
trializing East Asian economies with Latin America suggest that government
intervention in financial markets could be welfare enhancing. Theoretical
debate on interest rate liberalization began in earnest at the beginning of
1990s4. The critics of the McKinnon-Shaw paradigm emphasize the possi-
bility of financial market failures, arguing for some degree of interest rate
2Financially repressed system can be characterized as one in which the government
determines who gets and gives credit and at what price. A government can exercise or
reinforce such control by regulating which financial institutions will be permitted to do
business and how they will be permitted to operate, by owning banks and other financial
intermediaries, and by exercising control over international capital movements. Financial
liberalization points out to opposite direction regarding to all of these dimensions.
3The reason is the following. The low interest rate will make low-yielding projects
profitable, and therefore, given a degree of randomness in bank lending decisions, there
will be many low-yielding investments that will serve to reduce the average rate of return
on investment.
4See Blommestein, H. and J. Lange (eds.) (1993).
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control to be maintained over the financial sector — at least over a foresee-
able period of time. More specifically, the rethinking and the move toward
a more cautious approach to interest-rate liberalization are based on several
considerations.
First, McKinnon (1993) himself raises the theory of the order of eco-
nomic liberalization, which maintains that countries should liberalize inter-
est rates and the flow of credit only after macroeconomic stability has been
established, real reforms have been implemented, and a system of supervi-
sion has been put in place. Caprio (1995) further argues that interest rates
should be liberalized only when banks have positive net worth, bank man-
agers have attained adequate sophistication in terms of their ability to judge
credit risks, and financial markets are contestable. For particular focus on
transition countries’ necessity of bank restructuring before liberalization, see,
for example, Blommestein, H. and M. Spencer (1994), Not many countries,
however, have actually followed such counsel.
Second, the theory of adverse selection and moral hazard has cast new
light on interest-rate liberalization (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). When asym-
metric information exists between borrowers and lenders, a higher interest
rate could lead to a more severe adverse selection and moral hazard problem,
thus increasing the risks of a bank’s portfolio. Since interest-rate liberaliza-
tion is frequently accompanied by higher interest rates, this theory attaches
some cautions to interest-rate liberalization. However, the establishment of
a well functioning supervision system, together with a higher screening and
monitoring ability of banks, could reduce the asymmetric information prob-
lem to an acceptably low level.
Third, the recent “financial restraint theory” (Hellmanna, Murdock and
Stiglitz, 1997) argues that a deposit interest rate set below the competitive
equilibrium level could create “rent opportunities” and “franchise value” to
banks, offering incentives for banks to actively mobilize savings, thus deep-
ening the financial system. When "financial constraint" passes on some rents
to the production sector through lending rate control, the increase of firms’
equity could also reduce the firms’ incentive to undertake risky activities.
According to these authors, however, "financial restraint" is not a static pol-
icy instrument. As the economy matures, and in particular, as the capital
base of the financial sector strengthens, "financial restraint" policy can be
progressively relaxed and the economy may transit to a more classic "free
market" paradigm.
Fourth, an argument has been advanced for "mild financial repression",
which applies to countries where widespread income-tax evasion and an un-
derdeveloped debt market make it rational to resort to an inflation tax to
help finance the budget deficit (Bencivenga and Smith, 1992). A lower con-
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trolled interest rate reduces the cost of government borrowing, which yields
greater benefits when the need for government spending is high and the pos-
sibilities of raising tax revenue are limited. Giovannini and De Melo (1993)
also study financial repression chosen by a government following optimal tax
policies. The tax benefit must, however, be weighted with the normal cost
of financial repression.
To summarize: because the above arguments have their limitations, and
the benefits of interest rate liberalization are widely recognized (although
interest-rate liberalization has begun to take a more cautious approach since
the 1990s), liberalized and market-determined interest rates are still a widely
accepted concept among economists and policy-makers.
5.2.2 Public vs. private interest view of interest-rate
regulation
Clearly, the choice of whether to have financial liberalization goes beyond
a purely academic debate, and is also a significant policy choice. For an-
alyzing economic policy choices, economists have broadly taken two views:
"the public interest view" and "the private interest view" (see Kroszner and
Strahan (2001) for a more detailed discussion). According to "the public in-
terest view", the regulator is supposed to play the role of "benevolent social
planner". The four justifications listed above for interest-rate regulation, for
example, are for the sake of the best economic interests of the public at large.
All financial intervention has significant distributional consequences, how-
ever. Existing individual country studies show the distributive effects of
interest-rate liberalization. Siregar (1992) finds that in Indonesia, after finan-
cial liberalization, credit tended to decrease for both small and large firms,
whereas it increased for medium-size firms, verifying that prior to reform,
small firms had some special access to credit and most credit subsidies went
to large firms with political connections. For Korea, Atiyas (1992) found
that small firms gained improved access to external finance after liberaliza-
tion, and that credit flows also moved from light industrial manufacturing to
services, utilities, and construction. For exchange-rate intervention, Huizinga
(1996) provides interesting evidence that some countries have used their con-
trolled system of two-tiered exchange rates, with separate commercial and
financial exchange rates, to effectively subsidize capital inflows, or national
borrowing, from abroad.
The significant distributive effects of financial liberalization thus provide
the parties affected by financial regulation with an incentive to try to en-
sure that the government intervenes in such a way as to benefit them. The
Chapter 5. Political Economy of Interest Rate Liberalization 153
intervention can thus be regarded as one of interest group competition in
which compact, well organized groups are able to use the coercive power of
the state to capture rents for those groups at the expense of more dispersed
groups (Becker, 1983). According to "the private interest view", the public
interest argument is often, in fact, used to mask the private interests that
the intervention serves. Contrarily, private interests may try to confuse the
public debate by providing false or misleading information to make it difficult
to discern whether policy would improve social welfare (Kane, 1996).
The political economy approach of financial regulation (taking the "pri-
vate interest view"), attempts to offer a positive analysis of how and why
financial regulation has evolved and what forces can lead to its durability
and potential for changes. The approach demonstrates that the banking and
financial system is not independent of politics, and describes what implica-
tions this interdependence has for understanding reform.
Generally speaking, although political economy tools have long since been
applied to the field of economics, only recently have such tools been applied to
topics in the field of finance. Pagano and Volpin (2001) conducted a compre-
hensive review of the emerging literature of the political economy of finance.
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) provided an insightful empirical analysis of the
political economy of banking regulation in the United States. The authors
show that the timing of the deregulation of branch banking across the United
States was determined by the relative strengths of the interest groups affected
by the reform. Rajan and Zingales (2001) attribute the "great reversal" of
the development of the arm’s length financial markets of civil-law countries to
incumbents’ opposition to the development of the external financial market.
Incumbents can finance investment opportunities mainly with retained earn-
ings, while potential competitors need external capital to start up: equity
market development thus breeds competition for incumbents. Laeven (2004)
used a political economy framework to empirically explain the differences in
the support for explicit deposit insurance across countries. Montinola and
Moreno (2001) applied a lobbying model to show that liberalization of for-
eign bank entry may result from political changes and a fall in domestic
bank efficiency caused by the lack of competition, which raises the costs to
domestic banks of restricting foreign bank entry. The Philippines’ liberal-
ization of foreign bank entry in 1994 was taken as a case study. A political
economy approach has also been applied to other topics of finance, such as
exchange rates (Huizinga, 1997; and Broz and Frieden, 2001) and capital
control (Alesina, et al., 1993), among others. To our best knowledge, this
chapter is the first to apply a political economy approach, together with a
country case study to the area of interest-rate liberalization.
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5.2.3 A closer review
For the purpose of this study, three strands of research are particularly worth
reviewing.
A common agency model was pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston
(1986), and applied to trade policy by Grossman and Helpman (1994) and to
the structure of the taxation by Dixit et al. (1997). The government is the
agent that sets economic policy. Various interest groups act as principals,
and confront the government with contribution schedules: with functions
mapping economic policy into actions valued by the government. Then, a
two-stage game is played. First, the lobbies simultaneously commit to con-
tribution schedules; next, the government, having observed these schedules,
sets economic policy. This chapter applies this specific modeling technique.
“Ideology theory” (Kroszner, 1999) emphasizes the beliefs and “ideology”
of the politicians in explaining intervention and regulation. Political ideolo-
gies are defined as "consistent sets of normative statements as to best or
preferred states of the world, which statements are moralistic and altruistic
in the sense that they are held as applicable to everyone, rather than merely
to the actor making the statements" (Kalt and Zupan, 1984). Within the
legislative framework of the United States, several studies (Kalt and Zupan,
1984; Kau and Rubin, 1981) have attempted to explain the voting records
of particular congressmen as functions of a relevant economic interest vari-
able plus some measures of the "ideological" orientation of the congressmen.
They find that "ideology" is indeed one of the dominant explanatory factors
in congressional voting behavior. For post-Communist economies of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union countries, Denizer et al. (1998) find that
the overall financial repression5 is greater in countries with a higher percent-
age of communists in parliament and less party fractionalization. Through a
combination of partial state ownership of financial institutions and interest-
rate controls, state-owned industries in these countries have been assured a
continuous flow of cheap credit. Following this line of literature, this chap-
ter will incorporate the ideology factor into the analyses (demonstrating its
necessity for countries like China — with its communist legacy).
Finally there is a growing literature on China. Several studies are close to
this study. Aziz and Duenwald (2002) check the "finance-growth nexus" with
China’s provincial data. They found that there existed an allocation ineffi-
ciency of loans across provinces in China: during 1988-1997, those provinces
with above-average GDP growth had bank loan-to-GDP ratios that were sta-
5In their chapter, the higher the percentage of directed credit to total credit, the lower
the central bank real discount rate, the lower the level of financial intermediation, the
more the system is depressed.
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tistically significantly lower — by up to 36% of GDP at the average — than
those of below-average-growth provinces. Bank loans in China thus appear
to have been channeled to provinces with a heavy concentration of SOEs,
which also have tended to grow relatively slowly. Due to this regional alloca-
tive bias toward state-owned enterprises, one can not significantly explain
cross-provincial growth differentials in cross-provincial panel regressions with
the bank-to-GDP ratio, even after controlling for other variables. Instead,
researchers find that the higher loans to the non-state sector can account for
a higher provincial growth (significant at the 1% level). This chapter shows
the importance of channeling a higher proportion of savings to the non-state
sector, which will allow China’s financial sector to play the role of efficient
intermediary between savers and borrowers, and thus strengthen the positive
link between financial development and growth. Brandt and Zhu (2000) ex-
plain the co-movement of the growth and inflation in China during reform
to the centralization and decentralization of credit allocation shifts. Decen-
tralized credit allocation leads to more credit being allocated to the higher
productivity non-state sector, thus resulting in a higher economic growth
rate. But at the same time it increases the pressure to subsidize state-owned
enterprises. Thus, inflationary financing is relied upon and credit allocation
is centralized, which in turn reduces the growth rate (since the non-state
sector gets less credit). Using provincial-level data on FDI and trade flows
in China over the years 1984-1995, Branstetter and Feenstra (1999) find that
the weight applied to consumer welfare is between one-fifth and one-twelfth
of the weight applied to the output of state owned enterprises in the govern-
ment objective function. Government preferences have shifted over time, but
even in recent periods the weight on consumer welfare has only been one-
half of the weight on state-owned enterprises. Other papers trying to apply
a political economic approach to China’s overall transition problem (Qian,
1999), to the dual-price system during transition (Lau, et al., 2000) and to




The economy basically consists of three kinds of players: depositors (D),
enterprises and banks (B). Enterprises can be state- or privately owned, de-
noted as SOEs and PEs, respectively. The nature of ownership affects the
weight attached to enterprises in the social welfare function chosen by the
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social planner (in this context, the interest rate setter or the "regulator"). In
addition, when the economy is open to the international capital market, the
fiscal authority or central bank starts to play a role that taxes or subsidizes
international capital flows.
The total population is normalized as 1. All individuals supply credit.
The total number of depositors is thus 1. Enterprises demand credit and
banks intermediate funds. Each individual owns at most one type of en-
terprise. Assume αS of the total population owns SOEs and αP owns PEs.
Individuals with enterprise ownership get returns not only from supplying
their deposit, but also from the profit of the enterprises. The rest of the
population 1− αS −αP = αA own no enterprises (supposedly corresponding
to people in the agricultural sector (denote superscript "A")), and only get
a return by supplying a deposit.
The regulator sets various interest rates, maximizing its objective func-
tion.
Behavioral functions
Each depositor supplies credit D according to a credit-supply function
D = D(rD) (5.1)
which increases with the deposit interest rate rD (i.e., D0(rD) > 0). The




) = 0. Since the total
population is 1, the aggregate credit supply is the same as the credit supply
per person.
The loan demand functions of SOEs and PEs are different, stemming
from their productivity differences. It is well analyzed why PEs on average
have higher productivity than SOEs. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) attribute
this difference to the possession of the control rights by private firms causing
it to be more costly for the government to intervene in a private firm in order
to force it to deviate from efficient decisions. Even if the government cares
as much about efficiency as firms do, the lack of government commitment
to SOEs could still lead to under-capacity production ("Ratchet effects"6;
6"Ratchet effects" refer to a particular phenomenon of socialist economy: the managers
of SOEs tends not to fully use their ability leading to under-performance of SOEs. As
a government in a socialist economy has monopoly power over managers, it is inevitably
tempted to "ratchet up" performance requirements and revise upward incentive schemes
for managers with a good performance so as to leave them less rents. The absence of
the government commitment power in socialist economy is the main reason account for
"rachet effect".
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see Roland and Sekkat, 2000) or soft budget constraint-related inefficiency
(Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995).
Suppose, for example, that PEs have a greater productivity in comparison
with SOEs not only on average, but also at the margin. As far as capital
input is concerned (at the same level of capital input), the PEs’ marginal
productivity can be supposed higher than that of the SOEs’. Since the loan-
demand function is the locus of the marginal productivity of capital (which
is equal to the interest rate in equilibrium), we can also see that: for a given
loan interest rate, the PEs’ demand for loans is higher than that of the SOEs.
This is true if the SOEs’ loan-demand function per person is
LS = L(rL) (5.2)
with L0(rsL) < 0,and the loan-demand function of PEs per person is assumed
to be proportionately higher,
LP = θL(rL) (5.3)
with θ > 1 (which is exogenously given). The upper bound of loan interest
rates r̄ satisfies L(r̄) = 0. We assume r
¯
<r̄ to ensure that credit supply
and demand lines can cross each other. Correspondingly, the aggregate loan
demands of SOEs and PEs are αSLS and αPLP , respectively.
Banks channel credit between depositors and enterprises. The interest-
rate spread is their profit margin. Banks could have different profit rates
when granting credit to different types of enterprises. Throughout the analy-
ses, we assume that banks act passively — in the sense that they do not
actively choose interest rates or quantities to maximize their profit. The
interest rates are set by the regulator, and the market-clearing condition
thereafter determines quantity.
Surplus, profit and welfare
Since the total population is normalized as one, the aggregate depositors’






which is a function of rD.
The surplus of aggregate enterprises is
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i = S, P,standing for state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, re-
spectively, which represent the surplus of individual enterprises times the
population size and are functions of riL.
The total profit of banks is
V B = (rSL − rD)αSLS + (rPL − rD)αPLP 7 (5.6)
which is a function of both deposit- and loan- interest rates.
For populations in different sectors, the aggregate welfare of individuals
outside of SOEs or PEs is given by
WA = αAV D (5.7)
which is an "agricultural" population share of aggregate depositors’ surplus.
The aggregate welfare of the individuals possessing SOE or PE ownership
is
W S = V S + αSV D (5.8)
WP = V P + αPV D (5.9)
respectively, which are the sector’s surplus plus a corresponding population
share of the depositors’ surplus.
5.3.2 Regulator’s problem in a closed economy
"Closed economy" refers to the situation in which there are no international
capital flows and the credit market clears domestically. The regulator sets
various interest rates to maximize its objective function. We first study this
problem when political distortions and political considerations are absent.
Then we add political elements to the model to see how the equilibrium
changes.
Socially optimal case
When the regulator’s objective function is to maximize social welfare, thus
acting as a "benevolent social planner", we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5.1 When the regulator chooses interest rates to maximize
social welfare, defined by Ω =WD+W S+WP+WB = V D+V S+V P+V B, she
sets rD = rSL = r
P
L = r
∗. Here, r∗ satisfies D(r∗) = αSLS(r∗) + αPLP (r∗) =
(αS + αP θ)L(r∗).
7This is for the case of a closed economy. We will discuss the profit of banks in open
economy later.
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Proof. see appendix.
This proposition points out that in the absence of any political distortions,
the social-welfare-maximizing regulator will choose interest rates at the same
levels as will occur under the competitive market. Thus, the regulator no
longer has any reason to regulate the interest rate and can simply let the
market work, leading to a socially optimal result. This proposition also
verifies that the competitive market equilibrium is social optimal, which is a
particular case of the first welfare theorem.
Lemma 5.2 When the regulator maximizes social welfare, the equilib-
rium interest rate r∗ increases with the productivity parameter θ. The share






for PEs. PEs get relatively more
credit, since they have higher productivity. The higher the productivity ad-
vancement of PEs, the more credit they get (relatively). Increasing the share
of the population possessing PEs (measured relatively by α
P
αS
)also leads to an
increased share of aggregate credit granted to PEs.
Ideological bias and lobbying for interest rates
We add political distortions to the simple model above in two ways. First
of all, for certain reasons, the regulator could have a biased attitude to-
wards SOEs. This bias can be modeled by a higher weight associated with
the production surplus of SOEs in the regulator’s objective function. Define
WSλ = λV
S +αSV D, where λ > 1 captures the ideological bias of the regula-
tor towards SOEs. Secondly, we could allow bankers and individuals owning
SOEs and PEs to lobby the regulator for setting the interest rate in accor-
dance with their own interests. But individuals in the agricultural sector
who do not have any sector ownership cannot lobby at all. This distinction
comes from our assumption that sector ownership can serve as a mechanism
to overcome free riding and the coordination-failure problem.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), we model the lobbying process
as a two-stage game. In the first stage, SOEs, PEs and banks simultaneously
make contributions to the regulator. One chooses the amount of one’s con-
tribution given the contributions made by others and the expected reaction
of the government. In the second stage, the regulator sets the interest rates
to maximize social welfare plus total contributions. The model’s detailed
structure is closer to Rama and Tabellini (1997), who model capitalists and
a labor union lobbying for an open trade policy and a minimum wage policy
at the expense of the unorganized agricultural population. In their model,
the interests of capital and labor are aligned over trade policy, but are op-
posed over labor policy. In our model, the interests of banks and enterprises
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are aligned over the deposit interest rate, but opposed over the loan-interest
rate. The distinction between SOEs and PEs generates another potential
opposing interest among enterprises, due to ideological bias towards SOEs.



























Here, a is the weight assigned by the regulator to social welfare. It
captures the relative importance of social welfare and total contributions
from the regulator’s point of view. A higher a indicates that the regulator
cares more about social welfare and less about contributions. CS(rD, rSL),
CP (rD, r
P





L), the contribution schemes of SOEs, PEs and
banks, are the functions of relevant interest rates. The following proposi-
tion characterizes the sub-perfect Nash equilibrium of interest rates of this
two-stage game.
Proposition 5.3When the regulator has a biased attitude towards SOEs,
and SOEs, PEs, and banks can make contributions to the regulator to influ-
ence the interest-rate choice, a common agency-type two-stage game leads to


























, i.e.rSL < r
P
L . SOEs face lower
loan interest rates than PEs do; SOEs are thus relatively subsidized. The
higher the degree of ideological bias towards SOEs and the lower the interest-
rate elasticity of loan demand of SOEs, the lower the loan interest rate to
SOEs will be, relative to PEs, and the greater the subsidy SOEs get. The
relationship between the interest rate elasticity of loan demand of SOEs and
the size of the subsidy they get is consistent with the normal Ramsey rule.
Moreover, the loan interest rate to PEs will never be less than the deposit
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interest rate, whereas the loan interest rate to SOEs could be lower than the
deposit interest rate (when λ is very big or when the interest-rate elasticity
of loans to SOEs is very small, for example).
Secondly, both interest-rate spreads decrease with the interest-rate elas-
ticity of deposit (εD) and increase with αA. The greater the reactiveness of
depositors to the deposit interest rate, and the lower that of the population
belonging to the unorganized agricultural sector, the lower the interest-rate
spread that will be chosen. Because they cannot act collectively, depositors
as a whole have no lobbying influence and can rely merely on increasing their
sensitivity of credit supply, indicated by interest-rate elasticity of deposit, to
get a higher deposit interest rate and a lower interest-rate spread. Moreover,
the lower the proportion of the population in the "agricultural" sector, the
more individuals get involved with the lobbying activities, and the higher
the extent that the lobbying effects among different lobbying groups are can-
celled out, the closer the results will be to the socially optimal solution. At




Thirdly, both interest-rate spreads decrease with a, the weight assigned to
social welfare, showing that the less the regulator cares about contributions,
the less the interest-rate spread will be. When a → ∞ (the regulator does
not care at all about the contribution) together with λ = 1, both of the
interest-rate spreads are zero, arriving at the social optimum.
Some special cases of Proposition 5.3, varied by who participates in the
game and whether participants can lobby, are worth further attention, in
order of increasing complication.
Case 1: no PEs exist and neither SOEs nor banks can lobby.
This is a very simple situation in which the regulator has a biased attitude
towards solely existing SOEs, and both SOEs and banks do not lobby. The
result of this case corresponds to the outcome of proposition 5.3 by taking







The loan interest rate to SOEs is always smaller than the deposit rate, and
the negative spread results in losses to the banks. The greater the bias and
the lower the loan demand elasticity of SOEs, the smaller the loan interest
rate will be, compared with the deposit rate. Intuitively, when SOEs enjoy
biased support by the regulator, and banks cannot lobby for favored interest-
rate settings, banks sacrifice their profit8 for the subsidy to SOEs stemming
from the ideologically biased policy towards SOEs.
8Here we focus on one period problem. Overtime, the survival of banks is not a problem
Chapter 5. Political Economy of Interest Rate Liberalization 162















,which is the same as (5.12). Compared with
(5.14), where banks cannot lobby, the possibility for banks to lobby in-
creases the weight associated with the banks in the regulator’s social-welfare-
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ther. ((5.16) has a higher numerator and a lower denominator compared with
(5.13)), corresponding to a relatively even higher loan interest rate than the
one faced by the SOEs. Therefore, PEs are more discriminated against if they
cannot lobby due to certain reasons (institutional obstacles, too dispersed to
cooperate, etc.). The greater the share of the population belonging to PEs,
and the smaller the loan-demand interest-rate elasticity of PEs, the higher
rPL−rD
rD
.Intuitively, PEs are more discriminated against if non-lobbying PEs
are larger in size and if their loan demand is less responsive to interest-rate
changes.
5.3.3 Regulator’s problem in an open economy
When the country is open to the world capital market and faces an exoge-
nously given world interest rate r∗∗, domestic credit supply does not need to
be equal to domestic credit demand, and the difference can be met by either
international capital inflows or outflows. This section analyzes the political
economy determination of interest rates in a financially open setting. We
first make further assumptions and distinguish two situations on the basis of
if government can make lump-sum transfer to banks to cover their lost. Lump-sum trans-
fer will not affect the first order condition in regulator’s welfare maximization problem.
Therefore, equation (5.14) remains the same when lump sum transfer takes place in each
period.
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the directions of capital flows. Then we determine the interest-rate choices
of the regulator with or without political distortions. It turns out that when
political elements are absent, capital inflow and outflow situations lead to the
same interest-rate level choice, which mimics the result of the competitive
markets. But when lobbying activities are possible and an ideological bias
exists, capital inflow and capital outflow situations lead to distinct results —
and the distinction between these two situations is necessary and important.
Assumptions
(1). When at equilibrium there is capital inflow (D(rD) < αSL(rSL) +
αPθL(rPL )), we assume that domestic deposits are sufficient for SOEs’ loan
demand alone but insufficient for SOEs’ and PEs’ loan demand together. We
also assume that the loan demand of SOEs is fully met by domestic deposits,
and that capital inflow only goes to PEs to fulfill their loan demand that
can not be met domestically. Under this assumption, the profit of banks is
derived from loans to SOEs, (which meets their loan demand fully), and from
loans to PEs, (only their partial demand is met by domestic credit supply).
Specifically, the profits of banks are
V B = (rSL − rD)αSL(rSL) + (rPL − rD)(D(rD)− αSL(rSL)) (5.17)
To equalize the domestic return rate of capital inflow (rPL ) with the world
return rate, the tax authority taxes or subsidies capital inflows at level T ,
T = (rPL − r∗∗)(αSL(rSL) + αP θL(rPL )−D(rD)) (5.18)
If at equilibrium the loan interest rate of PEs is lower than the world interest
rate, then the tax authority has to subsidize the capital inflow in order to
provide enough incentives for foreign capital to flow in (correspondingly, T <
0).Otherwise, when rPL > r
∗∗, the tax authority could tax away the additional
return of capital inflows to PEs (correspondingly T > 0).
(2). When at the equilibrium interest rate there is capital outflow (D(rD) >
αSL(rSL)+α
P θL(rPL )), then the profit of banks is derived from providing the
domestic credit to SOEs and PEs. Specifically, the banks’ profit is
V B = (rSL − rD)αSL(rSL) + (rPL − rD)αPθL(rPL ) (5.19)
The deposit surplus will flow outside of the country. The tax authority taxes
or subsidizes the returns of the capital outflow to equalize domestic return
with the international return. Specifically, the tax authority’s amount of tax
or subsidy due to this return-equalization activity is
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T = (r∗∗ − rD)(D(rD)− αSL(rSL)− αPθL(rPL )) (5.20)
If at equilibrium the domestic deposit interest rate is lower than the world
interest rate, the additional return from the capital outflowwill be taxed away
(correspondingly T > 0); otherwise, a subsidy will be given and T < 0.
We assume that the tax authority treats T in a lump-sum way; T will
thus be deducted (when T < 0) or added (when T > 0) to the depositors’
surplus on a one-to-one basis in the regulator’s social-welfare function.
Social optimal case
Proposition 5.4 When the regulator sets interest rates to maximize social












∗∗. Denote r∗ as the domestic interest rate that will clear
the credit market in a closed economy. Then, if r∗∗ < r∗, there is capital
inflow; otherwise, there is capital outflow.
Proof. see appendix.
Again, this proposition shows that in the absence of political distortions,
the regulator’s interest-rate choice mimics the competitive market result. It
is very easy to show that the share of the total credit going to PEs remains as
αP θ
αS+αP θ
in a financially open economy. Moreover, the higher the productivity
of PEs (bigger θ), the higher the domestic market-clearing interest rate (given
the world interest rate), the more possible that r∗∗ is smaller than r∗, and
the more chance that the country is a capital-importing country.
Capital flow with ideological bias and lobbying
However, if political distortions exists, the ideological bias towards SOEs
and the lobbying activities of SOEs, banks and PEs for favored interest-rate
settings will lead to interest rates set differently from the world interest rate.
We characterize the equilibrium interest rate in capital inflow and capital
outflow situations respectively.
Case 1: capital inflow Assume throughout this sectionD(rD) < αSL(rSL)+
αPθL(rPL ), which will be verified at the equilibrium. Denote [α
SL(rSL) +
θαPL(rPL ) − D(rD)]/θαPL(rPL ) = k > 0, indicating the share of PEs’ total
loan demand met by capital inflow. The regulator maximizes aggregate wel-
fare (with a biased attitude towards SOEs) plus total contributions made
by SOEs, PEs and banks. The tax authority subsidizes or taxes on capital
inflows depending on whether the loan interest rate of PEs is lower or higher
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than the world interest rate, as described in assumption (1) of subsection
5.3.3. The tax authority’s revenue or payout as measured by T (see equation
(5.18)) directly enter into the aggregate welfare. We formulate the regulator’s
maximization problem in detail in the appendix. By solving the problem, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 5.5 In an open economy with capital inflow going to PEs,
when the regulator has a biased attitude towards SOEs, and SOEs, PEs, and
banks can make contributions to the regulator to influence the interest-rate






























First, all interest rates are set below the world interest rate9. One immedi-
ate implication is that T < 0, which means that the tax authority subsidizes
capital inflow because the domestic return of loans to PEs is smaller than
the world interest rate. A greater subsidy rate will be given to capital inflow
if PEs rely relatively more on capital inflow measured by k, if the regulator
values contributions more (compared to social welfare), or if PEs have lower
interest-rate elasticity.
Secondly, the order of rSL, r
P
















, rPL > r
S
L > rD. The diminished impor-
tance of the imported capital for PEs will cause the regulator to rank her
loan interest rate highest, showing more discrimination towards PEs; more
attitude bias towards SOEs leads to a lower loan interest rate, indicating
more subsidy to SOEs; recall that αA measures the share of the unorganized
population that are excluded from lobbing activity; a larger unorganized
9Therefore, r∗∗ < r∗ is sufficient condition to ensure that at political equilibrium in-
terest rates D(rD) < L(rSL) + θL(r
P
L ) by the following logic. Firstly, if r
∗∗ < r∗ there is
capital inflow. Secondly, when at equilibrium all deposit and loan interest rates are all set
below world interest rates, decreasing domestic deposit supply and increasing domestic
credit demand, more capital inflows are necessary. So D(rD) < L(rSL) + θL(r
P
L ) holds at
the equilibrium.
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population in the economy results in a lower deposit interest rate, meaning
that depositors lose more. Therefore, interestingly, k, λ, and αA, all scaled
by the corresponding elasticities, indicate the relative political strength (for
PEs and SOEs) or weakness (for depositors) of PEs, SOEs, and depositors
to influence the interest rate set with respect to their own interest.
Thirdly, the relative interest-rate spread between rSL and rD, or between
rPL and rD, decreases with both the interest rate elasticity of depositors and
the weight attached to social welfare. The same interpretation applies as in
the closed economy case.
Case 2: Capital outflow We turn to the case D(rD) > αSL(rSL) +
θαPL(rPL ). Denote [D(rD) − αSL(rSL) − θαPL(rPL )]/D(rD) = e > 0, indi-
cating the share of total deposits flowing out of the country. The regulator
maximizes aggregate welfare (with a biased attitude towards SOEs) plus to-
tal contributions made by SOEs, PEs and banks. The tax authority taxes
or subsidizes on capital outflows depending on whether the domestic deposit
interest rate is lower or higher than the world interest rate, as described in
assumption (2) of subsection 5.3.3. The tax authority’s revenue or payout as
measured by T (see equation (5.20)) directly enter into the aggregate wel-
fare. We formulate the regulator’s maximization problem in detail in the
appendix. By solving the problem, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5.6 In an open economy with capital outflow when the reg-
ulator has a biased attitude towards SOEs, and SOEs, PEs, and banks can
make contributions to the regulator to influence the interest-rate choice, a





















First, whether capital outflow is taxed or subsidized is determined by
whether the domestic deposit interest rate is set below or above the world
interest rate. From equation (5.24) we know that when e < αA, we have
rD < r
∗∗; then, capital outflow is taxed (T > 0) and smaller e and larger
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αA will lead to a higher tax rate on capital outflow. Intuitively, when a
lower share of domestic deposit is exported and more depositors belong to
the unorganized group, depositors’ economic influence (measured by higher
e) and political influence (measured by lower αA) becomes less important.
The deposit interest rate is thus set below the world interest rate and capital
outflow is taxed. The capital outflow subsidy is in force when e > αA. This
happens to a massively capital-exporting country or to a country with widely
organized depositors.
Secondly, the order of rD, rSL and r
P












then rSL < rD < r
P
L . We can regard
a(λ−1)
εSL
as any indicator of the strength of
SOEs to get rSL set low and to get a subsidy for themselves. Their strength
increases if the regulator has more ideological bias and the elasticity of loan
demand of SOEs is low. α
A−e
aεD
measures the weakness of the depositors’
exertion of political influence that could be brought to bear to induce a high
rD. More unorganized depositors and less capital exporting corresponds to
a reduced ability of depositors to get a high deposit interest rate, leading to
a low deposit interest rate in the equilibrium. Since PEs do not receive any
special treatment from the regulator, and capital outflow refers only to the
depositors, the relative ability of PEs to exert political influence is "zero".
5.4 China’s case (1980-2004)
In the past two decades, despite the rapid marketization process of the Chi-
nese economy overall, the market-oriented reforms of the financial sector lag
far behind: banks are still mainly owned by the state, competition among
banks is low, entry barriers are high, etc. (see, for example, van Gemert
(2001) for an overview of the Chinese financial system under transition). In
particular, the interest-rate liberalization process is slow, and loan and de-
posit rates have been, until quite recently, especially tightly controlled. We
now apply our political economy model to analyze the Chinese case, trying to
pin down the political economic forces and environmental economic changes
that have driven the Chinese interest-rate-level dynamics and liberalization
pace.
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5.4.1 Background: pre-1984
Transformation from budgetary finance to intermediary finance
China had sustained an average rate of national savings of more than 25%
since the 1950s. But before 1978, the year marking the initiation of "the
reform and open policy", this high rate of savings was mobilized almost
entirely through the government. Household financial savings were insignifi-
cant10. Investment was financed predominantly from interest-free budgetary
grants11, which were actually the source of much of the working capital of
SOEs. Banks made few loans to SOEs to finance their investment in fixed
assets, and concentrated their lending on providing a portion of the working
capital.
The initial years of reform (1978-1984) were marked by important changes
in the sources of both savings and investment. On the savings side, the
decentralization of financial resources into the hands of households led to
an explosion in household savings deposits. On the investment side, bank
loans replaced the state budget appropriations as the main source of invest-
ment finance. The composition of funds allocated to SOEs changed rapidly
from budget appropriations in 1978 (70%) to state bank loans in 1982 (80%)
(Mehran, 1996). Dating from 1984, bank loans became the chief source of ex-
ternal funding for industrial enterprises (Fan and Woo, 1992). The change in
the structure of savings and sources of investment since 1984 has highlighted
the importance of financial intermediaries in resource allocation.
Change from mono-bank to two-tiered banking system
Pre-reform China had a mono-bank system typical of a planned economy,
revolving around the People’s Bank of China (PBC). Although in 1979 there
was some institutional transformation of the financial sector (mainly the re-
establishment of the Agricultural Bank of China), the separation of the Bank
of China from the People’s Bank of China, and the functional enhancement
of the Construction Bank (by removing the administrative control of the
Ministry of Finance), these reform steps were still modest. Far more signifi-
cant institutional change began in 1984, when the deposit-taking and lending
functions of the People’s Bank of China were taken over by the Industrial
and Commercial Bank. The PBC itself was thus organized into the Central
10In the years prior reform, the annual additions to household financial savings were
equal to only about 0.5% of GNP. In 1978 the entire accumulative stock of household
savings was only about 6% of that year’s GNP (Lardy, 1998).
11The principle source of the prominent government savings was the profits of SOEs
that were surrendered to Ministry of Finance.
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Throughout the period analyzed, the transfer of funds from savings to invest-
ment in China took place mainly through the banking system. During 1980s
and 1990s, China’s equity and bond financing always accounted for less than
10 percent of the financial system, indicating the underdevelopment and lim-
ited role of equity and bond markets in transforming savings to investment.
The banking system, with four major state-owned banks taking around 70%
of total loans and deposits (data in year 1999), instead plays a crucial role
in the allocation of financial resources in China. Thus, deposit and loan
interest rates became particularly important in allocating funds, mobilizing
savings and directing international capital flows for China. The theoretical
model of the chapter, which studies the role of banks in channeling funds and
focuses on deposit and loan interest rates, thus reflects the Chinese financial
structure.
Regulated interest rates and directed credit
Despite the decentralization of the source of finance, and the institutional
establishment of a two-tiered banking system in 1984, the banking system
still played a rather limited role in financing investment. Most types of
interest rates were regulated. Banks initially had no room at all to adjust
rates, and followed the directed rates on a one-to-one basis. Later on, Chinese
banks received some limited capacity to charge differential rates of interest,
but mainly on the basis of ownership and size of the loan applicants. Only
quite recently have banks received more room in adjusting interest rates, and
started to practice charging different interest rates on a commercial basis.
During the periods analyzed, loans were, most of the time, directed under
the credit plan, and neither the project’s profitability nor the borrower’s re-
payment ability was taken into consideration in granting loans. Furthermore,
the banks’ monitoring of SOEs was almost non-existent (Tong 2002).
12However, it assumed normal central bank functions only gradually.
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Politically oriented interest-rate setter and government interven-
tion at various levels
Although the People’s Bank of China by name should be the setter of various
types of interest rates, the PBC is far from independent and must ask permis-
sion from the State Council for each interest rate change. The final decision
maker is not the state council, however, but "the Central Economic and Fi-
nancial Leading Group", which became later "the Central Financial Working
Commission" (established in 1998 after the Asian financial crisis) of the Chi-
nese Communist Party. This body is the final decision-maker for various im-
portant financial policies, certainly including the interest-rate-setting mech-
anism and level changes. Not surprisingly, the interest-rate-setting process
is very much politically oriented.
The overall structure of authority from top to bottom also made it diffi-
cult to limit political intervention in loan allocation. On the one hand, the
Chinese authority consists of multiple levels of government and the commu-
nist party branched at the national, provincial, city or county, and township
levels; on the other hand, the government also consists of functional bureau-
cracies duplicated at each of those administrative levels. Given that most
(if not al)l of the vertically organized governmental agencies face budgetary
constraints, it is in their interest to pursue policies that enhance their own
material resources. The local governments inevitably press the local branches
of the state banks to grant the SOEs’ application for investment loans. Evi-
dence overwhelmingly shows that the local bank branches have generally not
been able to resist the demand of easy money.
Although not officially recognized and institutionally legitimated, various
interest groups, such as SOEs, PEs and banks, have become more active as
the reform proceeds. They use various means to influence the regulator-set
policies to their own advantage.
5.4.3 Observations on interest-rate data
Figure 5.1 plots time-series data of deposit and loan interest rates over the
period 1980-2002 both in nominal terms (Figure 5.1.1) and in real terms
(Figure 5.1.2.), which are deflated by an annual GDP deflator. Figure 5.2
shows the change of the interest-rate spread over time. We summarize the
information conveyed by the figures as follows.
1. Levels: Overall except real interest rates in some high inflationary
years, which were below zero (during three periods China met high
inflation: 1985, 1988, 1993-1995), the rest of the real interest rates
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were low and above zero. Look carefully, at the average, before 1996,
real interest rate was low. From 1996 on, the real interest rate started
to increase.
2. Spread: Overall, the interest-rate spread in China is small13, and the
interest rate spread started to increase, only since 1995, to 2.61, and
remained at 3.6 for several years until 2001.
There are several preliminary observations. First, low levels of the real
interest rate — especially at the beginning of the periods — are indicative
of the "financial repression" policy practiced in China. Secondly, advanced
countries generally possess more efficient financial intermediation and a more
competitive banking sector, both contributing to a lower interest-rate spread.
China’s banks are less efficient, however, due to state ownership and a rel-
atively concentrated banking structure. The surprisingly low interest-rate
spread of China therefore strongly implies that some other factors than con-
cern for efficiency dominate. Thirdly, roughly the whole period to be analyzed
could be divided into two sub-periods. Before 1996, both spread and levels
were low, with even a sporadic negative or zero spread or a negative real
interest rate; after 1996, both spread- and interest- rate levels increased, and
neither are currently negative.
5.4.4 Regulated interest rate and biased lending (1980-
1996)
Current situation
Price discrimination: effective interest rates to PEs It is not easy to
obtain data on the effective interest PEs paid from the official sources, despite
the fact that most private enterprises that are able to borrow already pay
effective interest rates that are significantly higher than the ones prescribed
by the Central Bank. Banks and credit unions are also using “creative” ways
to circumvent interest-rate controls when granting loans to PEs. According
to firm survey (World Bank, 2000), in 1992, state-owned commercial banks
charged an average interest rate of 7.9 percent, and credit unions 11.5 percent,
13They are exceptionally small compared to other countries. The world average interest
rate spread between year 1984 and 2002 is 10.57%. For OECD countries, the number is
5.38% and 11.83 for non-OECD countries. China’s average is only 1.50% for the same
period, ranked as lowest No.4. among 164 countries. (WDI 2002). List the interest rate
spread average for some of other countries: South Korea (0.59), Canada (1.54), Swithz-
erland (1.83), the United Kingdom (1.97), Japan (2.74), Tailand (3.00), Phillipine (5.20),
Germany (5.78).
Chapter 5. Political Economy of Interest Rate Liberalization 172
on borrowers from the non-state sector. These rates, with transaction costs
factored in, are comparable to the informal market rate. Moreover, from
April 1991 to August 1996, both collectively owned and privately owned
enterprises were explicitly asked to pay a working-capital interest rate that
floated up to 20% of the basis rate applying to SOEs (Chinese Financial
Yearbook and Chinese Yearbook, 1997).
Quantity discrimination: lending bias against PEs The phenomenon
of lending bias in favor of SOEs has been widely documented (see McKinnon,
1994; Lardy, 1998; and Aziz and Duenwald, 2002). Admittedly, small and
opaque private firms have difficulty obtaining external financing because they
represent higher risks and high unit-transaction costs. But the lending bias
in favor of SOEs in China is particularly rooted in a policy choice made by
the authorities to commit massive financial resources to the state sector.
There is a great deal of direct evidence showing the lending bias. For ex-
ample, between 1991 and 1997, the share of private investment in the national
total was in the range of 15-20%, with little recourse to formal bank loans
(less than one percent of working capital loans went to the private sector)
(World Bank, 2000). Using city-level data over 1989-1991, Wei and Wang
(1997) examine the connections between the Chinese state-owned banks and
SOEs. They find clear evidence that bank lending is biased in favor of SOEs:
Cities with a higher SOE’ share in output are more likely to experience faster
growth in loans — even after one takes into account the cities’ size, capital
intensity and beginning-of-sample loan-to-output ratio.
Indirect evidence is acknowledged to a lesser degree. Table 5.1 shows how
the loan-to-deposit ratio varied for three typical Chinese provinces from 1988
to 1999. Less than 1.0 would indicate that the province as a whole was not
lending out as much as it was receiving in deposits, and that the province was
a net supplier of capital. The table indicates that on the whole, Fujian and
Zhejiang experienced capital outflow, and Henan capital inflow. The former
two provinces(coastal south of China), however, have a higher proportion of
non-state sector and economically outperform the latter province (northern
central China), whose economic structure is dominated by the state sector.
This inconsistency demonstrates that the center was reallocating financial
resources biased toward the SOE-concentrated region.
The significance of the administratively allocated funds (referred to as
"policy loans") provided more indirect evidence of the lending bias. An
example: policy lending as a percentage of total lending in 1991 was as
follows: Bank of China, 67%; Agricultural Bank, 52.2%, Construction bank,
58 %; and Industrial and Commercial Bank, 25% (Lou, 1993). Overall policy
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lending of the four banks as a group constituted 42% of all lending at year-end
1991. World Bank (2000) estimates indicate a similar result: the outstanding
stock of policy lending at the beginning of the 1990s reached about one-
third of the total outstanding loans extended by the banking system. Policy
lending is normally defined as government-directed credit allocations toward
nationally or locally defined industrial priorities. Industrial priorities are
chosen according to the overall interest of the nation or the region. However,
it was hard to discern policy lending from SOE biased lending, and many
of the policy lending cases were de facto SOE biased lending in the name of
"policy lending".
What should happen: the optimal credit allocation
Efficiency gap: θ The efficiency of using capital in the SOE sector was
relatively low. In 1997, the ratio of value added to fixed assets for SOEs
was 37% compared with 56% for shareholding companies, 61% for foreign
companies, and 94% for collectively owned firms (Heytens and Karacadag,
2001).
Table 5.2 shows that the average capital-to-output ratio for SOEs was
almost twice that of non-state enterprises in 1996. It was more than twice
the capital-to-output ratio of the private and individual enterprises, and sig-
nificantly higher than that of foreign-invested enterprises. These numbers,
to certain extent, indicate the SOEs’ low efficiency of investment.
Admittedly, the higher capital-to-output ratio in SOEs could be due to
the concentration of state-owned enterprises in capital-intensive industries,
but disaggregated data suggest otherwise. Food processing and textiles are
generally less capital-intensive than machinery, chemical, automotive, and
electronics industries. In all six of these, SOEs had much higher capital-to-




Despite the fact that the non-state sector
emerged on the fringes of the Chinese economy in the early 1980s, the ac-
tual size of its growth was significant. The growth of the non-state sector
throughout the 1980s was characterized by the growth of township and village
enterprises, which are owned either by local communities or governments or
by rural households (and are therefore quasi-privately owned). Moreover, due
to the negative ideological stereotype associated with the pursuit of private
profit, many de facto private businesses disguised their ownership structure
by registering as "people-run enterprises" (Minying Qiye), carrying a less
nakedly capitalistic connotation. Since the 1990s, other types of non-state
enterprises, including private and individual enterprises, and foreign-invested
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enterprises, have grown rapidly. Moreover, the delayed ownership reform in
1995 of SOEs took the first steps — in divesting and laying off employees
— toward changing the ownership structure on a large scale. The focus of
the 1995 SOE reform was to privatize small enterprises and to commercial-
ize large ones under the principle of “seize the large and release the small"
(zhuada fangxiao). The government decided to keep under its ownership 500
to 1,000 large state firms and to reform the smaller SOEs through a package
of policy measures including reorganizations, mergers, acquisitions, leasing,
and sales. The ownership reform of SOEs further added to the size of the
non-state sector.
Not only has the size of the non-state sector grown rapidly, but also
its contribution in the total volume of China’s national economy has risen,
especially since 1992. This can be seen in the following indicators. From
1992 to 2001, the proportion of the total industrial output by the non-state-
owned industry in that of national industry rose from 48.5% to 78.3%; the
proportion of the non-state-owned sector with respect to urban employment
rose from 39.03% to 68.09%.
Table 5.3 summarizes the growth of the non-state sector between 1989-
1998. The number of private enterprises grew at an average rate of 33%
per year, much faster than the growth of the numbers of state-owned and
collectively owned enterprises. The workforce in the private sector also grew
by almost 30% per year during the same period, compared with a slight
decline of the workforce in state- and collectively-owned enterprises. The
output of private enterprises had increased at an extraordinary rate of 52%
annually between 1989-1998.
Overall, on the basis of the theoretical model, the optimal allocation
of credit to the non-state enterprises should be an increasing function of θ
and the relative share of PEs, measured by α
P
αS
.Due to the existence of the
productivity gap and the increasing share of PEs, it is expected that PEs
should get relatively more credit (compared to SOEs). However, this is not
what is actually happening.
Reasons
Unorganized depositors with low deposit-supply elasticity Depos-
itors in China were a large and dispersed “group”, with a high proportion of
the population remaining in the agricultural sector. The free-rider problem
strongly affected them when trying to take collective action. Therefore, as a
whole they can not “lobby” for a high deposit interest rate. In the model,
higher αA, (meaning that more depositors are out of the lobbying process)
is associated with a lower deposit interest rate. A lower deposit interest rate
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actually implies that there is an income transfer from depositors to banks
and enterprises.
Several independent econometric analyses (Xu, 2002; and Li, 1999) on the
relationship between the interest rate and the saving rate applied to varied
periods of time in China have obtained the similar results: the nominal
interest rate has an insignificant impact on the saving rate, and the real
interest rate has insignificant positive effects on savings. Several reasons
may account for the lack of deposit-supply interest-rate elasticity in China:
(1). the lack of a deposit substitute, such as equities, bonds, and insurance
policies, etc.; (2). the precautions and liquidity dominated motivations for
savings; (3). the lack of depositors’ experiences in adjusting their portfolios
according to returns. In the model, a low interest-rate elasticity of deposit
is associated with a relatively low deposit interest rate as well.
Ideological bias against PEs Until 1988 (at which time PEs already
started to emerge), there was no Constitutional recognition of the prop-
erty rights of them, indicating a foremost bias against PEs. Article 11 of
the 1982 Constitution acknowledged only the property rights of individual
enterprises–defined as self-employed family businesses. The conspicuous si-
lence on the property rights of private firms stemmed from an ideological
consideration. Since private firms were defined as those with more than
eight hired employees, their operations raised the specter of exploitation by
private capital owners.
In 1988, Article 11 was amended to include a clause saying that the state
permitted PEs and that the state was to protect their “lawful rights and
interests.” However, the amended article reserved the right of the state to
exercise “guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the
economy.” As if the vested power of the state to supervise the private sector
was not sufficient, the amendment also carefully subordinated the private
sector as “a supplement to the socialist public economy.”
The ideological discrimination against PEs lasted throughout the 1980s
and the beginning of 1990s. In the model, λ > 1 results in a relatively high
loan interest rate to PEs. The higher the λ, the greater the interest-rate gap
between SOEs and PEs.
Significant lobbying ability of SOEs with low interest-rate elastic-
ity of loan demand State-owned enterprises in China have many stakes in
common and could collectively lobby the regulator to set loan interest rates
low. An additional channel (not directly captured in the theoretical model)
through which state-owned enterprises could lobby for favorable interest rates
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was the regulator’s concern regarding unemployment. SOEs’ frequent warn-
ing to the regulator on the negative impacts of high loan interest rates on
employment together with Ministry of Finance’s unemployment benefit bur-
den could further increase the effectiveness of the lobbying ability of SOEs.
In addition, the unemployed as a group were normally more likely to express
their demands by collective expression.
The phenomenon of the "soft budget constraint" of SOEs is widely docu-
mented . Since "soft budget" reduces the responsiveness of deposit demand
to interest-rate changes, εSL is small.
In the model, the SOEs’ ability to lobby added to the ideological bias
towards SOEs, and thus more weight was put on to SOEs in the regulator’s
social welfare function, corresponding to a relatively lower loan interest rate
of SOEs. A small εSL also leads to a lower loan interest rate that SOEs face.
Subordinated banks with less autonomy In the early years of the re-
form, the Chinese banking industry was dominated by state-owned banks. It
was hard to separate independently the interest of those state-owned banks
from the state. These banks mainly served as tools for facilitating the gov-
ernment’s financial policies. Due to the lack of the bank autonomy and their
independent interest, they had few incentives to lobby the regulator to set
interest rates in their favor. In the special case 1 of Proposition 5.3, when
the banks can not lobby and SOEs obtain ideological bias, the interest-rate
spread is negative. This was consistent with the very low interest-rate spread
(with sporadic, zero or negative level) before 1996 in China.
In sum, the political economy model of interest-rate liberalization pro-
vides a powerful tool for understanding the late deregulation of the inter-
est rate in China until 1996. The low and regulated interest rate, the low
interest-rate spread, and the biased credit in terms of price and quantity,
rather than a desirable gradually liberalized interest rate, reasonable spread,
and nondiscriminatory credit policy, were primarily the political economic
equilibrium reached by different interest groups. Moving this equilibrium
would require either changes in the relative strengths of interest groups or
some institutional shocks.
5.4.5 Trend of interest-rate liberalization (1996-2004)
Changes
China officially initiated interest-rate liberalization in 1996, and assumed a
gradual and piecemeal policy thereafter. The first step was to liberalize the
interbank interest rate on June 1st, 1996. Then, in June 1997 and October
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1999, bond repurchasing and treasury bond interest rates were liberalized.
On September 21st, 2000, China started to liberalize the interest rates of
the large deposits and loans denominated in foreign currencies. Deposits
below 3 million dollars retained the interest rate at 5.5% set by the rules; the
marginal amount above 3 million dollars would have its interest rate set on
the basis of LIBOR. The scope for banks to adjust their interest rate on the
basis of the regulated loan and deposit interest rate was gradually enlarged.
As of October 1998, the loan interest rate to small enterprises could float up
10% to 20% compared to the base value. As of September 1999, the loan
interest rate to small- and medium- sized enterprises could float up 30%; for
big enterprises, it remained at 10%. On March 21st, 2002, eight selected
rural cooperatives were allowed to float the deposit interest rate up from
20% to 50%, and the loan interest rate to 100%. A significant step was taken
in October 2004: the loan interest rate could be adjusted by banks within
the range [0.9, ∞) of the rate basis and the deposit interest rate within the
range [-∞, 1] of the rate basis. Thus, China shifted to a loan-rate floor and
deposit-rate ceiling regime.
Not only did interest rates start to liberalize, but also the formerly biased
lending towards SOEs has lessened. From 1996 to 1998, the annual growth
rate of the total lending stock of the financial institutions was 17.2% to the
state sector and 27.3% to the non-state sector. During the same period, the
proportion of newly granted loans to the non-state sector grew from 38.87%
to 45.82%. At the end of 1998, the four state-owned banks granted 32.8% of
their total loans to the non-state sector, and among the total loans granted
to the non-state sector 48.6% originated from four state-owned banks14. The
latest statistics15 show that in 2003, the SOEs took only 17.22% of the total
newly granted loans. As far as working capital is concerned (at the year-end
of 2003) the total stock of working capital loans to SOEs was 35.72% and
34.11% at the end of the first quarter of 2004.
Domestic reasons
PEs begin to lobby Due to the arrival at a critical mass and the increasing
awareness of their own common stake, the private enterprises started to lobby
the regulator. The model (compare special Case 3 of Proposition 5.3 with
Proposition 5.3) shows that ability of PEs to lobby relative to that of the
SOEs, reduces their loan interest rate.
14People’s Bank of China, Statistic Division.
15Governor Zhou of People’s Bank of China, The International Finance Conference,
Shanghai, 2004.
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Reduced ideological bias: λ Since 1992, the government has adopted
more positive and open policies in the form of regulations and laws in favor
of the non-state-owned sector. In November 1993, the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China stated that "the State shall create conditions
for economic sectors of all types of ownership to participate equally in the
market competition and all types of enterprises shall be treated alike".
Furthermore, in March 1999 the Chinese Constitution acknowledged the
private sector as an integral part of the Chinese economy and conferred an
equal status on private firms with other firms. Private economy is now a
“component” of, rather than a supplement to, the Chinese economy. This
represents a major change in the government’s commitment to the private
sector, which is no longer temporary, expedient or tentative (as was the case
during the late 1980s and early 1990s). Less ideological bias reduces the gap
of loan interest rates between SOEs and PEs.
Increased loan-demand elasticity of SOEs and decreased αA Some
progress has been made in hardening the budget constraint of SOEs, such
as the transformation of the corporate governance structure, better designed
incentive schemes, modernized internal management, etc. The resulting in-
crease of the loan-demand elasticity has resulted in a reduced subsidy to SOEs
when the regulator chooses various interest rates given other parameters.
At the same time, industrialization and the urbanization process have
resulted in a smaller population left in the unorganized agricultural sector,
thereby increasing the politically influencing power of depositors.
Increasingly autonomous banks Since 1993, China’s financial sector
reforms have focused on commercializing the lending operations of banks.
Reforms were initiated by establishing three policy banks16, designated to
be the main vehicles for policy-based lending in the future, to relieve the
four large state-owned banks of their own operations and to pave the way for
further commercialization of banks. A range of reforms introduced in recent
years included limiting local government interference in bank lending deci-
sions17, abolishing the credit plan18, recapitalizing the banks through a RMB
(Renminbi, Chinese currency) 270 billion bond issue in 1998, and initiating a
16They are the State Development Bank, The agricultural Development, and the Export-
Import Bank of China.
17Because of tendency of the provincial-level people’s bank of Chinas to succumb to
local political pressures for subsidizing SOEs, they were replaced by nine cross-provincial
regional PBCs in 1999.
18In 1998 the government phased out the credit quota system that were applied to the
four state owned banks and replaced with asset liability management.
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debt-for-equity swap during 1999-2000. Internal reforms of the state-owned
banks included the revamping of loan approval and analysis procedures, intro-
ducing more incentive-based compensation systems, rationalizing branches,
and reducing staff. Overall there was increasing recognition of the banks’ own
interest and a gradual separation of state-owned banks from the government.
Market participants were increasing; so was the extent of competition.
Apart from four state-owned banks, four more other nationwide commercial
banks were established19 between the mid-1980s and 1996. In the mid-1990s,
China also established a number of regional banks. Moreover, urban credit
cooperatives were formally authorized as new shareholding financial institu-
tions in 1986. These new market participants compete, more or less, with
existing state banks by providing better services to depositors and non-state
enterprises. For example, at year-end 1995, more than half of the urban
credit cooperatives’ loans outstanding were to collective firms, and another 8
percent went to private firms (Lardy, 1998). Although state banks dwarfed
the urban credit cooperatives in total lending, during the same year loans
outstanding to private firms by urban credit cooperatives were almost five
times those of state-owned banks (Lardy, 1998).
The increasing autonomy of state-owned banks enhances their incentives
to lobby the regulator. Their small number makes it easy for the state-owned
banks to take collective action to capture regulators in order to set interest
rates in their favor — and at the expense of the depositors or even enterprises.
The model (compare Case 2 with Case 1 of proposition 5.3) reveals that the
lobbying ability of banks increases the interest-rate spread and the banks’
profit, which indeed occurred in China after 1996.
Uncertainties and limitations
Although China has already been moving toward a liberalized and compet-
itive interest rate regime since 1996, some uncertainties and obstacles still
play an important role.
19(1) In the mid-1980s the Bank of communications of China established, who pioneered
the use of modern banking methods in China. From the outset this bank was not required
to undertake directed lending on behalf of the state. Rather it has been able to make its
lending decisions primarily on commercial considerations. (2) Two smaller national wide
commercial banks were established in 1992-the Everbright Bank, the Huaxia Bank. They
are shareholding banks, with provincial and local governments and enterprises as major
shareholders. Major sources of funds are enterprise deposits and they mainly serve their
stakeholders. (3) In earlier 1996, China’s first private shareholding bank, the China Min-
sheng Bank established, which was in response to the complaints from non-state enterprises
on difficulties in obtaining credit from SOB. It mainly served non-state enterprises.
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The political economy of the sequence of interest-rate liberalization
The official principle guiding the order of Chinese interest-rate liberalization
was determined in 2000: from foreign currencies to domestic currency; from
loans to deposits; from large amounts and long-term loans or deposits to
small amounts and short-term ones. The latest liberalization of interest rates
shows that China actually adopts "the loan-rate floor" and "the deposit-
rate ceiling" policy. Although one could list reasons to justify the sequence
and direction of interest-rate liberalization, we argue that political-economic
factors play important roles as well. For example, the lobbying competence
of PEs vs. the inability of depositors tends to cause regulators to liberalize
loan rates before deposit rates; Since wholesale transactions normally have
larger interest-rate elasticity, regulators may consider them more than retail
transactions; "The deposit-rate ceiling policy" could be the result of the
inability of the unorganized depositors to lobby, and "the loan-rate floor
policy" could be serving the banks’ interest.
Possible reversal: 1998-2001 Since 1998, the new government has fo-
cused on reducing poorly performing loans of state-owned banks and trans-
forming state-owned enterprises so that they would be profitable within three
years. Examining figures 5.1.2. and 5.2., we notice that: (1) immediately
following the changes in 1998, real deposit interest rates decreased for three
successive years from 6.33% in 1998, to 4.54% in 1999, to 1.29% in 2000,
corresponding to the decreases of real loan interest rate; (2) the interest-
rate spread increased from 2.61% in 1998 to 3.6% in 1999, and remained
at 3.6% for the years 2000 and 2001. This change of interest-rate level and
spread, which is contrary to the general trend of interest-rate liberalization,
is broadly consistent with the prediction of the model: unorganized depos-
itors transferred large incomes to banks and SOEs. It is possible that this
type of reversal could happen again in the future.
Ideology residual Over time, the government’s policy to reduce ideologi-
cal disfavor against PEs has often appeared reluctant or begrudging, as the
government has continuously tended to be more apt to recognize the de facto
situation rather than to break new ground. There has also been, until now,
residual ideological opposition to the private sector, which was interestingly
revealed in an announcement allowing private entrepreneurs into the Com-
munist Party.
Politicians and the bureaucracy as a distinct interest group Politi-
cians and the bureaucracy could actually be a distinct interest group. Al-
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though in the theoretical model we assume that the regulators and the gov-
ernment are the same, they can be different. If so, the government itself will
be one interest group — perhaps the strongest one pursuing its own interest.
During late 1990s, when domestic demand in China was weak and deflation
started, the Chinese government chose expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate
domestic demand by issuing a huge amount of government bonds. Since low
interest rates would decrease the costs of bond offering and the future gov-
ernment burden, the government itself didn’t want a liberalized high interest
rate. To include the government as a distinct interest group will be left for
future research.
Reasons from outside: De facto partially financial opening
China has maintained an inconvertible capital account from the outset of the
reform until now. Many types of capital inflows are restricted and closely
monitored, except FDI. Capital outflow is officially even more severely cur-
tailed. At the same time, due to the accumulative current account surplus
(a reflection of domestic saving being bigger than domestic investment) and
FDI inflows, a huge official foreign reserve has been accumulated and has
increased dramatically over time.
Gain or loss when government channels the saving’ surplus abroad
Many authors (Guo, 2003; and Prasad and Wei, 2004) have noticed that
China has surplus savings, especially in the 1990s. Figure 5.3. plots the
gross capital formation, gross savings, and current account balance, all as
a percentage of GDP from 1980 to 2002. Not surprisingly, the years with
a savings surplus correspond to years with a current account surplus of the
same amount. It is obvious that since 1994 China has sustained a continuous
savings surplus and current account surplus at 1.5% of GDP on average.
For a country with surplus savings, the corresponding net capital outflow
can be channeled either through private investors or the public investor,
generally the national central bank. Yet in China, due to capital outflow
control, although there is significant capital flight, private investors have a
rather limited role in channeling capital outflow. As a result, the People’s
Bank of China channelled China’s surplus savings. In addition, due to the
substantial amount of FDI inflow (among other types of capital inflow), the
People’s Bank of China also channelled substantial inflows of foreign private
capital out of the country. These unusual investment patterns explain why
reserve purchase in China has exceeded China’s saving surplus.
Reserve purchases directly increase the monetary base. Central banks
normally opt to sterilize their reserve purchase through an offsetting draw-
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down in their net domestic assets — either by selling domestic government
securities out of their portfolio or by issuing domestic currency securities in
their own name (for example, central bank bills). The result is to drain the
cash injected into the economy by the reserve purchase, leaving the mone-
tary base unchanged. From end-2000 to end-2003, net foreign assets in China
increased 9.2 percentage points relative to GDP, while net domestic assets
fell 4.3 percentage points (roughly half of that amount), thus leading to a
monetary base increase of 4.9 percentage points of GDP. Because of the in-
sufficiency of existing short-term instruments (mainly government bonds, for
open-market operation), the Chinese central bank started to rely on issuing
central bank bills to sterilize foreign reserve increases. In most recent years20,
however, due to the extensive amount of "hot money" inflows (expectations
of RMB appreciation) and a midst concern about excessive credit growth and
potential economic overheating, the pace of sterilization by China’s central
bank has picked up, with a dramatic increase of central bank bills issued in
order to limit growth of the monetary base. Table 5.4 provides quarterly
stock data on foreign reserve and central bank bills. Both of their dramatic
increases are obvious.
Generally speaking, sterilized reserve purchases come at a fiscal cost.
They involve purchasing relatively low-yield foreign assets while issuing rel-
atively high-yield domestic liabilities. Moreover, as sterilization continues,
these fiscal costs rise, as the central bank may have to offer ever-higher in-
terest rates in order to induce domestic investors to continue adding central
bank securities to their portfolio. The magnitude of the fiscal burden depends
on the gap between domestic and reserve currency interest rates.
However, China’s low controlled interest rate compared with the returns
of treasury instruments of medium- and long-term industrialized countries
may imply that there are in fact net benefits to sterilization (see (5.20),
when r∗∗ > rD, T > 0). We compare China and the US real interest-rate
differential by different measures.
First, the real-interest-rate differential is measured as the real one-year
deposit rate in China minus the real one-year yield on treasury securities in
the United States21. During the entire 1980s, China’s real short-term interest
rate was lower than that in the United States, and the gap reached its peak in
20At the year-end of 2004, the official foreign reserve is 609,9 billion US$ increased by
206,7 billion US$ compared with end of 2003.
21China’s real one year deposit rate is equal to the nominal one-year deposit rate minus
12 month changes in the CPI in China. The US real yield on constant maturity one-year
treasure securities is the nominal yield minus 12-month changes in the CPI in the United
States. The US nominal yield on constant maturity one-year treasury securities is obtained
from the Federal Reserve System and the others are based on the IFS and the IMF.
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1988-89. Since the early 1990s, the real interest rate differential has narrowed
significantly and was relatively close to zero in most portions of this period
(except for 1994-96, when the overheated economy induced high inflation(See
Jin, 2003)).
Secondly, Cheung et al. (2003) compared monthly interbank interest rates
between China and the US from February 1996 (immediately after a unified
national interbank market was established) to June 2002. They found that,
on average, China’s real interbank rate was 3.245% lower than that in the
US.
Thirdly, we directly compare China’s central bank bill interest rate with
the US Treasury bill rate. Over time, the US Treasury bill return rate is
about 3%. The available data on China’s central bank bill’s interest rates
are 2.198% (April, 2003), and 2.300% (August, 2004). Again, China’s rate is
lower than that of the US22.
In sum, the Chinese central bank’s sterilization activity has tended to
provide the Chinese government with a net fiscal benefit rather than a fis-
cal burden. The political-economy-determined low interest rates certainly
account for this exception.
Capital inflows relieve PEs’ unsatisfied capital demand The rate
at which foreign capital has been flowing into China over the last decade
is remarkable. The movement in total net inflows has been driven largely
by trends in foreign direct investment (FDI), its largest component. From
1979 to 1999, China absorbed a total of $306 billion in FDI, which is second
only to the United States, and FDI flows into China account for 30 percent
of total FDI going to developing countries. Portfolio inflows have been less
dynamic than FDI. China only began in 1992 to allow foreign sales of equities
by domestic companies and Chinese companies to list and sell shares on
foreign markets. Until recently, the amount of portfolio inflows has been
overshadowed by FDI. International borrowing is also much less significant
compared to portfolio inflows.
Relative to GNP, inflows of foreign capital to China remained small until
the 1900s. Prior to 1991, net inflows of private capital were about 2%, and net
FDI about 1%, of GNP. After 1991, both net private capital inflow and FDI
rose to more than 5% of GNP. By the mid —1990s, foreign capital contributed
to roughly 15% of total investment.
22The annual gain for Chinese Central Bank when conducting sterilization activity by
issuing central bank bills is 2.30 billion Renminbi. The average holding of central bank
bill is 458.12 billion Renminbi (take average of the stock value of the central bank bill in
Table 5.4). The interest rate differential is taken as 0.5%. Then 458.12*0.5%=2.30 billion
Renminbi.
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Where do these capital inflows go? The "political pecking order" theory of
Chinese firms raised by Huang (2003) offers some theoretical clues. He argues
that the constitutional protection of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) far
exceeded that accorded to the domestic private firms, although less than
SOEs. 23. From the very beginning of economic reforms, FIEs were accorded
a superior legal status, compared with the private firms, despite the fact that
FIEs could be 99 percent owned by foreign–and private–investors. The
existence of "a political pecking order" implies a disproportionate reliance
on FDI by PEs than by SOEs. Chinese private firms have a higher demand
for FDI because they are more willing to accept greater foreign controls. For
example, a liquidity-constrained private firm may be more willing to accept a
large foreign equity stake because it has no other financing recourse. A more
privileged firm, SOE, may need foreign equity financing less because it can
borrow from a bank. Although Huang logically deduces why PEs rely on FDI
at a disproportionately higher rate, it is not feasible, due to data limitations,
to provide Chinese evidence to verify his deduction. But a survey done by
World Bank (2000) indirectly points toward a similar direction. This survey
showed that among the sample of private firms, 23 percent wanted to form
joint ventures with foreign firms in order to get capital in the future, and
11 percent said they were willing to borrow from foreign banks. The same
numbers are much smaller for the sample of SOEs.
Under the assumption that SOEs’ credit demand could be fully met by
domestic credit, and that capital inflows merely go to PEs, the capital in-
flow case of the political economy model predicts that the possibility of PEs
getting foreign capital reduces their relative loan interest rate compared to
SOEs. Furthermore, the model predicts that the PEs’ loan interest rate is
chosen below the world interest rate; the regulator therefore needs to sub-
sidize capital inflow. This is indeed happening in China: central and local
governments in China have adopted a range of special provisions to attract
FDI (including tax concessions, liberalized land-leasing options, government
guarantees on loans by foreign lenders to domestic borrowers, etc.).
Capital outflow increases the power of domestic depositors in a
financially depressed system Despite the dramatic growth in capital
inflows into China, concern has been glowing that quite a lot of capital si-
multaneously flows out of the country in an "abnormally" unreported way
23China’s current Constitution, adopted in 1982, clarified and offered protection to
the legal status of foreign enterprises operating in China. The foreign enterprises were
permitted “to invest in China and to enter into various forms of economic cooperation
with Chinese enterprises and other Chinese economic organizations. . . .” (Article 18 of
1982 constitute). The Article also swore to protect their “lawful rights and interests.”
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(formally referred to as "capital flight"). From 1991 through 1998, China’s
"net errors and omissions" of balance of payment showed capital flight every
year. A positive value one year did not offset a negative value the next, as in
other countries. The cumulative capital flight over this period amounted to
$101.1 billion, nearly two-fifths of total foreign direct investment in China.
Cai (1999) estimated that the ratio of capital flight to inward foreign direct
investment was 100% in the year 2000. Similarly, Gunter (2004) estimates
that the capital flight from the mainland China was equal to or greater than
inward FDI for the 1990s24.
Relative to GNP, capital flight fromChina has increased. Gunter’s (Gunter,
1996) unadjusted residual estimate rises from about 1% of GNP in the late
1980s to 4-5% in the mid-1990s; the high, adjusted residual estimate rises
from about 5% of GNP in 1988/89 to over 12% in 1993/94. By the mid-
1990s, capital flight was thus equivalent to somewhere between 12 and 27%
of domestic savings. These numbers suggest that a substantial portion of
domestic savings was finding its way out of the country.
The result of the capital outflow case of the political economy model
illustrates the way in which the surplus of savings can flow out of the coun-
try, thereby increasing the political power of unorganized depositors and the
relative deposit interest rate.
5.5 Discussion and conclusions
This chapter develops a political economy model of interest-rate determi-
nation to explain positively why interest rates could be set differently from
the domestic-market-clearing level (when the economy is closed) and the in-
ternational level (when the economy is open). The model shows that these
deviations could be the result of the optimal choice of the regulator, who
maximizes her social welfare objective function by factoring an ideological
bias and lobbying contributions. The model thus offers useful insights in
explaining the depressed level of the interest rate, the size of the interest-
rate spread, the credit allocation bias towards certain sectors (hereby the
state owned enterprises), and the pace and sequence of interest-rate liberal-
24Sicular (1998) focused on the mystery of why China had simultaneously experiencing
large amounts of inward foreign capital investment and outward capital flight. She at-
tributed this to the different incentives and return faced by foreign and domestic investors.
For example, many FDI appears to be associated with implementing market strategies,
exploiting production knowledge, or overcome trade restrictions apart from high returns.
The most recent research by Denis and Huizinga (2004) show that foreign ownership could
be a substitute for a insufficiency of domestic investors’ protection, thus offering another
reason why FDI could be driven by non return reasons.
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ization. Applying this model to China for the period between 1980 to 2004,
we find that the interest groups’ lobbying activity and ideological bias are
forces underlying the delayed Chinese interest-rate liberalization. Over time,
the dynamic changes of the features of interest groups and ideology shift,
together with the de facto partial financial opening in China, shake the pre-
vious political equilibrium and can largely account for the recent trend of
Chinese interest-rate liberalization.
The main messages conveyed by the chapter are the following. First,
normative analysis of interest-rate control based on purely economic reasons
is not sufficient. Interest-rate regulation and liberalization have significant
distributive effects; positive analyses using a political economy approach are
thus rewarding. Secondly, to what extent the political economic equilibrium
of interest rates favors or disfavors certain players depends on their political
and economic strength (associated with their ability to lobby, their interest
rate elasticity, and the regulator’s ideological bias). The underlying relative
change of strength can shake the previous equilibrium. Thirdly, the possi-
bility of having access to the international capital market enhances certain
players’ political influence in obtaining a better domestic interest-rate set-
ting. Enlarged choice sets of the players formerly disfavored is thus generally
a good thing for them. Fourthly, over the past two decades, China’s biased
and low interest-rate levels, the low interest-rate spread, and the lagged pace
and particular path of interest-rate liberalization can — to great extent — be
explained by the political economic model. Fifthly, the recent sterilization
operations of the People’s Bank of China have actually generated net fiscal
gains for the central bank, rather than a normal fiscal burden. The depressed
domestic low interest rate largely accounts for this gain.
Several points deserve further discussion. First, the model assumes that
the credit market clears, ruling out the possibility of credit rationing. Al-
though credit rationing is prevalent in countries like China, it is hard to
model who supplies or gets credit when saving rationing or loan rationing
happens without using strong ad hoc assumptions. To avoid the "rationing
to whom" problem, we therefore assume market clearing as the first step.
Secondly, the chapter overlooks the existence of the informal financial mar-
ket, which in China, as well as in other developing countries, had expanded
rapidly. The informal financial market gets savings leaked from formal banks
and most often grants loans to satisfy the PEs’ unmet credit demand. This
chapter’s basic conclusion would not change if informal credit markets were
also considered. Finally, it is difficult to incorporate both capital inflows and
capital outflows into one model, and thereby to explain the coexistence of
huge FDI inflow and capital flight (which are of similar magnitude in China).
The coexistence could also be the result of consistent political economy equi-
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librium, however. For example, if the domestic-market-clearing interest-rate
level were below the world level (implying that the country has a savings
surplus and is a capital-exporting country), but (perhaps due to political
economic reasons) the domestic interest rate was actually set lower than the
domestic market-clearing level, then it would be necessary to attract capi-
tal inflows with a subsidy to fill the credit shortage. If we further assume
that there exists sophisticated vs. non-sophisticated savers (and the former
can have access to the international returns), then at the same time there
are capital outflows by sophisticated savers. Currently, the analyses of open
economies are rather more illustrative than analytical.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
5A Proofs
Proposition 5.1
Proof. When the regulator’s objective function is to maximize social welfare,
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LP (s)d(s) + (rSL −
rD)α
SLS + (rPL − rD)αPLP
subject to D(rD) = αSLS(rSL) + α
PLP (rPL )
From the constraint, we get rD = D−1(αSLS(rSL) + α
PLP (rPL )). Substi-
tute this expression into the objective function and calculate the first-order
conditions with respect to the loan interest rates. From ∂Ω
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L = rD = r
∗. By
the market clearing condition, we know the interest level satisfies D(r∗) =
αSLS(r∗) + αPLP (r∗) = (αS + θαP )L(r∗).
Proposition 5.3






















subject to D(rD) = αSLS(rSL) + α
PLP (rPL )
When deciding how much contribution to make, the SOEs, PEs, and
banks follow a locally truthful contribution schedule (Grossman and Help-
man, 1994). Around the optimal interest rates chosen by the regulator, for
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one unit change of interest rate, SOEs, PEs, and banks will additionally con-





























Plug these seven equations into the FOCs of the regulator’s objective func-
tion, and the original problem is shown to be equivalent (in the sense that
they have same FOCs) to the following problem,
maximize aV D + (aλ+ 1)V S + (a+ 1)V P + (a+ 1)V B + (1− αA)V D
subject to D(rD) = αSLS(rSL) + α
PLP (rPL )
Substitute the constraint into the objective function (eliminating rD) and
calculate two FOCs with respect to rSL and r
P






































After simplification, we get (5.12) and (5.13).
Case 3 of Proposition 5.3
Proof. The regulator’s problem is
maximize a(WA +WSλ +W














subject to D(rD) = αSLS(rSL) + α
PLP (rPL )
Following the similar logic of the proof of proposition 5.3, plug SOEs and
banks’ truth-telling conditions into the FOCs of the regulator’s objective
25Note that αS appear in every term of FOC, thus it doesn’t appear in the final result.
The same thing holds for αP .
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function, and the original problem is shown to be equivalent to the following
problem in terms of FOCs:
maximize aV D + (aλ+ 1)V S + aV P + (a+ 1)V B + (1− αA − αP )V D
subject to D(rD) = αSLS(rSL) + α
PLP (rPL )
Substitute the constraint into the objective function (eliminating rD) and
calculate two FOCs with respect to rSL and r
P





































After simplification, we get (5.15) and (5.16).
Proposition 5.4
Proof. maximize Ω(rD, rSL, r
P
L ) =W
A+W S +WP +WB + T = V D + V S +












(rPL − r∗∗)LP (rPL ) + (r∗∗ − rD)D(rD)26
FOCs with respect to rSL, r
P







Proof. The regulator’s problem is











Following the similar logic of the proof of proposition 5.3, plug SOEs,
PEs, and banks’ truth-telling conditions into the FOCs of the regulator’s
objective function, and the original problem is equivalent to the following
problem in terms of FOCs:
maximize aV D+(aλ+1)V S +(a+1)V P +(a+1)V B + aT +(1−αA)V D
Plug in (5.17) and (5.18) and calculate three FOCs with respect torD, rSL
and rPL . We get the following:





26It is easy to prove that in either capital inflow or capital outflow case the summation
of V B and T is (rSL − r∗∗)LS(rSL) + (rPL − r∗∗)LP (rPL ) + (r∗∗ − rD)D(rD)
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Proof. Again, by plugging in the SOEs, PEs, and banks’ locally truthful
contribution schedules into the FOCs of the regulator, we get a equivalence
problem in terms of FOCs as follows,
maximize aV D+(aλ+1)V S +(a+1)V P +(a+1)V B + aT +(1−αA)V D
Plug in the expressions (5.19)and (5.20) and calculate three FOCs with
respect to rD, rSL and r
P
L . We get the following:
D(rD)− αSL(rSL)− θαPL(rPL )− αAD(rD) + a(r∗∗ − rD)D0(rD) = 0
(a+ 1)rSL − rD − ar∗∗ =
a(λ− 1)αSL(rSL)
L0(rSL)
(a+ 1)rPL − rD − ar∗∗ = 0
Simplifying these FOCs, we get the expression of rD, rSL and r
P
L , so do the
results of the proposition.
























































Figure 5.1.2: Real Interest Rates (1980-2002)
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Figure 5.3: Savings, investment, and current account (1980-2002)
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5C Tables
Table 5.1: Comparison of Loan-to-Deposit Ratios of State Banks: Henan,
Fujian, and Zhejiang provinces, 1988-1999
Year Henan Province Fujian Province Zhejiang Province
1988 1.48 1.23 1.26
1989 1.42 1.18 1.19
1990 1.36 1.07 1.05
1991 1.28 0.96 0.97
1992 1.25 0.88 0.93
1993 1.20 0.95 0.92
1994 1.16 0.90 0.90
1995 1.12 0.83 0.81
1996 1.09 0.78 0.75
1997 1.13 0.75 0.77
1998 1.14 0.79 0.73
1999 1.12 0.79 0.74
Source: Tsai, Kellee S., 2002.
Note: The national average loan-to-deposit ration is 1.0.
Table 5.2: Capital-to-output ratio of industrial state and non-state en-
terprises by industry in 1996
Types of enterprises Capital-output ratio
State-owned Enterprises 1.92
Non-state enterprises 1.05
Collectively owned enterprises 0.82
Private and individual enterprises 0.99
Foreign-invested enterprises 1.25
Source: Tong (2002).
Table 5.3: Average annual growth rates, private enterprises vs. other
types of enterprises in 1989-1998 (in %)
State-owned Collectively owned Foreign-invested Private
Number of enterprises 5.37 0.27 34.40 33.27
Total capital 12.89 11.56 36.49 63.97
Average capital per firm 7.64 11.86 1.89 23.04
Workforce -0.01 -0.06 22.55 29.76
Output (in real terms) 51.86
Tax remitted 14.83 11.80 73.15
Source: Tong (2002).
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Table 5.4: Quarterly data on Chinese foreign reserve and central bank
bills (Sept. 2002-Dec. 2004) Unit: billion RMB
Date 09/2002 12/2002 03/2003 06/2003 09/2003
Foreign reserve 2038.2 2210.7 2406.2 2598.3 2867.0
Central Bank Bills 193.8 143.8 45.0 238.0 440.0
Date 12/2003 03/2004 06/2004 09/2004 12/2004
Foreign reserve 2984.2 3275.8 3519.8 3823.7 4594.0
Central Bank Bills 303.2 595.7 747.6 766.2 1107.9
Source: People’s Bank of China website.
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Samenvatting(Summary in
Dutch)
Dit proefschrift bevat vier essays waarin wordt onderzocht hoe de financiële
structuur van een land invloed uitoefent op de macro-economische presta-
ties in termen van groei, conjunctuur en consumptie-effening. Het begrip
financiële structuur is daarbij gedefinieerd als de verzameling van markten,
instellingen en instrumenten, het systeem van toezicht, regelgeving en func-
ties, en de rentestructuur. Informatieproblemen en transactiekosten leiden
tot een variëteit van financiële contracten, markten en instituties, en daarmee
tot een complex financieel systeem. Het staat hoog op de onderzoeksagenda
van economen om een analytische basis te leggen voor het beschrijven van
de voorwaarden waaronder een bepaalde financiële structuur beter kan bij-
dragen aan macro-economische groei en stabiliteit.
De hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift zijn min of meer onafhankelijke stud-
ies rondom deze centrale probleemstelling. Hoofdstuk twee en drie analyseren
de gevolgen van schuldfinanciering versus aandelenfinanciering voor de sta-
bilisatie van de consumptie respectievelijk de productie. In de literatuur
worden deze verbanden weinig onderzocht. Hoofdstuk vier evalueert de rol
van informele financiële instituties tegen de achtergrond van het feit dat deze
dominant aanwezig zijn in ontwikkelingslanden en dat het beleid ter zake
vaak een ambivalente houding aanneemt. Nagegaan wordt hoe de gelijkti-
jdige aanwezigheid van formele en informele instituties, binnen de context van
een ongelijke maatschappij met een imperfecte kredietmarkt, van invloed is
op de groei. Hoofdstuk vijf gaat in op het vraagstuk van de rentevorming in
een transitieland. De beleidsmaker wordt geleid door een eigen ideologische
voorkeur alsmede door de pressie van een aantal belangengroeperingen. Het
model beziet hoe een politiek verwrongen rentevoet gevolgen heeft voor de
economische efficiëntie onder omstandigheden die relevant zijn voor landen
in transitie.
Elk van de vier hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift bevat zowel een the-
oretisch als een empirisch deel, waarbij het relatieve gewicht van beiden
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varieert. De empirische methode is voor elk hoofdstuk verschillend. Hoofd-
stuk twee en drie presenteren dwarsdoorsneden over landen. Hoofdstuk 4
bevat een dwarsdoorsnede over de provincies van één land. Hoofdstuk vijf
is een gedocumenteerde landenstudie. De keuze van het in de hoofdstukken
vier en vijf bestudeerde land, China, is theoretisch aantrekkelijk, maar gaat
ook terug op de eigen achtergrond en bekendheid van de auteur.
Hoofdstuk 2 introduceert proxie-variabelen voor zowel de binnenlandse
ontwikkeling als de internationale integratie van de schuld- en aandelen-
markten. Op deze manier kan een aantal conclusies worden getrokken over
de betekenis van de financiële structuur voor de consumptie-effening. In
de eerste plaats blijken zowel de binnenlandse ontwikkeling als de interna-
tionale integratie van belang. In de tweede plaats blijkt voor rijke landen de
ontwikkeling van de binnenlandse markt voor schuldtitels relatief belangrijk,
terwijl voor arme landen juist de internationale integratiegraad bepalend is.
In de derde plaats draagt de ontwikkeling van zowel de markt voor schuldti-
tels als de markt voor eigendomsbewijzen bij aan de consumptie-effening,
met een iets sterkere rol voor eerstgenoemde. En tenslotte zijn de schuld-
en aandelenmarkt tot op zekere hoogte substitueerbare instrumenten bij het
realiseren van consumptie-effening.
Hoofdstuk 3 laat aan de hand van een eenvoudig model zien hoe de finan-
ciële structuur verantwoordelijk kan zijn voor macro-economische fluctuaties
en recessies. Bij het zoeken naar een optimale vermogensstructuur wordt de
ondernemer geconfronteerd met een afruil. Schuldfinanciering is goedkoper
dan aandelenfinanciering omdat het minder verificatie vergt, maar daar staat
tegenover dat schuldfinanciering de kans op een kostbaar faillissement ver-
hoogt. Op geaggregeerd niveau leidt een bepaalde negatieve schok in een
bankgeoriënteerde systeem tot meer faillissementen en een scherpere neer-
gang in de productie dan in een marktgeoriënteerd systeem. Ook de vari-
antie van de productie is groter in een economie met een relatief omvangrijke
kredietmarkt. Aan de hand van een uitgebreide internationale dataset kan
deze hypothese empirisch worden gesteund.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een ruraal-specifiek model geconstrueerd waarmee
de invloed van de inkomensongelijkheid op de groei kan worden onderzocht
onder omstandigheden vanmoreel laakbaar gedrag in de kredietmarkt. Banken
vertrouwen op onderpand terwijl informele instellingen hun kredietnemers di-
rect volgen, en daarbij kosten maken. Aangezien beide kanalen onaantrekke-
lijk zijn voor een bepaald segment van de markt, leidt hun gezamenlijke
aanwezigheid tot een verhoging van de groei. Een dwarsdoorsnede analyse
van provinciale data in ruraal China laat een negatieve relatie zien tussen on-
gelijkheid en groei. Een nadere modeltest bevestigt dat een positieve houding
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tegenover informele instituties de groei bevordert.
Het fundament van hoofdstuk 5 is een politiek-economische benadering
van de rentevorming in een transitieland. Het model geeft een positieve verk-
laring voor het verschijnsel dat de rente duurzaam kan afwijken van het bin-
nenlandse evenwichtsniveau, dan wel van het buitenlandse niveau in een open
economie. Aangetoond wordt dat de afwijking het gevolg is van een beleids-
maker met een ideologische voorkeur die onder druk van een pressiegroep zijn
sociale welvaartsfunctie maximaliseert. Het model levert nuttige inzichten
ter verklaring van de onderdrukking van de rentevoet, de grootte van de
rentemarge, de sectorspecifieke afwijking in de kredietallocatie, en de snel-
heid en volgorde van het renteliberaliseringsbeleid. Toepassing van het model
op China bevestigt dat het proces van renteliberalisering is vertraagd door de
aanwezigheid van belangengroepen en van een ideologische voorkeur bij de
autoriteiten. Dynamische veranderingen in de kenmerken van de belangen-
groep en de aard van de gehanteerde ideologie, samen met het gedeeltelijk
openbreken van het Chinese financiële systeem, ondermijnen het bestaande
politieke evenwicht en maken de recente versnelling in het renteliberaliser-
ingsbeleid begrijpelijk.
Gezamenlijk genomen proberen de essays in dit proefschrift een dieper
inzicht te geven in de krachten achter de vormgeving en de dynamiek van
de financiële structuur. Tevens willen zij het theoretisch onderzoek ter zake
verruimen in de richting van de relatie met de macro-economische ontwikkel-
ing, in het bijzonder de economische groei, de conjunctuur en de consumptie.
Door een aantal praktische boodschappen te geven verschaft het proefschrift
bovendien enkele aangrijpingspunten voor het financiële structuurbeleid.
